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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Governments adopt different models to interact with markets, including the 
invisible-hand model, the helping-hand model and the grabbing-hand model (Frye & 
Shleifer, 1996), and researchers hold either a development view (Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Hawtrey, 1926a) or a political view (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) on the 
impact of governments on financial markets. Governments participate in market 
activities through various approaches, such as establishing political connections (e.g. 
Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006) and issuing laws, regulations and policies (e.g. 
Shleifer, 1997), as well as having direct ownership of firms (e.g.Shleifer & Vishny, 
1994). This thesis explores two under-researched ways in which the government 
influences the market – political endorsement and political visits.  
This thesis, as a whole, largely supplements literature on the role of the 
government by investigating political endorsement and political visits – two strategies 
the government uses to affect the market, which have received limited academic 
attention. The government penetrates the market through various methods, including 
directly owning enterprises (Andrianova, Demetriades, & Shortland, 2012; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994), issuing laws or policies (Krueger, 1974; Shleifer, 1997) and 
establishing corporate-level or individual-level political connections (Claessens, 
Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio et al., 2006). This thesis particularly contributes to the 
stream of literature that focuses on exploring the ways in which the government 
influences the market. Political endorsement, tested in Chapters 3, and political visits, 
examined in Chapter 4, are two under-researched ways in which the government 
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influences the market, which largely fill the existing gaps in the literature. Furthermore, 
following the introduction of the development view (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hawtrey, 
1926b) and the political view (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), there has been 
an increasing focus in the literature on examining the role of the government in the 
market, within which one of the most influential works is the paper of Frye and Shleifer 
(1996) proposing three government-market interaction models: the invisible-hand 
model, the helping-hand model and the grabbing-hand model. This thesis provides 
supporting evidence for the helping-hand model and development view. 
To better understand the government’s role in the capital market, “The Role of 
Government in the Market: A Review” (Chapter 2) provides a detailed review, 
including different interaction models between government and market, different 
researchers’ views regarding the impact of the government’s market participation, and 
various methods the government uses to influence the market. This chapter finds that 
governments and capital markets are closely linked and demonstrates that political 
visits and political endorsement, which this thesis focuses on, are two under-
researched areas.  
This thesis then explores an under-researched way in which the government 
influences the market – political endorsement – in “Political Endorsement: Evidence 
from Propaganda Coverage” (Chapter 3). Political endorsement is defined as public 
statements or actions showing government’s support for firms. This chapter finds that 
political endorsement is an efficient way for the government to help firms add value, 
both in the form of higher market reactions and better operating performance. And the 
results are robust after applying PSM to control selection on observables and applying 
treatment effects model with the instrumental variable technique to control for 
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selection on unobservables. Such value-added effects are more pronounced when firms 
are endorsed for their achievement and advanced operation, and are more salient for 
firms with relatively weak pre-event performance, less connections, and higher 
dependence on external financing, and also for those located in provinces with strong 
institutions, Moreover, three channels of value creations are identified in this paper: 
increased subsidies, reduced cost of debt, and higher investment efficiency. In addition, 
the results also show that the government’s underlying motive for endorsing firms is 
its social goals rather than vested interests. 
This chapter largely contributes to the literature on the role of government as the 
first study to investigate political endorsement – a way in which government affects 
the market. Moreover, Chapter 3 also extends the literature on endorsement from three 
perspectives. First, previous literature tests the effects of endorsement mainly in a 
marketing context, such as celebrity endorsements (Farrell, Karels, Montfort, & 
McClatchey, 2000; Khatri, 2006) and typical customer endorsements (Freiden, 1984), 
while this chapter introduces the concept of endorsement into finance and examines 
its influences on market and firm performance. Second, some literature points out that 
affiliation with prestigious underwriters (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; Pollock, Chen, 
Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Ramirez, 1995), venture capitals (Milanov & Shepherd, 
2013) and auditors (Beatty, 1989) provides similar effects to endorsement. Compared 
with endorsements from these financial organisations, which are based on bi-lateral 
cooperation, endorsement from the central government is unilaterally decided by the 
government, and thus is rarer and more valuable. Therefore, this chapter further 
contributes to this stream of literature by introducing a kind of more unilateral and 
more valuable endorsement that is largely ignored in previous literature. Third, this 
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study also supplements literature on endorsement by shifting attention to a new type 
of endorser—the government – while existing literature focuses on endorsers like 
customers (Freiden, 1984), celebrities (Farrell et al., 2000) and experts (Fireworker & 
Friedman, 1977).  
Another largely ignored way in which governments participate in the market is 
political visit, which is investigated in Chapter 4 “Political Visit: State Leader Visit 
and Firm Performance”, and is defined as a political device in which national political 
leaders carries out all the functions and symbolic representations of governing by 
periodically visiting firms. By testing a sample of firms that hosted political visits of 
Chinese state leaders from 2009 to 2016 and applying propensity score matching and 
instrumental variables to control bias, this chapter documents positive associations 
between political visits and firm value, both in the form of market performance and 
operating performance. However, the results show that the degree of the positive 
effects depends on the political power of visiting leaders and different administrations, 
as well as on various firm and institutional characteristics. Furthermore, the tests on 
firms’ post-visit behaviour demonstrate that political visits can be substituted as a 
source of legitimacy, which results in a reduced need to conduct CSR. In face of the 
increased social attention, firms tend to engage more in disclosure. However, in order 
to meet increased public expectations, unethical behaviours like earnings management 
increase after visits. Moreover, the results of this study show that representativeness, 
political connections and alignment with government goals are the three basic criteria 
for choosing firms to visit. 
The first main contribution of Chapter 4 is that it supplements the literature on 
the role of government, which is also a main contribution of the whole thesis and is 
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already discussed at the beginning of the introduction. Second, through differentiating 
the effects of political visits from leaders with different political powers, comparing 
the effects of two administrations and examining the post-visit effects on firm 
behaviour, this chapter particularly contributes to the paper of Li, Tsang, Luo, and Ying 
(2016) and Schuler, Shi, Hoskisson, and Chen (2017) which document positive effects 
of leaders’ site visits but ignore the differences caused by different leaders and 
administrations, and also ignore the firms’ post-visit behaviour. Third, Chapter 4 
largely supplements literature on political visits by investigating how the government 
chooses firms to visit because no literature to date has clarified the criteria for choosing 
firms. The results particularly complement the interview conducted by Schuler et al. 
(2017) which interviewed several experts and they speculated that long-term firm-
government interactions was a possible determinant of political visit. Fourth, Chapter 
4 also adds value to literature on CSR by pointing out that political visits can be 
substituted as a source of legitimacy and demotivate firms to donate. 
As a further step, based on the phenomenon of political endorsement and political 
visits examined in the Chapters 3 and 4, “Passive Signals and IPO market: Signalling 
Theory Extension” (Chapter 5) employs the concept of political endorsement and visits 
as two examples of passive signals to extend existing signalling theory, and this chapter 
also provides a theoretical background to explain why political endorsement and visits 
examined in previous chapters can strongly influence the market. Compared with the 
signals investigated in existing literature, which are intentionally sent out by firms 
themselves, passive signals are different in both purpose and form, making them 
particularly reliable cues to combat information asymmetry and enabling them to have 
higher signal fit, signal honesty, and signal observability. The IPO market provides a 
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perfect setting to test the impact of passive signals regarding its high information 
asymmetry. The results demonstrate that passive signals are valued by investors even 
under circumstances with high information asymmetry when investors carefully screen 
information. The results show that passive signals like political endorsement can 
efficaciously influence the views of shareholders, potential institutional and private 
investors, regulators and partners, thus affecting every part of the IPO process, 
including IPO application, IPO valuation during issuing and post-IPO performance. 
Specifically, this chapter finds that passive signals can successfully influence 
regulators (CSRC members), hence resulting in higher IPO pass rates. Financial 
intermediaries like investment bankers and institutional and individual investors also 
value passive signals, leading to narrower offer price spread, lower under-pricing, 
higher cumulative abnormal returns and higher industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
over one to five years after IPO. Furthermore, results demonstrate that firms achieving 
political endorsement are less likely to change face and are able to outperform their 
counterparts in both the short and long term. 
This chapter contributes to and extends the boundaries of signalling theory in 
three ways. First, this chapter introduces a new kind of signal – passive signals – which 
are issued in situations where firms lose control of the decision to issue signals and 
cannot control the signal content; this challenges the traditional signals investigated in 
existing literature that are intentionally sent out by firms to convey positive 
information, such as patent numbers (Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), board 
prestige (Certo, 2003) and firm names. As suggested by Janney and Folta (2003) and 
Connelly, Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel (2010), the intention of signalling is vital in 
influencing people’s judgement and non-intentional signals are relatively ignored by 
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the literature, and Chapter 5 fills this gap by investigating passive signalling. Second, 
different from the commercial-led signals discussed in existing literature, whose 
purpose is to help firms enjoy commercial benefits such as overcoming consumer 
uncertainty (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000) and attracting investment (Park & Mezias, 
2005), passive signals are sent out by authorities like the government, and their main 
purpose is encouraging industries and stimulating the economy, rather than focusing 
on individual firms. Therefore, Chapter 5 also supplements signalling theory literature 
by investigating such authority-led signals which are different from the commercial-
led signals in both purposes and forms. Third, this thesis introduces the passiveness as 
a new criterion to enhance the efficacy of signals, which complements recent literature 
on determinants of signal efficacy, including signal observability, high signal costs, 
signal honesty and signal fit (e.g. BliegeBird et al., 2005; Connelly et al., 2010). 
Moreover, Chapter 5 also adds value to literature on entrepreneurship and IPO. 
Strategic alliance (Gulati, 1998) and association with prestigious parties like VCs 
(Milanov & Shepherd, 2013), underwriters (Pollock et al., 2010) or universities 
(Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2011) are common strategies used by new ventures to 
overcome the liabilities of newness and smallness. Quantifying the effects of passive 
signals on new firms, this chapter suggests a new approach through which the 
government can help new firms overcome barriers, thus encouraging market 
competition and promoting innovation. Furthermore, this chapter examines the 
government’s role in IPO from the new perspective of its market power exercised 
through sending out signals rather than its regulatory power during IPO screening, as 
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Chapter 2 The Role of Government: A Review 
2.1 The Role of Government in The Market 
Researchers like Frye and Shleifer (1996) propose three models through which 
the government interacts with markets and influences economic growth: the invisible-
hand model, the helping-hand model and the grabbing-hand model. Under the 
invisible-hand model, governments with low corruption levels delegate resource 
allocation power to the private sector and confine themselves to providing basic public 
services like laws, regulations and contract enforcement. Invisible-hand governments 
are more common in Eastern Europe and countries that make an effort to join the 
European Community (Sachs, 1994). 
Under the helping-hand model, governments maintain close ties with markets by 
taking the initiative to promote private economic activity (Frye & Shleifer, 1996). For 
example, pursuing industrial policies, establishing political connections with firms and 
treating firms unfairly are typical features of helping-hand governments. Different 
from invisible-hand governments, helping-hand bureaucrats have overwhelming 
power over the legal framework to adjudicate most disputes, leading to the limited 
effects of legal frameworks in these countries. However, despite the fact that 
corruption usually exists in helping-hand governments, the corruption is organised and 
the amount is limited. A representative and well-researched example of a helping-hand 
government is China (e.g. Walder, 1995). For example, Sun and Tong (2003) support 
the helping-hand role of the Chinese government during the process of share issuing 
privatization by examining the performance of over 600 SOEs in China.  
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By contrast, grabbing-hand bureaucrats are far less organised and far more 
corrupt, with many bureaucrats focusing only on pursuing their own political purposes 
(Frye & Shleifer, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Without a unified public-policy 
stance, grabbing-hand governments are not restricted by courts, and are empowered to 
expropriate firms by executing predatory regulations. Russia is one of the typical 
countries with grabbing-hand government researched in existing literature (e.g. Levin 
and Satarov, 2000; Shleifer, 1997). For example, Levin and Satarov (2000) point out 
that corruption is a social norm in Russia, resulting in government’s grab of the society 
and the failure of economic reform.  
As a further step, later literature starts to consider the government’s role in the 
market from a dynamic perspective, and highlights that governments in reality are 
always a mix of invisible-hand, helping-hand and grabbing-hand models. Through 
investigating the effects of related party transactions between firms and their 
government parents, Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) find that the related party 
transactions can benefit minority shareholders if the firm is controlled by the central 
government, or expropriate wealth from minority shareholders if the firm is controlled 
by local government due to the corruption of local bureaucrats, suggesting the helping-
hand role of central government and grabbing-hand role of local government. 
Researches by Zou, Wong, Shum, Xiong, and Yan (2008) and Chen, Firth, and Xu 
(2009) find higher market reactions to the announcement of purchasing the liability 
insurance of directors for centrally controlled firms over locally controlled firms, and 
the higher Tobin’s Q of firms controlled by the central government over those 
controlled by local government, and also indicate the helping role of the central 
government and the grabbing role of local government. Furthermore, the same 
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bureaucrat can switch between different models. For example, Chen, Hillman, and Gu 
(2001) point out that the revenue-sharing rules imposed by the central government on 
local government, and the interactions between local and central governments, 
sometimes can motivate local government to switch from helping hand to grabbing 
hand model.  
Furthermore, some literature explores the determining factors of operating 
models (i.e. invisible, helping, grabbing). For example, Brown et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that larger bureaucracy size can lead to a helping-hand model. Larger 
bureaucracy size indicates increased capacity and competition among bureaucrats, 
leading to a better post-privatization business environment in the form of lower license 
application costs and reduced waiting time for the administration. As a result, 
governments with larger size are usually helping-hand for the privatization and market 
development. The work of Dalgic and Van Long (2006) complements this study by 
pointing out that low local tax share, shorter politician tenure length and lower local 
governance transparency (i.e. the ease with which extortionary activities can be hidden 
from central government) can motivate local governments to adopt a grabbing-hand 
model.  
The model of the government plays a key role in determining the success of 
economic reform and privatization. According to Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach (2009), 
privatized firms after reform have incentives to maximise profits by actively 
restructuring the workforce, investing in new technologies or increasing R&D for new 
products. Government cooperation and support are prerequisites for the success of 
these endeavours. While a helping-hand government is capable of providing essential 
legal infrastructure to reduce restructuring costs, a grabbing-hand bureaucracy could 
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raise costs due to its weak institution, high corruption or weak rule of law. By 
comparing government models between Poland and Russia, Frye and Shleifer (1996) 
claim that the grabbing-hand government is accountable for the failure of economic 
transition in Russia. The later work of Shleifer (1997) upholds this view by attributing 
the failure of Russian economic reform to the poor performance of the government in 
terms of its inappropriate fiscal and electoral incentives for politicians and inefficient 
tenure system of politicians.  
2.2 The Impact of Governments on Markets -- Development View, 
Social View, Political View And Agency View 
Researchers hold different views on the impact of government participation in 
financial markets, including development view, social view, political view and agency 
view. The development view (Arthur Lewis, 1945; Gerschenkron, 1962; Hawtrey, 
1926) highlights the government’s necessary role in fulfilling the functions of 
institutions, especially when institutions like banks fail to support private capital 
markets due to public distrust, capital scarcity and fraudulent practices among debtors. 
For example, banks in Russia experienced a failure to direct savings to support 
industries due to the scarcity of capital, and finally state-owned banks allow the 
government to step in to fulfil the functions to support both economic and financial 
development (Gerschenkron, 1962). As another example, Andrianova, Demetriades, 
and Shortland (2008) find that state-owned banks can mobilize savings more 
effectively than private banks if contract enforcement is weak in the private sector. 
Moreover, the positive effects of government market participation are more obvious 
during economic downturn. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, while 
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privately owned banks cut down their credit supply to a large extent, the reduction in 
state-owned banks was far less, in order to support the economy (Fungáčová, Herrala, 
& Weill, 2013). 
Advocators of nationalisation, like Arthur Lewis (1945) and Myrdal (1968), 
provide supporting evidence for the development view. For instance, by comparing the 
economic growth of 128 countries, Andrianova, Demetriades, and Shortland (2012) 
point out that government ownership of banks is a contributing factor for the economic 
growth rate. Although state ownership is usually criticised for inefficiency, researches 
on transition economies (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005), developed countries like 
Germany (Altunbas, Evans, & Molyneux, 2001) and countries with lower income 
(Detragiache, 2005) find that state-owned banks have profit and cost advantages and 
perform more efficiently. 
Another view that is similar to the development view is the social view (Atkinson 
& Stiglitz, 1980), which suggests that state ownership can be used to address market 
failures whenever its social benefits exceed the costs. Stiglitz (1993) upholds this view 
by underlining the government’s key role in overcoming market imperfections and 
failures to invest in socially desirable projects, thus enhancing social welfare and 
contributing to economic development. For example, Stiglitz (1993) points out that 
government participation in the financial, particularly banking, industry is socially 
essential in order to form a secure financial system, overcome market failure due to 
information asymmetry, and support unprofitable but socially desirable projects.  
In contrast, the political view (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) suggests 
that the underlying motive for government participation in the market is the personal 
political interests of politicians like votes, bribes and political contributions. For 
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example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) state that public enterprises can lead to excess 
employment, excess wages and the production of goods that only meet the needs of 
politicians. One of the most influential works supporting the political view is the paper 
of La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), which tests the impact of state-
owned banks in 92 countries and concludes that government ownership is more 
prevalent in less developed countries with backward financial systems, leading to both 
lower financial development and lower economic growth. Moreover, despite the fact 
that connected firms have a higher probability of default, state-owned banks still 
provide larger loans and favourable rates for them (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; 
Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Vins (2008) also upholds the political view and highlights a 
positive association between political elections and the loan amounts provided by 
state-owned banks, and a negative relationship between elections and the probability 
of closing branches, engaging in M&A and laying off staff.  
Corruption accounts for a major part in political view to demonstrate the negative 
role of government’s market participation. For example, researchers like Shleifer 
(1997) and Levin and Satarov (2000) point out that high corruption can distort resource 
allocation and leads to the failure of economic reforms. However, the paper by Shleifer 
(1998) points out that corrupt governments remain effective in positively influencing 
markets under certain circumstances, especially when institutions are weak and 
necessary regulation is jeopardized by corruption. Some literature then investigate 
corruption from a dynamic perspective and highlight a U-shaped relationship between 
government and market (Pagano, 2008; Petrou & Thanos, 2014). For example, Petrou 
and Thanos (2014) claim that capital investment first falls as corruption increases from 
low to moderate levels, and then increases as corruption increases from moderate to 
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high levels, suggesting that the government serves as a grabbing hand when corruption 
is low, and a helping hand when corruption is high. Under high corruption, officials 
tend to form “rules of the game” in order to maximise their rents, thus reducing the 
uncertainty of corruption and motivating firms to use bribes and buy legitimacy in 
order to successfully invest in these countries. 
A view similar to the political view is the agency view, which admits that 
government market participation can solve market imperfections, while highlighting 
that agency costs within the government can offset the benefits. This view stresses a 
trade-off between the enhanced allocative efficiency supported by development and 
social views and the internal efficiency of state-owned firms. For example, Shleifer 
(1998) claims that government regulation and contracting can be used to address 
market imperfections and concerns, but government ownership is inefficient due to its 
low incentive to innovate, improve quality and reduce costs. Furthermore, the pursuit 
of political goals and personal interests can result in high corruption and resources 
transferred to supporters.  
2.3 Main Influencing Mechanisms of Government 
2.3.1 Types of Government Actions 
According to the influential work of Stiglitz (1993), the actions governments take 
to influence the market can be classified into four categories, including issuing policies 
in terms of bankruptcy, accounting or taxes; directly participating in the capital market 
by providing loans; creating and regulating financial market institutions; and 
intervening in these institutions.  
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Moreover, government actions can be classified into six categories according to 
their objectives: stimulating economic growth, ensuring macroeconomic stability, 
motivating competition, enhancing resource allocation, ensuring bank solvency and 
providing consumer protection (Stiglitz, 1993). 
With the development of the literature and the economy, researches point out 
more ways in which governments participate in markets, of which political connection, 
laws and policies, and state ownership are the three most influential. The following 
subsections review these three well-researched approaches in detail, and the political 
endorsement and political visit this thesis examines are two under-researched ways in 
which government influences the market.  
2.3.2 Political Connection 
Political connection is commonly used as a way for the government to influence 
the market. Political connection is a ubiquitous trend both in developed and emerging 
markets. For example, political connections are detected in developed countries such 
as the U.S. (Kim, Pantzalis, & Park, 2012) and Poland (Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, 
& Kozłowski, 2017), and pervasive in emerging markets such as China (Allen, Qian, 
& Qian, 2005; Chen, Lee, & Li, 2008; Guariglia & Mateut, 2016; He, Wan, & Zhou, 
2014; Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008; Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010), Indonesia (Leuz & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) and Malaysia (Gul, 2006). 
Political connection can be observed from various perspectives. For instance, 
campaign contributions (Claessens et al., 2008), political experience or identity of 
managers and directors (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Hung, Wong, & Zhang, 
2012; Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 2012; You & Du, 2012), firm location (Hillman, 2005; Siegel, 
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2007) and state ownership (Chen et al., 2008; Dinç, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2010) are 
all observable and explicit ties that can be used to determine whether a firm is 
connected.  
Furthermore, political connections can be either at an individual level or a 
company level. Individual-level connections consist of two broad categories: political 
experience and political identity. Political experience is defined as top executives’ and 
board members’ former occupation in parliaments, branches of government, state-
owned banks and other regulated industries (Faccio et al., 2006; Hasan et al., 2017; 
You & Du, 2012). Similar measurements are employed by Li et al. (2012), Hung et al. 
(2012), Faccio et al. (2006) and Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2008). Executives and 
board members are considered to possess a political identity if they are party members 
(Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008), deputies to the National People’s Congress or 
National Committee (You & Du, 2012), mayors or deputy mayors (Calomiris, Fisman, 
& Wang, 2010), or government or military officers (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). 
Additionally, some political connection is relatively indirect. For instance, if top 
managers have relatives with the same last name or come from the same family as 
serving government officers, Faccio et al. (2006) and Amore and Bennedsen (2013) 
deem them to be politically connected. Similarly, Siegel (2007) identifies political 
connection if top managers graduated from the same high school or were born in the 
same region as government officers. Other indirect political connection includes 
governmental awards, such as the “Model Worker” award (You & Du, 2012). As to 
company level connections, literature identifies company-level political connections 
by exploring whether firms pay huge campaign contributions (Claessens et al., 2008), 
have their headquarters in the birthplace of government officers, or are state-owned 
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(Faccio et al., 2006). 
There has long been controversy over whether political connection is a blessing 
or a curse. Abundant empirical literature embraces the view that political connection 
is a contributing factor to performance improvement and value enhancement. Under 
the supporting hand of the government, connected firms demonstrate higher value and 
generate higher long-term returns for investors (Luo & Liu, 2009). Investors’ positive 
views on the promising future performance of connected firms pushes up the market 
value. For instance, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2008) point out that the 
market-to-book ratio increases by 242.16% after previously non-connected firms 
establish ties with the government, and politically connected firms also outperform 
counterparts with 160% higher market-to-book ratios. The significant positive 
correlation between political connection and superior firm performance is also proved 
by researchers like Hillman (2005), Calomiris et al. (2010). 
These positive effects of political connection, however, are seen as biased by 
other research that stresses the restrictions and high costs of connection. The mutual 
influences between firms and government sometimes constrain firm operations and 
cause high costs. First, inefficiency can be caused by the unreasonable diversion of 
firm resources and the surrender of autonomy (Shleifer & Vishny, 2002). For example, 
under informal political regulations, connected firms are forced to invest in 
government infrastructure projects using their capital raised from IPO, and are 
compelled to pay dividends to release the financial problems of government (Lawrence 
& Crispin, 1999). Second, political officers usually pursue personal objectives at the 
expense of connected firms’ value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, 2002). For instance, in 
order to win a campaign, political officers usually force connected firms to misallocate 
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capital on campaign contributions, generating economic costs of higher than 0.2% of 
GDP (Claessens et al., 2008). As a result, politically connected firms are characterised 
by higher campaign contributions and lower returns. Third, connected firms are 
hampered from adapting to the new competitive environment due to the heavy 
“liability to localness” (Perez-Batres & Eden, 2008; Uzzi, 1997). For example, after 
foreign banks were allowed by the government to enter the Mexican market, domestic 
connected firms suffered from their liability to the government and lost their 
competitiveness to foreign counterparts (Perez-Batres & Eden, 2008). Fourth, the 
political relationship is quite unstable, as it heavily depends on political fortunes, and 
is featured as short-term. Consequently, the short-term relationship encourages 
opportunistic behaviours such as earnings management (Chen et al., 2008). 
Considering the inconsistent effects of political connections, some literatures shift 
attention to the dynamic changes of the effects of political connections and try to find 
the critical point at which the costs of political connection exceed the benefits. For 
example, Cheung et al. (2009) assert that what determines the effects of political 
connection is government level (central or local) rather than the proportion of shares 
held by the government. While investors of locally connected firms suffer losses, 
central government connection can benefit investors by providing more resources to 
improve firm performance. Based on Okhmatovskiy (2010), direct connections with 
the government can induce severe interference, while indirect connections through 
connecting with state-owned companies are beneficial. Furthermore, the effects of 
political connection are contingent on market competition (Li, Poppo, et al., 2008), the 
soundness of formal institutions (Li, Meng, et al., 2008) and macroeconomic situation 
(Hasan et al., 2017). 
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Compared with developed markets, political connection is especially pervasive 
and vital in emerging markets, since developing markets are characterised by the 
coexistence of market mechanisms and governments’ redistributive mechanisms 
(Zhou, 2000), which motivates firms to establish government ties to get access to 
resources. Firms in emerging markets are left vulnerable to market changes due to a 
lack of effective legal systems and property rights (Allen et al., 2005; Hoskisson, Eden, 
Lau, & Wright, 2000). Consequently, political connections can serve as an informal 
support in emerging markets. 
Besides sharing the common characteristics of emerging markets, the Chinese 
market has several unique features which attract huge attention from researchers. The 
first unique point lies in the non-thorough reform, indicating that the government 
maintains control over economic transition (Luo, 2005), which is the opposite of the 
situation in other transformed economies, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, 
which have decentralised thoroughly (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 
2004). As a result, key resources are under the control of the Chinese government, 
leading to the overwhelmingly advantageous role of political connection as an 
informal channel to obtain resources. Second, the rapid changes in the economy and 
legal institutions challenge the stability of the market within a transition economy, 
resulting in the necessity of ties to act as a buffer against the unreliability of 
institutional infrastructure (Xin & Pearce, 1996). The third unique characteristic of 
China rests with the long tradition of ties. Social ties are deemed the ‘lifeblood’ of 
business in China (Ambler, Styles, & Xiucun, 1999; Xin & Pearce, 1996), without 
which marketing or daily operations are hard to succeed. Fourth, some special policies 
encourage the prevalence of political connections in China. For example, as Fan et al. 
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(2007) stated, the Chinese government has the right to nominate and appoint 
executives for listed companies. In their sample of 790 firms from 1993 to 2001, 27% 
of CEOs are appointed directly by the government. 
2.3.3 Law, Regulations and Policies 
Law, regulations and policies are the second channel through which the 
government influences the financial market and economic growth. Since the 
pioneering paper of La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) which 
highlights the associations among legal origin, investor protection and development of 
financial markets, the literature increasingly focuses on the relationships among law, 
finance and economic growth. By comparing the legal rules of 49 countries, La Porta 
et al. (1997) point out that common law countries are superior in investor protection, 
followed by Scandinavian and German civil laws, while French civil law countries are 
ranked as worst in investor protection. This paper further underlines the contributing 
effects of legal protection for the value and breadth of both debt and equity markets.  
Later research upholds and complements La Porta et al. (1997) by pointing out 
that both legal systems and enforcement are contributing factors for the development 
of financial intermediaries like banks, and more developed financial intermediaries in 
turn lead to economic growth (Levine, 1998, 1999). The positive relationship between 
financial sector development and economic growth is verified by many researchers, 
including Levine and Zervos (1999) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000). For 
example, by examining data from 80 countries, King and Levine (1993) reveal a 
significant positive relationship between different measures of financial development 
and the growth rate of real per capita GDP.  
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Besides laws, issuing policies and regulations is another effective way for the 
government to affect financial markets and economic growth. For example, through 
testing 46 developing countries, Aizenman and Marion (1993) conclude that economic 
growth is negatively correlated with the uncertainty of fiscal and monetary policies. 
Moreover, according to Stiglitz (1993), regulations on fraud, accounting standards, 
insider trading and other issues are prerequisites for a viable equity market. For 
instance, to ensure the thickness of the equity market, the Korean government issued 
a regulation to restrict firms’ debt-to-equity ratio, which effectively increased the 
magnitude of equity issues (Stiglitz, 1993). Furthermore, the effects of restrictive trade 
policies like import restrictions (Krueger, 1974) and tariffs (Johnson, 1960) on the 
economy and financial market are widely examined in existing literature. 
Moreover, the government’s function of issuing laws, regulations and policies 
plays a key role in determining the success of economic reform. For example, 
researchers like Shleifer (1997) claim that during times of economic transition, 
governments have to take on new functions of creating legal and regulatory institutions 
to enhance property rights and contract enforcement, as well as dealing with banking, 
securities markets and patents. At the same time, regulations to constrain the power of 
regulators to pursue personal political goals also largely contribute to the success of 
economic transition.  
2.3.4 State Ownership  
Directly owning firms is one of the major ways in which governments participate 
in market activities. Consistent with the development view, state ownership can fulfil 
the functions of institutions and overcome market imperfections, especially during 
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economic downturn (Arthur Lewis, 1945; Fungáčová et al., 2013; Gerschenkron, 
1962). One stream of literature highlights the profit and cost advantages of state-owned 
firms over private ones (Altunbas et al., 2001; Detragiache, 2005), and the positive 
relationship between state ownership and economic growth (Andrianova et al., 2012). 
Moreover, with government ownership, social benefits can be strengthened as 
economically unviable but socially profitable projects can be invested in (Atkinson & 
Stiglitz, 1980). 
However, another stream of literature claims that overcoming market 
imperfections cannot justify the existence of state ownership, as market imperfections 
like monopoly can be addressed by government contracting and regulations, without 
resorting to government ownership (Shleifer, 1998). Instead, the choice between 
government ownership and private ownership depends on how different models 
efficiently enhance cost reduction, quality improvement and innovation (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2002). Compared with private firms, state-owned companies are less efficient 
as they have less incentive to reduce cost, improve quality or innovate because the 
managers are not owners and cannot share the return (Shleifer, 1998). Researchers like 
Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) and Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, 
and Lutter (1994) support this view by pointing out that privatized firms outperform 
government-owned firms in quality, efficiency and productivity growth. Moreover, 
other literature asserts that state-owned firms are characterised by poorer monitoring 
systems, lower investor protection and insufficient investments. For example, Vickers 
and Yarrow (1991) state that state-owned companies that are only partially privatized 
face an adverse situation where no individual investor is really interested in the active 
monitoring. As a result of this poor monitoring and investor protection, managers have 
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no motivation to take reasonable risks in order to increase firm value (John, Litov, & 
Yeung, 2008). 
This view is criticised as biased because it is the strong incentive of private firms 
to reduce costs that motivates them to sacrifice non-contractible quality. For example, 
with a high incentive to reduce cost and increase profits, private hospitals tend to refuse 
to treat non-profitable patients. Similarly, it is the low motivation of government-
owned firms that make them more efficient in providing non-contractible quality 
(Shleifer, 1998). Therefore, some people advocate state ownership of water utilities to 
ensure water purification, as well as advocating state car makers in order to develop 
environmentally friendly cars. However, researchers like Shleifer (1998) still promote 
private ownership by stating that this problem can be solved through competition 
among private companies. In face of high market competition, the demands for firms’ 
goods and services will decrease if the firms reduce costs excessively and sacrifice 
non-contractible quality. As a result, market competition can motivate private firms to 
emphasize non-contractible quality in order to survive.  
State ownership is made less efficient not only by the weak incentive of state-
owned firms to reduce costs and innovate but also by the pursuit of political goals and 
politicians’ pursuit of personal economic interests. According to Shleifer (1998), 
governments all over the world have a long history of channelling benefits to 
supporters through state-owned firms or government projects. For example, in order 
to win votes, governments are inclined to provide favourable prices, jobs in state-
owned firms and more resources to their supporters, even though this is not 
economically efficient (Shleifer, 1997). Similarly, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) 
state that with an ultimate goal of winning an election, state-owned firms are unwilling 
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to undertake risky but profitable projects in case firm failure or distress negatively 
influence the government’s reputation. Moreover, SOEs are not so interested in profit 
maximisation. Instead, solving unemployment problems and regional development 
become more important objectives. In addition to the government’s pursuit of political 
goals, politicians’ personal interests are also detrimental to SOE efficiency, leading to 
bribes and high corruption that result in resource misallocation and failed reforms 
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This chapter studies an under-researched way in which governments influence the 
market – political endorsement. I examine firms that are endorsed by the central 
government of China through propaganda coverage, and document positive market 
reactions and operating performances after controlling for selection on observables 
through applying PSM methodology and controlling for selection on unobservables 
through using treatment effects model with instrumental variable technique. The value 
of endorsement is more pronounced among firms with weaker pre-event performance, 
less political connections, higher dependence on external financing, and those located 
in regions with stronger market institutions. This study also identified increases in 
subsidy, reduction in cost of debts and improvement in investment efficiency as three 









Endorsement is a common phenomenon worldwide. Endorsement demonstrates 
the formal support and approval from social actors such as celebrities, authorities, 
partners or governments. For example, endorsement by celebrities (Farrell, Karels, 
Montfort, & McClatchey, 2000; Khatri, 2006), typical customers (Freiden, 1984) and 
experts (Dean & Biswas, 2001; Fireworker & Friedman, 1977) are found to enhance 
reputation and improve sales. The share price of retailer J.Crew even increased from 
$9.61 to $19.23 after Michelle Obama wore a cardigan from this brand. Governments 
and politicians often endorse firms too. During the speech of Barack Hussein Obama 
on the state of education, he praised the contributions of Apple, Microsoft Verizon and 
Sprint to education by connecting 99% of students to high-speed internet. For another 
example, Evoc Group, a high-tech company, was praised by the Chinese government 
through its central news program about its creative improvements in computers. 
Political endorsement is a strategy governments use to participate in market besides 
other well-researched approaches like establishing political connections (e.g. Faccio, 
Masulis, & McConnell, 2006b) and having direct ownership of firms (e.g.Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994). However, political endorsement has not yet been studied.  
To fill this gap, this study aims to explore the impact of political endorsement on 
firm value. Political endorsement, in this paper, is defined as public statements or 
actions showing government support of firms. I hand collect data on political 
endorsement in China from the propaganda coverage from 1st January 2009 to 31st 
December 2011. Propaganda in China is solely controlled by the Publicity Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party, an organization at the deputy state rank, serving as 
the propaganda organ for the Party. A major outlet for propaganda is a program called 
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Xinwenlinabo, which reaches more than 95% of the population (Jin, 2009). As a result, 
positive opinions on specific firms disseminated by Xinwenlinabo represent the 
endorsement from the central government.  
This paper supposes that political endorsement is positively associated with 
market reactions and firm performance because it implies governments’ supports in 
three aspects: advancement, shielding and legitimacy. First, political endorsement 
indicates that the government regards firms as exemplars, recognises their important 
role in helping the government carry out policies, or plans to foster the industries these 
firms belong to, and hence implying that the government will advance these firms or 
the relevant industries in the future by providing them more resources. Rich literature 
on political connection demonstrates the government’s ability to increase firms’ access 
to resources through providing bank loans (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006a), 
government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2008) and tax reductions (Bertrand, 
Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2007; Faccio, 2006b; Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008), 
as well as imposing tariffs on counterparts (Goldman et al., 2008). As a result, the 
increased resources can improve firm performance, both in the stock market and in 
daily operations. Second, government shielding is another potential benefit implied by 
political endorsement, especially for firms that fulfil public functions like providing 
employment. According to Schuler, Shi, Hoskisson, and Chen (2017), governments 
usually shield and protect firms that perform well in delivering public functions 
regardless of their financial performance; therefore, it can be expected that the 
government will shield endorsed firms, in particular those that fulfil public functions. 
Third, political endorsement can certify firms’ cultural and moral legitimacy, because 
achieving government endorsement indicates these firms have political correctness or 
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perform well in philanthropic activities. Moreover, political endorsement also certifies 
firms’ resource legitimacy as the government is more inclined to endorse firms that 
can utilise resources effectively; otherwise, the government’s resource misallocations 
will ruin its own reputation. Therefore, this paper hypothesises that political 
endorsement is positively correlated with market reactions and firm performance. 
The results of positive market reactions in various event windows confirm the 
hypothesis. The government usually specifically endorse some particular aspects of 
firms, so I expect that the impact of political endorsement is contingent on the contents 
of endorsements. I decompose endorsements into nigh specific types according to the 
keywords of contents: CSR, new product, R&D, profit-related, achievement, operation, 
co-operation, ideology and other. The definitions of each type are shown in Appendix. 
According to the results, endorsements of firms’ achievement and advanced operation 
can witness significant market reactions, while reactions to endorsements of R&D are 
significantly negative. One explanation for the negative market reaction is that 
investors suspect that firms will invest more in the endorsed aspects in order to curry 
favour with the government or meet government’s expectations after the political 
endorsement. Achieving political endorsement of risky aspects like R&D can give 
firms false motivation to excessively invest in these aspects, which could expose it to 
higher risks without increasing its value.  
Besides cumulative abnormal return, political endorsement is also positively 
associated with firms’ future operating performance after controlling for selection on 
observables through applying PSM methodology and controlling for selection on 
unobservables through using treatment effects model with the instrumental variable 
technique, no matter which performance measurements are used. Furthermore, this 
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chapter investigates firm and institution heterogeneity. By testing contingency factors 
about different firm characteristics and levels of institutional development, this study 
evaluates the precision of different theoretical predictions about whether firms’ past 
performance, the existence of political connections, firms’ dependence on external 
financing and the level of institutional development will modify the effects of political 
endorsement. The first contingency factor is firms’ past performance. Political 
endorsement can add more value to firms that previously performed relatively weak 
through helping these firms regain reputation and key resources. The second firm trait 
that can influence the impact of political endorsement is the existence of political 
connections. The results demonstrate that firm performance are improved more for 
less-connected firms because endorsement from central government can help these 
firms to overcome the difficulties in lack of legitimacy and resources. The third firm 
trait is firms’ dependence on external financing, and the results show that political 
endorsements are especially valuable for firms that heavily rely on external financing 
since these firms can get easier access to external funds after achieving a kind of 
guarantee from the central government through political endorsement. In terms of the 
institutional heterogeneity, results indicate that firms located in strong institution 
provinces can enhance performance more as the good institution can ensure that 
resources granted by central government can reach the target firms eventually, without 
being grabbed by local governments. Furthermore, this paper identify three channels 
of value creation after political endorsement: the increase in subsidy, decrease in 
financing costs, and the improvement in investment efficiency. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, this paper is the 
first to test an under-researched approach through which the government influences 
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the market – political endorsement. The government penetrates the market through 
various methods. Directly owning an enterprise (Andrianova, Demetriades, & 
Shortland, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994); issuing laws, regulations and policies 
(Krueger, 1974; Shleifer, 1997); or establishing corporate-level or individual-level 
political connections (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio et al., 2006b) are 
common strategies used by the government to participate in the market. As for state 
ownership and political connection, many researchers (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2007; 
Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008) point out that state ownership and 
political connections increase firms’ access to resources and are beneficial to firm 
performance, while other researchers (e.g. Perez-Batres & Eden, 2008; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994, 2002; Uzzi, 1997) highlight the inefficiency caused by the unreasonable 
diversion of firm resources, the surrender of autonomy, officers’ pursuit of personal 
objectives at the expense of connected firms’ value, and the high costs caused by the 
unstable political relationship. In terms of the impact of policies, literature on political 
economy demonstrates abundant evidence of how governments use policies to 
influence the market and the economy. For example, Aizenman and Marion (1993) 
focus on 46 developing countries and show that the uncertainty of policies can 
influence economic growth, but the direction of the sign depends on the specific region. 
Similarly, based on a sample of 92 countries, the study of Ramey and Ramey (1994) 
demonstrates that government spending-induced volatility is negatively correlated 
with economic growth. Such policy effects caused by a government are also supported 
by researchers like Bhagwati (1969) and Johnson (1960). This paper largely 
contributes to the literature on the ways in which governments can influence markets, 
because the political endorsement tested in this paper is an under-researched approach, 
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and no study to date has paid attention to this government strategy for affecting the 
market. 
Second, this study complements the literature related to political impact on the 
market. Researchers hold either development view (Arthur Lewis, 1945; 
Gerschenkron, 1962; Hawtrey, 1926), social view (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980), agency 
view (Shleifer, 1998), or political view (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) 
regarding the impact of governments on the market. While the development view 
highlights the essential role of government to fulfil the functions of institutions and 
overcome market imperfections (Andrianova, Demetriades, & Shortland, 2008; 
Gerschenkron, 1962), the political view claims that pursing political goals or 
politicians’ personal interests are the underlying motives for governments to 
participate in the market, leading to high corruption, excess employment in state-
owned firms, and lower financial and economic development (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Levin & Satarov, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
Somewhere in the middle is the social view (similar to the development view), which 
upholds the government’s positive role in the market as long as its social benefits 
exceed the costs (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980; Stiglitz, 1993), and the agency view 
(similar to the political view), which stresses the high agency costs within government 
which can offset all benefits, while at the same time admitting that the government can 
solve market imperfections (Shleifer, 1998). Another stream of literature, such as the 
work of Frye and Shleifer (1996), examines the role of government from another 
perspective by proposing helping-hand, invisible-hand and grabbing-hand interaction 
models between governments and markets. The results of this paper document a 
positive impact of political endorsement on both market reactions and firm 
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performance, which provides supporting evidence for the development view and 
helping-hand effects of government. 
Third, this paper also contributes to literature on endorsement from three 
perspectives. First, existing literature about endorsement is mainly restricted to the 
field of marketing, such as celebrity endorsements (Farrell et al., 2000; Khatri, 2006), 
typical customer endorsements (Freiden, 1984) and expert endorsements (Fireworker 
& Friedman, 1977). The examination of political endorsement in this paper extends 
the literature by introducing the concept of endorsement into finance and examining 
its impact on market reactions and firm performance. Second, in finance, some 
literature points out that affiliation with prestigious underwriters (Carter, Dark, & 
Singh, 1998; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Ramirez, 1995), venture 
capital firms (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013), auditors (Beatty, 1989) and authoritative 
third parties (Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2011; Corbett, Montes-Sancho, & Kirsch, 
2005; Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010) can bring about effects similar to 
endorsement. For example, affiliating with venture capital firms can increase the net 
proceeds of IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Pollock et al., 
2010). In these cases, firms have some degree of freedom to choose which underwriter 
or venture capital to cooperate with. However, the relationship between the 
government and firms in political endorsement is more unilateral, which means 
political endorsement is determined unilaterally by the government. Compared with 
certification from financial organizations, central government endorsements are rarer 
and more valuable. Therefore, this study further contributes to this stream of literature 
by introducing a unilateral endorsement which has not been previously investigated. 
Third, extant literature covers endorsers such as celebrities, experts and cooperating 
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firms (Clark & Horstmann, 2003; Dean & Biswas, 2001; Pollock et al., 2010), while 
neglecting one of the strongest and most credible endorsers – the government, and this 
paper can fill this gap. 
Furthermore, this study also provides practical implications for government, firms, 
and investors. Firstly, this paper provides policy implications by providing empirical 
evidence that resources can be redirected after endorsement. Through selecting firms 
more strategically during endorsement, officials can improve social welfare and 
promote economic development. For instance, choosing more environmental-friendly 
firms can help those firms get more social attention and thus win positive market 
reactions, and also help the firms to access more favourable resources. Secondly, this 
study has managerial implications. Although the results of this paper show that bribery 
and connection cannot increase the probability of endorsement, firms can maximize 
the impact by publicizing the endorsement once they achieved it, which is especially 
important for firms with relatively weak performance, less-connected, or heavily 
dependent on external financing. As to firms that want to pursue political endorsement 
in order to enhance firm performance, they can consider strengthening the aspects that 
the government cares more like helping government to solve employment problems. 
Thirdly, the empirical results of this paper offer practical implications for both 
domestic and international investors who are interested in investing in markets like 
China where the government has a helping-hand. It is sensible for investors to follow 
the indications from political endorsement, since they serve as important indicators of 
potential government support. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two reviews literature 
and develops hypotheses, and Section Three provides basic institutional background. 
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Samples and data are described in Section Four. In Section Five, I explored the 
determinants of political endorsement. Results about the impact of political 
endorsement on market reactions and firm performance are detailed in Sections Six 
and Seven respectively. Then the channels of value creation are investigated in Section 
Eight. Finally, a conclusion is articulated in Section Nine. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Endorsement demonstrates formal support and approval from social actors such 
as celebrities, authorities, partners or governments. Endorsement is widely examined 
in marketing (Daneshvary & Schwer, 2000; Farrell et al., 2000; Fireworker & 
Friedman, 1977; Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Khatri, 2006). Three types of 
endorsement through advertising are pervasive and well examined in research: 
celebrity endorsement (Dean & Biswas, 2001; Farrell et al., 2000; Khatri, 2006), 
typical customer endorsement (Friedman & Friedman, 1979) and expert endorsement 
(Dean & Biswas, 2001; Fireworker & Friedman, 1977). For example, Nike’s quarterly 
sales rose by 55% due to the market’s immediate response to Tiger Woods’s 
endorsement for Nike. And the sales of footwear and golf apparel which were endorsed 
by Woods doubled (Farrell et al., 2000). Marketing endorsement has various other 
forms in addition to advertisements mentioned above. For instance, royal warrant, a 
common tradition in countries with a monarch, such as the U.K., Belgium, France, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Spain and Sweden, is a kind of quality certificate given by a royal 
household. In the U.K., firms cannot obtain a royal warrant until they supply goods 
and services to the Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh or the Prince of Wales for over five 
years and the royal household are satisfied with the quality. Once firms achieve a royal 
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warrant, they would display the royal coat of arms on products, and this practice has 
been around since the 18th century, leading to improved recognition and sales. For 
example, the sales of Schweppes, a carbonated drinks maker, soared by 47% after the 
company displayed the royal warrant on its products. 
Endorsement also implicitly exists in finance. Affiliation with prestigious 
underwriters (Carter et al., 1998; Pollock et al., 2010; Ramirez, 1995), venture capitals 
(Milanov & Shepherd, 2013), auditors (Beatty, 1989) and authoritative third parties 
(Bonardo et al., 2011; Corbett et al., 2005; Doh et al., 2010) can provide effects 
equivalent to endorsements, which eventually influence firm evaluation. For example, 
endorsement by venture capitals can make affiliated firms more credible, lower 
information asymmetry and increase the net proceeds of IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Pollock et al., 2010). 
This chapter introduces a new kind of endorsement – political endorsement, which 
is also an under-researched way in which governments influences markets. Stiglitz 
(1993) points out that there are four ways in which a government can participate in the 
market and influence the economy: issuing policies, creating financial market 
institutions, regulating and intervening in these institutions, and directly participating 
in the capital market by providing loans. With the development of literature, more 
influencing mechanisms are discussed by researchers, within which issuing laws, 
regulations and policies (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; 
Levine, 1998, 1999; Shleifer, 1997), political connection (e.g. Claessens et al., 2008; 
Faccio et al., 2006a) and state ownership are the three most influential approaches 
through which governments affect markets (e.g. Altunbas, Evans, & Molyneux, 2001; 
Shleifer, 1998). This chapter shifts attention to political endorsement, which is 
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currently under-researched.  
This study hypothesises that political endorsement is positively associated with 
market reactions and firm performance. Political endorsement indicates the 
government’s support in three aspects: advancement, shielding and legitimacy. In 
terms of advancement, political endorsement indicates that governments are inclined 
to advance endorsed firms or the industries they belong to by providing more resources, 
because being endorsed means the firms are treated as exemplars by the government, 
or that they play a vital role in helping the government carry out certain policies, and 
sometimes also indicates the firm’s industry is favoured by the government. The 
support in resources is especially valuable when bureaucracies have high discretionary 
power. As suggested by Frye and Shleifer (1996), helping-hand governments tend to 
help some firms while killing some others, and are characterised as having close ties 
with firms and treating firms unfairly. As a typical example of a helping-hand 
government, the Chinese government has high discretionary power (Chen, Ding, & 
Kim, 2010; Yan & Li, 2018). Moreover, the coexistence of market mechanisms and 
government redistributive mechanisms (Zhou, 2000) and the non-thorough reform in 
China also indicate that the government maintains control over the economic transition 
(Luo, 2005), which stands in contrast to transformed economies, such those of Poland, 
Russia and the Czech Republic, which have decentralised thoroughly (Hitt, Ahlstrom, 
Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004). As a result, key resources remain under 
government control in China, and government support becomes especially important. 
For example, the rich literature on political connection shows that government support 
can increase the accessibility of resources such as favourable regulation (Goldman et 
al., 2008), operation licenses (Li et al., 2008), equity capital (Hearn, 2012; Johnson & 
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Mitton, 2003), profitable government contracts (Goldman et al., 2008) and bailouts 
(Faccio et al., 2006a).  
The second type of government support for endorsed firms is shielding, especially 
for firms that shoulder social responsibilities like providing employment. Researchers 
like Schuler et al. (2017) point out that governments are inclined to protect firms that 
deliver public functions regardless of their performance. Such socially important firms 
usually become targets of political endorsement. For example, on 6th June 2009, the 
government commended China Railway Group because it expanded recruitment for 
graduates, and also endorsed Hubei Yihua Chemical Industry Co., Ltd on 1st February 
2009 because it provided employment opportunities for returning migrant workers. 
Considering the essential role of these firms in fulfilling public functions, the 
government is inclined to shield and protect these endorsed firms. 
The third type of government support for endorsed firms lies in certifying the 
legitimacy of these firms. According to He and Tian (2008) and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003), legitimacy can be classified into three categories: cultural legitimacy, resource 
legitimacy and moral legitimacy. First, political endorsement can certify firms’ cultural 
legitimacy, because only firms that behave in politically and culturally appropriate 
ways can achieve government endorsement. For example, since the 16th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, scientific development became a priority 
of CPC. Many firms were endorsed by the government in 2009 and 2010, such as the 
Aluminium Corporation of China, China Unicom, China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation and China Construction Bank, because they organised in-depth studies 
and practice of scientific development, meaning that firms who integrate CPC 
activities into their daily operations and perform politically correctly can achieve 
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government endorsement. Second, political endorsement certifies firms’ resource 
legitimacy because the government tends to endorse firms with efficient and effective 
resource utilisation in order to protect its own reputation. For example, the government 
usually endorses efficient firms with large production potential and a promising future. 
On 1st August 2009, Changan Auto Co. Ltd was endorsed by the government for 
expanding its production capacity and increasing market needs. Third, political 
endorsement can also certify firms’ moral legitimacy because another kind of firms 
that usually becomes the target of political endorsement are the firms who perform 
well in philanthropic activities. For example, on 10th May 2009, SOEs like China 
Eastern Airlines and Dongfang Electric Corporation were commended by the 
government for their great contributions to the recovery and reconstruction of 
earthquake-stricken areas. Besides SOEs, privately owned firms can also achieve 
political endorsement to gain moral legitimacy by engaging in philanthropic activities. 
For instance, on 19th August 2010, the central government certify the moral legitimacy 
of Oceanwide Holdings, Fosun Pharma and Shimao Group by praising their donations 
to the mudslide disaster areas. 
Besides the government support in advancement, shielding and legitimacy, 
literature on endorsement also supports positive effects of political endorsement on 
market reactions and firm performance. The benefits of endorsement are widely 
documented in the marketing literature in terms of brand awareness (Daneshvary & 
Schwer, 2000), brain recall about products (Menon, Boone, & Rogers, 2001; Misra & 
Beatty, 1990; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983) and sales. In finance, there is some 
related evidence. For example, affiliating with prestigious underwriters not only 
increases the accessibility of external financing (Ramirez, 1995), but also provides 
49 
 
intangible resources such as knowledge or technologies (Quintas, Wield, & Massey, 
1992). Third-party endorsements such as granting awards and rankings can facilitate 
the trust transfer process (Jiang, Jones, & Javie, 2008) and provide commercial-related 
advantages (Daneshvary & Schwer, 2000) and attractive-related benefits (Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). 
Hypothesis 1: Political endorsement is positively correlated with market 
reactions and firm performance. 
This paper then proposes that the impact of political endorsement are contingent 
on the contents of endorsement. The purpose of government endorsement of firms is 
to improve the market or foster an industry by setting up models to motivate other 
firms to follow. In other words, endorsed firms have implied responsibilities to further 
enhance their model role on the endorsed aspects to meet the government’s 
expectations. Therefore, firms may invest more time, effort and money into the 
endorsed aspects. In some cases, endorsements may give firms false incentives to 
excessively divert their resources to aspects with high risks (e.g. R&D), leading to 
higher risks and lower profits. I expect that the market would not react or would react 
negatively to endorsements of high-risk aspects. On the contrary, this paper assumes 
that the market will react positively to endorsements of low-risk value-relevant aspects 
such as advanced operation and achievements. 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of political endorsement are contingent on the 
contents of endorsements.  
Furthermore, this paper hypothesizes that there are firm and institutional 
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heterogeneities regarding the effects of political endorsement. In terms of firm 
heterogeneity, firms’ past performance, the existence of political connections, and 
firms’ dependence on external financing are three traits that can influence the impact 
of political endorsement. First, political endorsement is expected to have higher value 
for firms with weak financial performance prior to endorsement. Researchers like 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) point out that firms’ weak performance can harm their 
reputation, therefore government endorsement are more valuable to help such weakly 
performed firms to regain legitimacy and reputation, and obtain key resources to 
improve performance.  
Second, both political connection and political endorsement indicate government 
support. One hypothesis is that government support has diminishing marginal effects, 
so the value of political endorsement for more-connected firms is not as high as for 
less-connected firms. Moreover, compared with firms with political connections, firms 
with no connection usually have less legitimacy and less support in subsidies and 
grants (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001), and political endorsement can help less connected 
firms to overcome these advantages, thus is more valuable for this kind of firms. The 
competing hypothesis is that connected firms can utilize their existing political 
connections to achieve material support once endorsed by the central government, 
which means connected firms can transform the endorsement into material resources 
more efficiently.  
Third, firms’ dependence on external financing is also a factor that can influence 
the impact of political endorsement. The higher dependence on external financing, the 
more important firms’ legitimacy and reputation are. And the government support 
implied by political endorsement can help firms to mitigate their financial constraints. 
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Therefore, this study hypothesizes that political endorsement is more valuable for 
firms that depend heavily on external financing.  
Besides firm heterogeneities, regional institutional development is also a 
contingency factor. Although researchers like Faccio (2006a) and Fisman (2001) state 
that the government’s role is stronger in places with weak institutions, this does not 
necessarily mean that political endorsement is more beneficial for firms located in 
provinces with weak institutions. Political endorsement represents support from the 
central government, but it is the attitudes and quality of local governments that 
determine whether the financial and other support from the central government can 
eventually reach the target firms. For example, Chen, Lee, and Li (2008) state that 
although fiscal policy about subsidies is determined by the central government, it is up 
to local governments to use their discretion in determining the timing and amount of 
subsidies eventually granted to local firms. Moreover, the helping-hand role of the 
central government does not necessarily mean that local governments must play a 
helping role in the regional market. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) show that local 
governments have a grabbing hand while the central government has a helping hand. 
And the different roles of central and local governments are also proved by researchers 
like Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) and Zou, Wong, Shum, Xiong, and Yan (2008). 
Therefore, this study hypothesises that political endorsement of firms located in 
provinces with better institutions are more value-added, since support from the central 
government can be transferred to endorsed firms without being intercepted by local 
governments. 




3.3 Institutional Background  
The Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (PD) was initially 
founded in May 1924, mainly responsible for guiding public opinion, guiding central 
news media, making propaganda, enforcing media censorship and control, and taking 
charge of information dissemination systems. PD is directly controlled by the 
Communist Party, the sole ruling party in China. The head of PD is normally a member 
of the Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China, with the political rank of a 
sub-national leader, the second-highest civil service rank in China. Meanwhile, one of 
the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, holding the highest national leader 
ranking, oversees work on publicity and ideology. This arrangement demonstrates the 
importance of propaganda work in China.  
One major goal of PD is to facilitate the execution of policies. For example, in 
order to help the government support domestic brands, PD issued a plan about 
‘strengthening internal and external propaganda work of Chinese brands’ on 24th April 
2015, which required major media outlets to highlight the high technology of domestic 
firms, and emphasize domestic brands’ good performance in quality, innovation, firm 
culture, social responsibility, etc. On the same day, PD also issued a list of good 
domestic firms, including firms like Citic Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., and required the 
media to focus propaganda efforts on these firms.  
Another major goal of PD is to help the Communist Party disseminate its ideology. 
Jinping Xi, the president of China, explicitly emphasized in 2016 that the Party’s media 
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work should serve the Party and serve the country’s overall interest, showing that the 
Publicity Department is the mouthpiece of the government. For example, in 2009, the 
60th anniversary of China, PD carried out a series of patriotic education activities to 
stimulate people’s patriotic enthusiasm and encourage people’s patriotic actions. In 
another specific example, PD designed a program called “Touching China” to report 
outstanding personages annually. In order to cultivate people’s sense of dedication to 
work, PD issued a notice about how to report stories of typical model workers. For 
example, Bin Zhang, a bus driver, is a model worker who was nominated by PD as a 
key figure in the program “Touching China”. As required by PD, 11 central media 
outlets immediately broadcast stories of Bin Zhang, followed by other local media 
outlets. Through these programs, PD successfully directs people’s values and 
disseminates the government’s idea of expected and advocated behaviour.  
PD closely controls the media in two ways. First, PD controls licenses of media 
outlets and issuing commands. Chief editors of China’s major media outlets are 
required to attend PD’s weekly central office meeting to receive instructions on which 
stories should be emphasized, downplayed or avoided (Sullivan, 2011). The 
instructions are as detailed as, "All websites need to use bright red colour to promote 
a celebratory atmosphere of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic". Second, 
PD also controls the appointment of senior media personnel, such as journalists, 
through a national registration system. They are required by PD to participate in 
ideology training sessions and their loyalty to the party is assessed before their press 
identification passes are renewed (Ashley, 2006). For instance, several deputy chief 
editors of a newspaper called Southern Weekly were fired because they published an 
article criticizing the paper of Xiaoping Deng – the paramount leader of China from 
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1978 to 1989. 
Arguably the most important outlet for PD to disseminate the will of the state is a 
news program called Xinwenlianbo by China Central Television (CCTV), the 
predominant state television broadcaster.1 Xinwenlianbo has the privilege of being the 
first program to report important political activities, policy announcements, chief 
social and economic issues, and international news, and serves as a medium through 
which the government disseminates their views, wishes and ideology. All channels in 
China are regulated to broadcast Xinwenlianbo live at 7 p.m. everyday. As a result, 
Xinwenlianbo reaches more than 95% of the population and thus has extensive 
coverage (Jin, 2009). 
PD often endorses firms through Xinwenlianbo. For example, in order to 
popularize the national policy on energy-saving and environmental protection, PD 
often endorses firms that perform excellently in environmental protection to set a good 
example for other firms. Double Star, a manufacturing company, was praised by PD in 
Xinwenlianbo in 2010 for its innovation of 800 new environmentally friendly 
techniques and its huge cost savings (60 million RMB) that these innovations resulted 
in. Therefore, commendation of firms on Xinwenlianbo can be deemed as strong 
political endorsements. 
3.4 Sample and Data 
The data on political endorsement is hand-collected by watching the daily 30 
minutes Xinwenlianbo from 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011. I record the dates 
                                                             
1 Two other major state media sources are People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Party, and 
Xinhua, the state news agency. 
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and names of all firms mentioned in the program. I define a political endorsement if 
the program dedicates a whole slot to commend a firm. It is important to know that not 
all coverage is classified as endorsement. In some cases, a firm’s name is mentioned 
in a slot in relation to other issues, and this study excludes these cases from the sample. 
Besides the firm names and dates of endorsement, I record the characteristics of 
the endorsements, including where in the program the mention happens (Sequence), 
the number of times a firm’s name is mentioned (Times), the length of the slot (Length), 
and whether the slot is in the main section of the program or the brief daily summary 
section (Brief). I also code the content of the endorsements into nine specific types: 
corporate social responsibilities (CSR), research and development (R&D), new 
products, profit, achievement, operation, co-operation, ideology and other. Detailed 
definitions of these types are shown in Appendix. Other financial data, such as return 
on assets and firm size, can be obtained from the China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) or the RESSET database.  
Table 3.1 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for the observations of political 
endorsement. From 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011, I collected 278 
observations of political endorsement. The small number of observations is consistent 
with common wisdom that political endorsements are rare and precious resources. 
After decomposing political endorsements into nine different categories, the 
distribution of the observations for each category is shown in Row 2 of Table 3.1, 
which reveals that government endorses firms’ advanced operations, achievements, 
and R&D more frequently. Whether these frequently endorsed aspects are associated 
with more significant market reactions would be tested in the later part of this study. 
Because firms can be endorsed for multiple aspects within one endorsement, the total 
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number of observations in row (2) is higher than the total observations in row (1). 
[Insert Table 3.1] 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of endorsed firms. Because firms can be 
endorsed for multiple times during the sample period, the total number of endorsed 
firms is 103. After dropping the firms lack data of GICs and the ownership types, the 
total observation of endorsed firms is 94 as shown in Table 3.2. Panel A and Panel B 
demonstrate the distribution of endorsed firms. Panel A shows that 10.64% of endorsed 
firms are directly controlled by the central government, while the percentage of central 
government-owned firms among all listed firms is just 2.67%, showing a tendency that 
government is more inclined to endorse connected firms. However, whether the 
probability difference of achieving endorsement between connected firms and other 
firms is significant still needs to be tested in the next section. Panel B shows the 
distribution of industries. Comparing Columns (2) and (4), firms in some specific 
industries, such as industrials and energy, are more likely to be endorsed by 
government. 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
3.5 Determinants of Political Endorsement 
Table 3.2 indicates that a high percentage of endorsed firms are SOEs, but no 
research to date clarifies how the government chooses which firms to endorse. It is 
worthwhile filling this gap. Furthermore, the determining factors of political 
endorsement also influence the impact of endorsement on market reactions and firm 
operating performance. For example, if bribery is a significant reason for endorsement, 
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market reactions can be expected to be low, because investors take a sceptical attitude 
about the quality of the firms and are suspicious of whether the government will really 
provide material support after endorsement. Therefore, this section investigates what 
kinds of firms are more likely to achieve political endorsement. 
Firstly, it can be expected that stated-owned and politically-connected firms are 
more likely to achieve political endorsements since the government has vested-
interests as it is the major investor of this kind of firms. Five proxies are used to 
measure the political connection: whether the actual controller of the firm is central 
government (CG) or other levels of government except central government 
(SOE_Other), party intensity as measured by the ratio of party members to the total 
number of directors (PartyIntensity), whether at least one director of the firm has 
working experience as a government official (PB), political background intensity 
measured as the ratio of directors who has working experience as a government official 
to the total number of board directors (PBintensity), and the percentage of shares 
owned by the state (StatesShare). The results in Columns (1) to (5) of Table 3.3 
demonstrate that most of the measurements of political connections are not significant, 
and the coefficients of PBintensity is even slightly negatively significant, meaning that 
government has no significant preference towards connected firms when it chooses 
firms to endorse, which is contradictory to people’s take-for-granted guesses. 
Secondly, another plausible determining factor of political endorsement is bribery 
because companies can bribe officials in return for endorsement, especially in 
countries with a helping-hand government where corruption does exist though its 
amount is limited (Frye & Shleifer, 1996). If the bribery is one of the determining 
factor of political endorsement, the effects of political endorsement on market and firm 
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performance would be negatively influenced. In columns (6) and (7), I test whether 
government is more likely to endorse firms located in provinces with high corruption. 
The higher the regional corruption level, the more likely the firms in those areas will 
bribe government. According to the World Bank, the ratio of provincial entertainment 
costs to provincial sales (Prov_Entertain) can be used as a proxy for the level of bribery. 
The results in column (6) show that political endorsement is not a thing that can be 
exchanged by bribery. I also manually collected data about the number of provincial 
corrupt officials caught during anti-corruption campaign as the second measurement 
of the level of provincial bribery. Results in column (7) are consistent with column (6) 
that bribery cannot increase the probability of endorsement. Firm-level bribery data is 
hard to collect since firms are reluctant to disclose such unethical information, so I 
follow the same measurement method as Prov_Entertain to calculate firm-level 
corruption data, Firm_Entertain, which equals the ratio of firms’ entertainment costs 
of managers or hospitality fees to sales. The firm-level corruption is also not significant, 
as shown in Column (8) of Table 3.3. Therefore, results from Columns (6) to (8) 
consistently show that firms cannot bribe central government in return for endorsement, 
which further ensure the quality of the endorsements. And these results are also 
consistent with results in Columns (1) to (5) because bribery also reflects the level of 
political connections.  
 Thirdly, the government may consider political endorsement as a method to win 
people’s support (Faccio et al., 2006a). As a result, the more employees a firm has, the 
more likely the government is to endorse that firm. Moreover, firms with more 
employees are usually more socially important in fulfilling public functions like 
solving employment problems. In Column (9) of Table 3.3, I test whether the logarithm 
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of employee number (Lnemployees) can significantly predict the probability of 
endorsement. The results show that the government is partial to firms with more 
employees.  
Fourthly, it can be expected that the government is more likely to endorse firms 
with good previous performance in order to avoid hurting their reputation and 
creditability. I tested the past performance of endorsed firms prior to achieving 
political endorsement (PastPerform) in all models of Table 3.3, and the results indicate 
that the government doesn’t emphasize firms’ past performance when they choose 
firms to endorse. Then I test whether other firm features are at play, including firm 
size, age, leverage and number of restricted shares. Size is defined as the logarithm of 
market value, which is consistent with the method used by other researchers such as 
Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, and Kozłowski (2017). Since size is proved by a lot 
literature to be a significant determinant of political connection (Hasan et al., 2017), 
and the access of political bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006a), firm size is included in all 
models of Table 3.3 to predict the probability of political endorsement. Moreover, 
since promoting innovation is one of the focuses of the Chinese government, it can be 
expected that some younger and creative firms are more likely to be endorsed, 
therefore age is tested as another plausible determining factor of political endorsement. 
Furthermore, leverage (proxy for solvency) and restricted shares (proxy for power 
concentration) are also tested as determining factors in all models of Table 3.3 because 
governments will prefer to endorse firms with good financial and managerial status in 
order to avoid damaging their reputation. The results show that firm size and age are 
significant across all models, meaning that they are important determinants of political 




One important implication of these results is that the government’s underlying 
motive for endorsing firms is its social goals rather than vested interests. According to 
the results in Table 3.3, both political connections and bribery cannot influence the 
endorsement decisions of the government, and the government does not even see past 
performance and firm leverage as important considerations. Instead, larger firms with 
more employees are more likely to be endorsed. This indicates that compared with 
firms with good past performance or with connections, the government prefers to 
choose firms with a greater social impact and those that have helped the government 
solve social problems, like employment problems. Moreover, firms that operate in line 
with the government’s development plan and those that play a necessary role in helping 
government to carry out policies are also main targets of political endorsement, which 
can be reflected by the results that younger firms are more likely to be endorsed 
because of the government’s plan to promote innovation. A lot of researchers like 
Knight and Cavusgil (2004) highlight that younger firms are more innovative because 
they are more flexible and less bureaucratic, while the innovation capability of long-
established firms is always hindered by the substantial bureaucratization. 
 [Insert Table 3.3] 
3.6 Political Endorsement and Market Reaction 
3.6.1 Overall Market Reaction 
 To examine the value of political endorsement, I first use event study to examine 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal return is calculated as the excess return 
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over market return. Because Xinwenlianbo is broadcast at 7 p.m. every night, after the 
stock market has closed, the day after Xinwenlianbo’s reporting is treated as the event 
date. According to Figure 3.1, the market starts to react about ten days before the event 
date. One reasonable explanation is that the interviews with target companies should 
be recorded in advance, which leads to information leakage, and being interviewed by 
Xinwenlinabo is a great honour which can attract social attentions. It is worth noting 
that the CAR is negative during the window [-15, -11], but the CAR at the event day 
is more than 2% and these positive effects persist and reaches about 3.5% in one month.  
 [Insert Figure 3.1] 
Then this study tests the significance of cumulative abnormal returns of political 
endorsement over different time windows: CAR(-1,1), CAR(-2,2), CAR(-3,3), CAR(-
4,4), CAR(-5,5) and CAR(-10,10) and one-month CAR. Based on Table 3.4 Row (1), 
political endorsements overall have significant positive relationship with market 
reactions, significant at the 5% or 1% levels over all windows. These results are 
consistent with the first hypothesis that political endorsement has positive association 
with market reactions.  
[Insert Table 3.4] 
3.6.2 Endorsement Characteristics and Market Reaction 
Hypothesis two suggests minimal or even negative market reactions if a firm is 
endorsed for aspects that have high-risk (i.e. R&D), because endorsement may give 
firms false incentives to excessively divert resources into these aspects in order to meet 
government or social expectations, which finally leads to high risks and low profits. 
In contrast, this paper supposes that only endorsement of low-risk value-relevant 
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aspects like advanced operation and achievements are positively correlated with 
market reactions.  
 To examine whether the significant market reactions are driven by specific types 
of endorsement, I decompose endorsements into nine more specific types according to 
the keywords of contents: CSR, new product, R&D, profit-related, achievement, 
operation, co-operation, ideology and other. The definitions of each type are shown in 
Appendix. Row (2) in Table 3.4 shows that market reactions to endorsements about 
achievement and advanced operation are significantly positive. However, the results 
on R&D are not significantly negative, and I will test this further in the regression.  
In order to conduct the regression on CAR, a matched sample of control 
companies has to be formed because the event dates of political endorsement for each 
firm are different. Only after identifying the matched control groups can I assign the 
same event dates as the endorsed firms to the corresponding matched non-endorsed 
firms and then the CAR are calculable for both treatment and control groups.  
 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is applied to match endorsed firms with non-
endorsed firms and this approach can help this study eliminate certain concerns. First, 
as suggested by Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2011), PSM methodology can be used to 
control the selection on observables by balancing out the groups being compared in 
terms of their covariates. Table 3.5 compares the mean differences of key variables 
before and after PSM. Rows marked as “U” show the mean differences between 
endorsed and non- endorsed firms before PSM, and rows marked as “M” demonstrate 
those after matching. As shown in rows marked as “U” in Table 3.5, some firm 
characteristics are significantly different between endorsed and non-endorsed firms. 
To alleviate the concern that endorsed firms are selected endogenously based on these 
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characteristics, PSM nearest-neighbour matching is applied. Through PSM, I formed 
treatment and control groups with similar predicted likelihood of political endorsement, 
hence these two groups are equally likely ex-ante to be endorsed by the government, 
though the control group in fact was not endorsed ex-post. As a result, the comparison 
of outcomes between treated and control groups is quasi-randomised. Second, 
according to researchers like Ettner (2004), PSM is especially suitable for reducing 
bias when the sizes of treatment and control groups are very different. Since the 
observation of the endorsed firms is relatively small when compared with the total 
number of firms, PSM is suitable to help this study reduce the bias. Third, another 
concern of this study is reverse causality. Firms’ good performance after political 
endorsement may be just because the government tends to endorse firms with good 
performance to avoid hurting its reputation. Although the results in Table 3.3 
demonstrate that past performance is not a significant determinant of political 
endorsement, this study will match firms according to their past performance as a 
further step to alleviate this concern. 
 [Insert Table 3.5] 
 Treatment and control groups are matched according to the significant 
determinants of political endorsement and a series of basic firm characteristics like 
past performance and age which I tested in the mean difference tests shown in rows 
marked as “U” in Table 3.5. The same firm can achieve endorsements in different years, 
and the financial characteristics of the same endorsed firm change every year. 
Therefore, panel data (firm-year) is used to match the treatment group with control 
group. And the non-endorsed firms will be excluded from the pool once they are 
matched successfully with one observation in the treatment group, meaning that one 
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non-endorsed firm can only be matched once. Finally, this study forms a sample of 
120 observations in the treatment group with 120 observations in the control group. 
Rows marked as “M” of Table 3.5 suggests that most of the differences between the 
characteristics of treatment and control groups are not significant after PSM. Moreover, 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the standardized percentage bias of the frim 
characteristics narrowed significantly after propensity scoring matching, showing that 
the endorsed firms and matched non-endorsed firms are now more comparable. 
[Insert Figure 3.2] 
Based on the matched sample, Figure 3.3 demonstrates the CAR difference 
between endorsed and the matched non-endorsed firms. The CAR difference between 
these two groups is about zero or even negative during the window [-15, -11], meaning 
that the CAR is even higher for the non-endorsed firms before political endorsement 
happens. However, when political endorsements were granted and market started to 
react ten days before the endorsement, the CAR difference rises to more than 1.5% at 
the event day and this trend persists over the whole month. 
[Insert Figure 3.3] 
This study then tests the impact of political endorsement on CAR through 
regression. I firstly identify the exact pairs of treated and control firms, and then assign 
the event dates of the endorsement to the corresponding non-endorsed firms in the 
control group. Since each firm can be endorsed for multiple times within the same year, 
there is an expansion in the sample size (356) compared with the previous matched 
sample (240). Specifically, treatment and control groups are matched according to a 
series of key firm characteristics like past performance and age. Because most of these 
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matching variables are annual data which is collected from firms’ annual financial 
statements, the endorsed firms and non-endorsed firms are matched based on firm-year 
panel data, forming a matched sample of 240 observations in total: 120 endorsed with 
120 non-endorsed observations. However, when this study tests the impact on market 
reactions (CAR), the data about market reactions is available every time when the 
firms are endorsed even within the same year. For example, if a firm is endorsed three 
times within the same year, the observation number for this firm at that year in the 
panel data to test firms’ operating performance would be one, while the observation 
number in the dataset to test market reactions would be three. Therefore, when this 
study examines the effects on market reactions, there is an expansion in the sample 
because each firm can be endorsed for multiple times within the same year. In the 
dataset to test the impact on CAR, 183 endorsed observations are matched with 183 
non-endorsed observations, forming a matched sample of 366 observations, within 
which 5 of 366 observations lack data on market reactions, thus leading to 356 
observations after excluding the 5 pairs that lack data on market reactions. The results 
of the regressions are shown in Table 3.6. According to Column (1), the results are 
consistent with those in Table 3.4 that political endorsements, as a whole, can 
significantly push the cumulative abnormal return up for 4.5% (P=0.034). 
In Column (2), where political endorsements are divided into nine specific types 
according to content keywords, the results show that endorsement about firms’ 
achievement and advanced operation have positive effects on market reactions, while 
contents about R&D witness negative reactions for as high as 10.8%, which is 
consistent with the second hypothesis of this paper. The negative market reactions of 
R&D endorsement are consistent with much of the literature. For example, as Cox 
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(2010) points out, R&D in particular causes unpredictable consequences and boosts 
idiosyncratic risks, since costs, time, human resources and eventual technical success 
are all uncertain. The riskiness of R&D is also supported by Cooper (1981), who 
reveals that most companies fail to recover costs and expenditures which eventually 
leads to huge loss and great risk. As a result, the risky nature of R&D leads to the 
negative reactions on R&D endorsements, since investors suspect that companies will 
be given false incentive by the government to take on more R&D after they are 
endorsed and result in higher risks. Since these firms were selected by government as 
exemplars for R&D, investing more in R&D to keep the trend and meet the 
expectations of government is inevitable. In an un-tabulated table, I use the subsamples 
of firms who were endorsed for R&D to test whether these firms will invest more in 
R&D one year after endorsement. The results show a positive association between 
political endorsement on R&D and firms’ future R&D investments (β=0.022, P=0.023), 
which provides supporting evidence for the increase in risk and the negative market 
reactions of R&D endorsements.  
[Insert Table 3.6]  
3.6.3 Endorsement Forms and Market Reaction 
The forms of political endorsement (e.g. length or sequence) can reflect how much 
importance the government attaches to that company. It can be expected that 
government values firms more if political endorsements are longer (Length), if firm 
names are mentioned more often (Times), if firms are endorsed in the non-brief section 
of Xinwenlinabo (Brief), and if firms are endorsed in the earlier parts of the program 
(Sequence). As a result, the market reactions are expected to be higher if investors 
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think the government values the firms more. Since only the firms who achieved 
political endorsement have data on endorsement forms, the sample in this section is 
restricted to the firms with endorsement rather than the matched sample. Column (1) 
of Table 3.7 demonstrates that the investors think the sequence of the political 
endorsement is a cue to judge how much importance the government attaches to the 
firm. Every forward move of sequence can increase the market reactions for 0.4%. 
However, length, times and which sections (brief or non-brief) the endorsement 
appears cannot influence investors’ market reactions significantly.  
Although previous results in Table 3.3 demonstrate that political connection does 
not influence the probability of endorsement, it is still possible that connected firms 
will be given favourable endorsement forms once they are selected for endorsements. 
Therefore, from Columns (2) to (5) in Table 3.7, I test whether Xinwenlianbo allocates 
more time to the connected firm, place endorsements about the connected firm in the 
non-brief section or in earlier parts of the program, and mentions the names of 
connected firm more times in order to impress audiences. The results show that the 
government doesn’t give favourable forms to connected firms, and Column (2) even 
demonstrates a negative association between central-government-ownership and the 
endorsement length. Therefore, government treats connected and non-connected firms 
fairly, both in terms of the probability of endorsement and the endorsement forms. 
 [Insert Table 3.7] 
3.7 Political Endorsement and Firm Performance 
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3.7.1 Firm Performance 
Besides PSM, this study will apply treatment effects model and the instrumental 
variable technique to further solve the endogeneity and selection problems. As 
discussed in the previous section, PSM can control the selection on observables and 
alleviate the reverse causality between political endorsements and firm performance 
by matching treatment and control groups according to firms’ past performance and 
other key characteristics to form samples with similar predicted likelihood of political 
endorsement, and thus making the treatment and control groups equally likely ex-ante 
to be selected by government to endorse. 
 However, there is still a concern that there are unobservable omitted variables 
which can bias the results. For instance, although I matched firms with similar 
matching covariates, these firms may face different market challenges and have 
various growth rates that influence their probability of being endorsed and also 
influence their performance, which would bias the results. According to researchers 
like Lennox et al. (2011) and Ettner (2004), the treatment effects model can control 
such selection on unobservables, and the treatment effects model is especially suitable 
when the endogenous variable is a dummy (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Lennox et al., 
2011), as endorsement is in this study. Specifically, I first run a probit model where the 
dependent variable is the endorsement dummy and include all the variables used to 
predict operating performance. Instrumental variable technique is used here. Whether 
the firm is located in the same location as the Publicity Department (SLPD) can be 
used as a valid instrumental variable because it meets the relevance condition that 
geographic proximity can increase firms’ probability of endorsement, and also meets 
the exclusion condition, as no evidence shows that being located in the same province 
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as the Publicity Department can influence firm performance. Based on the first-stage 
estimations, the treatment correction can be calculated to estimate the effects of 
unobservable factors underlying the achievement of political endorsement, and this 
treatment correction will be included in the second stage as a control variable to 
address bias (Guo & Fraser, 2014; Heckman, 1977; Lennox et al., 2011; Schuler et al., 
2017). 
Column (1) of Table 3.8 shows the results for the first-stage regression. The 
instrumental variable SLPD is significantly positively associated with political 
endorsement (β=1.054, P<1%), and the un-tabulated marginal effects of SLPD is also 
significant under 1% level with a coefficient of 0.39, meaning that locating in the same 
province as the Publicity Department can significantly increase firms’ probability of 
endorsing by 39%. Columns (2) to (4) demonstrate the results for the second stage. 
The dependent variables are one-year forwarded performance measurements: return 
on asset (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and operating margin (OM) respectively. 
Performance is forwarded one year in order to give firms enough time to take 
advantage of the political endorsement. The results indicate that political endorsement 
is positively associated with firm future performance, no matter which performance 
measurements are used. For example, Column (2) shows that the ROA of endorsed 
firms are 5.5% (P = 0.048) higher than the control group, even after matching firms 
according to observable characteristics like past performance and controlling for 
selection on unobservable factors through treatment effects model and instrumental 
variable technique. However, another potential concern of these results is that the 
statistical significance of the tests is overstated due to persistence in variables and 
correlation over time. Therefore, in Columns (5) to (7), performance changes are used 
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instead of performance level to solve the problem of persistence. The results are 
consistent with Columns (2) to (5) except that the impact on change in OM is not 
significant. The Rho in Models (2) to (7) means the correlation between the error terms 
of the first-step model and second-step model. A negative Rho means the positive 
impact of endorsement on firm performance would be biased downward if OLS is used, 
showing the necessity to use treatment effects model to control this bias.  
[Insert Table 3.8] 
3.7.2 Firm Heterogeneity 
As a further step, this section explores whether endorsement differentially affects 
firm performance across different types of firms in a manner that is consistent with 
particular theories. The first contingency factor this section tests is the past 
performance, and this study hypothesizes that political endorsement is more valuable 
for weakly performed firms because it can help them regain reputation, legitimacy and 
key resources for development. The negative coefficient of the interaction term 
Endorse × PastPerform (β=﹣0.198, P=0.048) shown in Column (1) of Table 3.9 
supports the hypothesis. 
The second firm trait that can influence the impact of political endorsement on 
firm performance is the existence of political connections. Since both political 
endorsement and connection imply government support, one hypothesis is that 
political support has diminishing marginal effects, meaning that the effects of political 
endorsement for firms already having political connections are not as large as the 
effects for firms without connections. Moreover, political endorsement can be 
particularly valuable for less connected firms to help them overcome the lack of 
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legitimacy. As a result, the positive impact of political endorsement on firm 
performance is stronger for less connected firms. However, it is also possible that firms 
already have connections can utilize their political network to access more material 
preferential resources once they achieve political endorsement from the central 
government. The results of columns (2) in Table 3.9 support the first possibility that 
political endorsement is more valuable for less-connected firms to overcome the lack 
in resources and legitimacy. 
The third contingency factor is firms’ dependence on external financing. The 
impact of political endorsements on firms that rely heavily on external financing are 
assumed to be larger since these firms can more easily access external funds after 
achieving a kind of guarantee from the central government through political 
endorsement. The coefficients of the interaction term Endorse × Dependence (β=0.055, 
P=0.048) shown in Column (3) means that the positive impact of political endorsement 
on firm performance is 5.5% higher if the firm is more dependent on external financing.  
 [Insert Table 3.9] 
3.7.3 Institution Heterogeneity 
Institutional development level, like firm characteristics, can also influence the 
impact of political endorsement on firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) suggest that politicians’ interventions in 
business activities are more severe when institutional constraints are weak. In other 
words, the role of the government is stronger in provinces with weak institutions. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that political endorsement is more beneficial 
for firms located in provinces with weak institutions, because support from the central 
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government, such as subsidies, can be grabbed by local government if its local impact 
is strong and the quality is low. Therefore, this paper hypothesises that a stronger 
regional institution can ensure support from the central government is eventually 
transferred to endorsed firms, so the positive association between political 
endorsement and firm performance is stronger for firms located in provinces with 
better institutions. 
Based on the surveys of Fan and Wang (2011), six different measurements of 
regional institutional development are used: (1) the index of less government 
intervention (LessGovInt) measures the degree of convenience of administrative 
process; (2) the sales of non-state-owned industrial firms relative to the sales of state-
owned firms, reflecting the development level of the market (NonStateSales); (3) the 
number of employees in non-state-owned firms relative to that in state-owned firms 
(NonStateEmp); (4) the deposits obtained by non-state-owned financial institutions to 
the total deposits obtained by all financial institutions (NonStateDepo), reflecting the 
market competition in the financial industry; (5) the percentage of credits allocated to 
non-state firms from financial institutions (CreditDiscrepancy); and (6) the protection 
of intellectual properties index (IntellProtect), which refers to the ratio of the number 
of patent applications to the number of technical personnel. For easier and more 
consistent interpretations, the institutional indices finally used in the tests in Table 3.10 
are dummy variables, equal to one if the institutional development is better than the 
national average, and zero otherwise. 
The results of Table 3.10 show that all of the interaction terms between 
endorsement and these six measurements of institutional development are positively 
significant, which supports Hypothesis 3, that political endorsement is more value-
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added for firms located in provinces with better institutions. For example, the 
coefficients of the interaction term Endorse × LessGovInt (β=0.037, P=0.009), shown 
in Column (1), means the positive impact of political endorsement on firm 
performance is 3.7% higher for firms located in provinces with better institutions. 
 [Insert Table 3.10] 
3.8 Channel of Value Creation 
In terms of the channel of value creation, I explore whether endorsement can bring 
about more access to government support, and then investigate the firms’ improvement 
in financing and investment efficiency, and finally test firms’ change in policies after 
achieving political endorsement. According to the researchers like Hearn (2012) and 
Faccio et al. (2006a), companies are able to access more favourable resources after 
establishing a relationship with governments. Therefore, I test whether the government 
will give endorsed firms more support, such as subsidies and reduced effective tax 
rates. Results of Column (1) of Table 3.11 demonstrate that political endorsement is 
positively correlated with government subsidy, but Columns (2) and (3) show that 
there is no impact on effective tax rate. 
Then this section explores the impact of political endorsement on firms’ financing 
and investment. Column (4) shows the results about the impacts on cost of debt. The 
significant negative coefficient of endorse (β=﹣0.002, P=0.031) indicates that the cost 
of debt for endorsed firms is 0.2% lower compared with non-endorsed firms. Moreover, 
in Column (5), the significant positive coefficient of endorse demonstrates that 




Furthermore, the impacts on firm policies like executive salaries are also tested. 
In Column (6), I test whether the salaries of top 3 managers increase after 
endorsements as a bonus for achieving political endorsement. The results shown in 
Table 3.11 does not support that managers can get higher salaries after winning 
political endorsement, which is contradictory to what investors usually think according 
to anecdotal evidence. 
 [Insert Table 3.11] 
3.9 Conclusion 
Endorsement is a pervasive phenomenon that has traditionally been studied within 
a marketing context. However, scant literature focuses on endorsement in financial 
markets. Moreover, extant literature largely ignores political endorsement as a 
government strategy to influence the market. To fill these gaps, this chapter examines 
the impact of political endorsement in financial markets. Political endorsement, in this 
paper, is defined as public statements or actions showing government support of firms. 
The results of this paper demonstrate that firms that are larger, younger, and have 
more employees are more likely to achieve political endorsement, while political 
connections and bribery are not determining factors, which indicate that underlying 
motive of government to endorse firms is its social goals rather than vested-interests. 
Moreover, political endorsement, especially endorsements of firms’ achievements and 
operation, is positively correlated with market reactions. However, endorsement of 
aspects with high risks like R&D is negatively associated with market reactions as 
75 
 
endorsement gives these firms false incentives to excessively divert resources into 
these high-risk aspects in order to meet government or social expectations. Besides 
endorsement contents, the endorsement forms also influence the impact of political 
endorsement since the forms reflect how much importance the government attaches to 
the firms.  
 Furthermore, after applying PSM methodology to control for selection on 
observables and treatment effects model with instrumental variable technique to 
control for selection on unobservables, this paper suggests the positive influences of 
political endorsement on firm performance, indicating that endorsed companies can 
participate in an exclusive club where reputation and favourable resources can be 
transferred from the government to firms. The value of political endorsement is higher 
for firms that perform weakly before the endorsement, less politically connected, 
depend heavily on external financing, or located in places with strong institutions. And 
the results also demonstrate that the channels of value creations consist in the 
increasing in subsidy, reduction in cost of debt, and improved investment efficiency.  
This study is the first to examine political endorsement, an approach through 
which governments influence markets, which contributes to literature on the role of 
governments in capital markets. Furthermore, this study fills gaps in the literature on 
endorsement by introducing the concept of endorsement into finance, and focusing on 
a new type of endorser – the government. In addition, this study also provides practical 
implications for government, firms, and investors. The policy implication is that 
officials can improve social welfare and economy through selecting firms more 
strategically. The managerial implication is to publicizing the political endorsement 
once the firms are endorsed to maximize the market reactions. And this paper can also 
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provide implications for investors in markets where the government is helping-hand. 
Future research can try to examine whether these results of political endorsemnets can 
be generalized to fit other countries, especially by comparing the results among 
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shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: 





Figure 3.1 : Cumulative Abnormal Return of Political Endorsements 
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal return of political endorsements from 15 





Figure 3.2 : Standardized % Bias Before and After PSM 
This figures demonstrates the distribution of standardized % bias of the variables 
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Figure 3.3 : CAR Difference Between Endorsed and Non-Endorsed Firms 
 
This figure shows the differences in cumulative abnormal returns of endorsed and 
















dif-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 1M





Table 3.1 : Descriptive Statistics for Political Endorsement 
 
This table shows the observations and percentages of different political endorsement 
types. Row (1) treats all endorsements as a whole. In row (2), endorsements are then 
decomposed into nine specific aspects according to the key words of news contents: 
CSR, new product, R&D, profit-related, achievement, operation, co-operation, 
ideology and other. Firms can be endorsed for multiple aspects within one 
endorsement. Therefore, the total number of observations in row (2) is higher than the 













  Observations Percentage% 
(1) All Endorsement  278  
    
(2) CSR 39 8.97% 
 New product 31 7.13% 
 R&D 57 13.10% 
 Profit  37 8.51% 
 Achievement 64 14.71% 
 Operation  98 22.53% 
 Co-operate 46 10.57% 
 ideo 10 2.30% 
 other 53 12.18% 
 Total 435 100% 
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Table 3.2 : Descriptive Statistics for Endorsed Firms 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of endorsed firms. Panel A demonstrates the 
number of endorsed firms that are controlled directly by central government (CG), by 
other levels of government except CG (SOE_Other) and private firms (Private). Panel 
B shows the distribution of industries. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided 








Panel B Industry Distribution 
GICs industry Endorsed Firms  All listed firms 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  # %  # % 
10 Energy 8 8.51%  44 3.17% 
15 Materials 8 8.51%  255 18.37% 
20 Industrials 26 27.66%  306 22.05% 
25 Consumer Discretionary 24 25.53%  249 17.94% 
30 Consumer Staples 3 3.19%  103 7.42% 
35 Health Care 3 3.19%  87 6.27% 
40 Financials 10 10.64%  159 11.46% 
45 Information Technology 6 6.38%  109 7.85% 
50 Telecommunication 
Services 
0 0.00%  3 0.22% 
55 Utilities 6 6.38%  73 5.26% 
Total  94 100%  1388 100% 
 
 Panel A  Ownership  Distribution 
 Endorsed firms  All listed firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 # %  # % 
CG 10 10.64%  37 2.67% 
SOE_Other 72 76.60%  868 62.54% 
Private 12 12.77%  483 34.80% 
Total 94 100%  1388 100% 
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Table 3.3 : Determinants of Political Endorsements 
This table presents the results for the research question: what kind of firms is more likely to achieve political endorsement? The dependent 
variable P(Endorsement) equals 1 if the firm achieved political endorsement, and zero otherwise. CG is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the actual controller of the firm is central government. SOE_Other is a dummy variable which equals one if the actual controlling 
shareholder is other levels of government except central government. PartyIntensity is the ratio of party members to the total number of 
directors. PB is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one director of the firm has working experience as a government official. 
PBIntensity means the political background intensity, which equals to the ratio of directors who have working experience as a government 
official to the total number of board directors. StateShare means the percentage of shares owned by the state. Prov_Entertain is a provincial 
level data, which equals the ratio of entertainment cost to sales, reflecting the regional corruption level. Prov_CorOfficial refers to the 
number of provincial corrupt officials caught during anti-corruption campaign. Firm_Entertain means the ratio of the entertainment costs 
of managers or the hospitality fees to sales. Employees means the number of employees. In all models, I check some other determinants 
of endorsement, including past performance (ROA_P), firm size (Size), firm age (Age), leverage (Lev), and the number of restricted shares 
(Restricted). Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Probability of Endorsement 




 Political connection  Bribery  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)   (9) 
CG -0.023           
 (0.951)           
SOE_other 0.055           
 (0.699)           
PartyIntensity  0.205          
  (0.375)          
PB   0.186         
   (0.464)         
PBintensity    -0.705*        
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    (0.089)        
StatesShare     -0.075       
     (0.865)       
Prov_Entertain       -0.126     
       (0.456)     
Prov_CorOfficial        -0.004    
        (0.205)    
Firm_Entertain         -0.004   
         (0.205)   
Employees           0.572*** 
           (0.000) 
Size 0.570*** 0.568*** 0.571*** 0.591*** 0.574***  0.574*** 0.572*** 0.557***  -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.112) 
Age -0.025* -0.026* -0.024* -0.028* -0.025*  -0.025* -0.022 -0.024*  0.009 
 (0.082) (0.072) (0.085) (0.054) (0.081)  (0.075) (0.112) (0.091)  (0.610) 
Lev 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.008  0.008 0.009 0.008  0.353 
 (0.592) (0.592) (0.616) (0.504) (0.598)  (0.607) (0.610) (0.613)  (0.702) 
PastPerform 0.316 0.335 0.262 0.375 0.282  0.237 0.353 0.256  0.109 
 (0.733) (0.716) (0.775) (0.688) (0.759)  (0.798) (0.702) (0.783)  (0.621) 
Restricted 0.101 0.095 0.114 0.105 0.165  0.114 0.109 0.094  0.173 
 (0.648) (0.668) (0.605) (0.639) (0.675)  (0.605) (0.621) (0.674)  (0.443) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y 
Constant -14.459*** -14.413*** -14.604*** -14.755*** -14.504***  -14.336*** -14.374*** -14.065***  -14.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
N 2873 2873 2873 2873 2873  2873 2873 2873  2873 




Table 3.4 : Market Reactions of Different Political Endorsement Types 
Row (1) presents the cumulative abnormal returns of political endorsement over different time windows. In row (2), endorsements are 
then decomposed into nine specific aspects according to the key words of endorsement contents: CSR, new product, R&D, profit-related, 
achievement, operation, co-operation, ideology and other. The detailed definitions of these endorsement categories are shown in Appendix. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Market reactions of different political Endorsement contents 
  
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-4,4) CAR(-5,5) CAR(-10,10) 
1 month 
CAR 
(1) Endorse 0.009** 0.006** 0.007** 0.008** 0.010** 0.021*** 0.030*** 
  (0.013) (0.039) (0.046) (0.036) (0.020) (0.001) (0.002) 
         
(2) CSR -0.005 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.036 
  (0.289) (0.818) (0.265) (0.476) (0.979) (0.514) (0.172) 
 New Product 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.031* 0.034* 0.030 0.059* 
  (0.205) (0.114) (0.147) (0.082) (0.070) (0.158) (0.050) 
 R&D 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.010 
  (0.202) (0.351) (0.510) (0.503) (0.630) (0.632) (0.620) 
 Profit  0.017** 0.026** 0.026* 0.026* 0.027** 0.030* 0.044** 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.051) (0.056) (0.047) (0.072) (0.041) 
 Achievement 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.018* 0.027** 0.033 
  (0.226) (0.235) (0.110) (0.195) (0.051) (0.018) (0.119) 
 Operation  0.013*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.032*** 0.055*** 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.031) (0.007) (0.001) 
 Co-operate 0.013* 0.020* 0.022* 0.029** 0.029** 0.038** 0.064*** 
  (0.077) (0.073) (0.069) (0.016) (0.033) (0.038) (0.005) 
 Ideology  -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 0.041 0.083 
  (0.652) (0.725) (0.365) (0.165) (0.498) (0.207) (0.111) 
 other 0.017 -0.004 -0.010** -0.014** -0.008 -0.002 -0.020 
  (0.228) (0.313) (0.039) (0.021) (0.237) (0.824) (0.208) 
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Table 3.5 : Compare Treated and Control Groups Before and After PSM 
 
This table compares the differences between the endorsed firms and non-endorsed 
firms before and after PSM. Endorsed firms are the firms that are endorsed by 
government through Xinwenlianbo. The matched non-endorsed firms are identified by 
applying PSM. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. ***, 











Variable Matched or 
Unmatched 
Mean t-test 
Treated Control t p>|t| 
CG U 0.025 0.0231 0.140 0.892 
 M 0.025 0.0167 0.450 0.653 
      
PartyIntensity U 0.340 0.257 4.060 0 
 M 0.340 0.285 2.110 0.036 
      
Employees U 9.557 7.421 15.86 0 
 M 9.557 9.409 0.840 0.400 
      
Size U 24.22 21.87 19.79 0 
 M 24.22 23.87 1.800 0.072 
      
Age U 10.07 11.98 -5.690 0 
 M 10.07 10.12 -0.0800 0.936 
      
Lev U 1.004 1.556 -1.420 0.157 
 M 1.004 1.031 -0.220 0.825 
      
PastPerform U 0.0519 0.0314 3.200 0.001 
 M 0.0519 0.0565 -0.630 0.527 
      
Restricted U 0.194 0.159 1.680 0.092 
 M 0.194 0.180 0.450 0.651 
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Table 3.6 : Market Reactions of Different Political Endorsement Types 
 
This table explores which types of endorsement are positively associated with 
significant market reactions. The dependent variables of column (1) and (2) are 1-
month cumulative abnormal return. Column (1) tests the market reactions of all 
endorsements. In column (2), political endorsements are decomposed into nine specific 
aspects according to the key words of endorsement contents: CSR, new product, R&D, 
profit-related, achievement, operation, co-operation, ideology and other. The 
definitions of these categories are provided in Appendix. Control variables cover 
commonly used influencing factors of market reactions: firm size, firm age, leverage, 
past performance, restricted shares, and also controls for industry effects. P-values are 




 (1) (2) 
Endorsement 0.045**  
 (0.034)  
CSR  0.050 
  (0.118) 
New Product  0.072 
  (0.119) 
R&D  -0.108*** 
  (0.001) 
Achievement  0.069* 
  (0.064) 
Operation  0.046** 
  (0.034) 
Co-operate  0.043 
  (0.160) 
Ideology  0.082 
  (0.122) 
Profit  -0.042 
  (0.392) 
Other  -0.041 
  (0.280) 
CG 0.023 0.019 
 (0.674) (0.722) 
PartyIntensity -0.030 -0.026 
 (0.473) (0.532) 
Employees 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.922) (0.704) 
Size -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.264) (0.448) 
Age -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.270) (0.334) 
Lev 0.009 0.010* 
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 (0.132) (0.071) 
PastPerform -0.084 -0.098 
 (0.623) (0.561) 
Restricted -0.022 -0.041 
 (0.569) (0.288) 
Industry Y Y 
Constant 0.338 0.288 
 (0.110) (0.156) 
N 356 356 












Table 3.7 : Market Reactions of Different Endorsement Forms 
 
Column (1) of this table reveals the relationship between market reactions and different 
endorsement forms, where the dependent variable is the 1-month cumulative abnormal 
return. And the main variables of interests are the variables about endorsement forms: 
the length of the endorsement (Length); the times the same company name is 
mentioned (Times); whether the firm is endorsed in the brief section of the news 
program (Brief); and the sequence of the specific endorsement relative to the whole 
news program of that day (Sequence). Columns (2) to (5) explore whether connected 
firms will be given favourable forms. The dependent variables are endorsement forms, 
and the main variables of interests are the variables about political connections, 
including CG and PartyIntensity. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in 
the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 1 month 
CAR 
 Length Times Brief Sequence 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Length -0.007      
 (0.625)      
Times -0.001      
 (0.844)      
Sequence -0.004*      
 (0.081)      
Brief 0.016      
 (0.628)      
CG 0.045  -0.341** 0.240 0.085 1.865 
 (0.339)  (0.016) (0.770) (0.839) (0.150) 
PartyIntensity -0.074  0.347 0.016 -0.592 -2.392 
 (0.207)  (0.300) (0.988) (0.249) (0.311) 
Size -0.022**  0.077 0.072 -0.082 -0.634* 
 (0.014)  (0.156) (0.548) (0.245) (0.050) 
Age -0.002  0.039* 0.162** -0.060** -0.324** 
 (0.438)  (0.066) (0.012) (0.036) (0.026) 
Lev -0.024*  0.196* 0.002 -0.199 -1.512** 
 (0.087)  (0.072) (0.994) (0.145) (0.024) 
PastPerform 0.042  -0.465 2.937 -0.684 8.615 
 (0.846)  (0.736) (0.505) (0.730) (0.364) 
Restricted 0.052  -0.012 -0.799 0.610 4.192** 
 (0.339)  (0.977) (0.327) (0.192) (0.044) 
Industry Y  Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.689**  -1.993 -1.493 3.443 34.842*** 
 (0.012)  (0.213) (0.671) (0.105) (0.000) 
N 216  216 216 216 216 
R2  0.083  0.098 0.104  0.133 
Pseudo R2     0.093  
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This table explores the impact of political endorsement on firm performance based on matched sample. Column (1) demonstrates the first-
step test of the instrumental variable: SLPD. SLPD is a dummy variable which indicates whether the firm is located in the same location 
as Publicity Department. The dependent variable in Column (1) is endorse dummy, which equals one if the firm is endorsed by government 
and zero otherwise. Column (2) to (7) are results of the second-stage tests. The dependent variables in Columns (2) to (4) are three one-
year forwarded performance measurements (ROA, ROS and operating margin (OM)). Performance is forwarded one year in order to give 
firms enough time to take advantage of the political endorsement. And in column (5) to (7), dependent variables are performance changes. 
The main variable of interest is the endorsement dummy for Columns (2) to (7). The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 First-Stage  Second-Stage 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 Endorse  ROA_F ROS_F OM_F  ΔROA ΔROS ΔOM 
SLPD 1.054***         
 (0.000)         
Endorse   0.055** 0.133** 0.241**  0.051** 0.067* 0.090 
   (0.048) (0.036) (0.039)  (0.047) (0.095) (0.133) 
CG -0.074  -0.010 0.006 0.009  0.011 0.018 0.018 
 (0.900)  (0.657) (0.902) (0.925)  (0.582) (0.567) (0.709) 
PartyIntensity 0.780*  -0.005 -0.000 -0.044  -0.018 -0.014 -0.030 
 (0.070)  (0.778) (0.994) (0.559)  (0.269) (0.586) (0.439) 
Employees -0.085  0.008** -0.025*** -0.045***  0.005 0.009 0.013 
 (0.416)  (0.046) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.164) (0.101) (0.116) 
Size 0.097  -0.010** 0.009 0.012  -0.009** -0.018*** -0.028*** 
 (0.345)  (0.012) (0.336) (0.499)  (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.033  0.000 -0.000 -0.002  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.172)  (0.740) (0.857) (0.625)  (0.972) (0.708) (0.849) 
Lev 0.050  0.000 -0.000 -0.024  -0.002 -0.007 -0.019** 
 (0.636)  (0.981) (0.968) (0.168)  (0.539) (0.246) (0.037) 
PastPerform 0.203  0.568*** 0.923*** 1.180***  -0.209*** -0.268*** -0.258** 
 (0.897)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.047) 
Restricted -0.001  0.000 0.023 0.050  0.003 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.997)  (0.990) (0.460) (0.389)  (0.831) (0.890) (0.974) 
Selection Correction   -0.032* -0.100** -0.185**  -0.028* -0.039 -0.056 
   (0.069) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.080) (0.116) (0.136) 
Industry Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Constant -2.279  0.171** 0.029 0.197  0.172** 0.330*** 0.535*** 
 (0.255)  (0.027) (0.871) (0.543)  (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) 
N   240  240 240 240  240 240 240 
Rho   -0.647 -0.888 -0.902  -0.624 -0.561 -0.533 
Pseudo R2 0.069         
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Table 3.9 : Firm Heterogeneity 
 
This table tests whether political endorsements differentially affect firm performance 
across different types of firms. Dependent variable is one-year forwarded ROA 
(ROA_F). From Columns (1) to (3), different interaction terms between endorse and 
firm characteristics are added. (1) PastPerfrom means the past performance of firms, 
which is measured as the average ROA of past two years. (2) SatesShare refers to the 
percentage of shares owned by the state. (3) Following the method of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), firm’s dependence on external financing equals the capital 
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. 
Dependence is a dummy variable which equals to one if the firms depend more heavily 
on external financing than average. The definitions of all variables are shown in 
Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA_F 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Endorse × PastPerform -0.198**     
 (0.048)     
Endorse ×StatesShare   -0.020*   
   (0.091)   
Endorse × Dependence     0.055** 
     (0.048) 
Endorse 0.068**  0.062**  0.055** 
 (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.049) 
PastPerform 0.655***  0.565***  0.568*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CG -0.010  -0.006  -0.010 
 (0.663)  (0.792)  (0.657) 
PartyIntensity -0.008  -0.002  -0.005 
 (0.648)  (0.911)  (0.778) 
Employees 0.008**  0.008**  0.008** 
 (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.046) 
Size -0.010**  -0.011***  -0.010** 
 (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Age 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.613)  (0.754)  (0.740) 
Lev -0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.925)  (0.917)  (0.981) 
Restricted -0.003  0.027  0.000 
 (0.847)  (0.193)  (0.990) 
Selection Correction -0.033*  -0.032*  -0.032* 
 (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.069) 
StatesShare   -0.007   
   (0.545)   
Dependence     -0.002 
     (0.889) 
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Industry Y  Y  Y 
Constant 0.156**  0.168**  0.160** 
 (0.040)  (0.025)  (0.034) 
N 240  240  240 




Table 3.10 : Institution Heterogeneity 
 
This table tests whether political endorsements differentially affect firm performance 
across different institutional development levels. Dependent variable is one-year 
forwarded ROA (ROA_F). From Columns (1) to (6), different interaction terms between 
endorse and provincial institutional development indexes are added. All of these 
institutional indices are based on the book of Fan and Wang (2011). The institutional 
indices used in this paper are dummy variables, which equals to one if the institutional 
development is better than national average and zero otherwise. (1) The index of less 
government intervention (LessGovInt) measures the degree of convenience of 
administrative process. (2) NonStateSales means the sales of non-state-owned industrial 
firms relative to the sales of state-owned firms, reflecting the development level of the 
market. (3) NonStateEmp refers to the number of employees in non-state-owned firms 
relative to that in state-owned firms. (4) NonStateDepo is the ratio of the deposits obtained 
by non-state-owned financial institutions to the total deposits obtained by all financial 
institutions, reflecting the market competition in financial industry. (5) CreditDiscrepancy 
is an index for development level of the market, which refers to the percentage of credits 
allocated to non-state-owned firms from financial institutions. (6) the protection of 
intellectual properties index (IntellProtect) means the ratio of the number of patent 
applications to the number of technical personnel. The definitions of all variables are 
shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance 
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA_F 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Endorse × LessGovInt 0.037***      
 (0.009)      
Endorse × 
NonStateSales 
 0.020*     
  (0.081)     
Endorse × 
NonStateEmp 
  0.022*    
   (0.075)    
Endorse × 
nonstatebank 
   0.031**   
    (0.023)   
Endorse × 
CreditDiscrepancy 
    0.020*  
     (0.091)  
Endorse × IntellProtect      0.023** 
      (0.039) 
Endorse 0.019 0.060* 0.038 0.026 0.056* 0.031 
 (0.529) (0.067) (0.210) (0.389) (0.084) (0.285) 
CG -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.779) (0.710) (0.742) (0.655) (0.689) (0.768) 
PartyIntensity -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.643) (0.660) (0.638) (0.777) (0.679) (0.938) 
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Employees 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.007* 







 (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.828) (0.937) (0.753) (0.783) (0.984) (0.698) 
Lev 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.956) (0.997) (0.890) (0.917) (0.970) (0.895) 
PastPerform 0.556*** 0.573*** 0.554*** 0.570*** 0.567*** 0.576*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Restricted 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.882) (0.882) (0.942) (0.871) (0.830) (0.912) 
Selection Correction -0.028 -0.042** -0.031* -0.029* -0.040** -0.024 
 (0.106) (0.039) (0.081) (0.091) (0.047) (0.172) 
LessGovInt -0.021**      
 (0.029)      
NonStateSales  -0.005     
  (0.542)     
NonStateEmp   -0.017*    
   (0.057)    
NonStateDepo    -0.016*   
    (0.089)   
CreditDiscrepancy     -0.006  
     (0.478)  
IntellProtect      -0.009 
      (0.304) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.186** 0.181** 0.171** 0.182** 0.178** 0.166** 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.028) (0.019) 
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 















Table 3.11 : Channel of Value Creation  
 
This table presents the impacts of political endorsement on the access of government 
supports, financing, investments and corporate policies. Subsidy_F refers to the logarithm of 
government subsidy, forwarded one year. Following Feng, Johansson, and Zhang (2015)’s 
method, ETR is defined as (tax expense-deferred tax expense)/EBIT. ETR_F refers to one-
year forwarded ETR. ΔETR represents the change in tax burden, equalling the difference 
between the three year average annual effective tax rate before and after the political 
endorsements. Cost of debt (CostofDebt_F) is the ratio of net interest expense to sales 
according to Cao, Hou, and Pan (2015). Return on invested capital (ROIC) equals to (net 
income+financial expenses)/(total assets-current liabilityies+notes payable+short-term 
borrowings +long-term liabilities due within one year), forwarded one year. Salary_F means 
the logarithm of salaries of top 3 managers, forwarded one year. The definitions of all 
variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 Government Support  Financing and 
Investment  
 Policy 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 Subsidy_F ETR_F ΔETR  CostofDebt_F ROIC_F  Salary_F 
Endorse 3.879*** 0.094 -0.339  -0.002** 0.064*  0.856 
 (0.009) (0.311) (0.743)  (0.031) (0.077)  (0.189) 
CG -0.241 -0.015 0.546  0.000 0.003  -0.236 
 (0.842) (0.837) (0.539)  (0.523) (0.926)  (0.655) 
PartyIntensity -0.770 -0.111* -0.777  0.001 -0.015  -1.341*** 
 (0.386) (0.065) (0.275)  (0.251) (0.540)  (0.002) 
Employees 0.430** 0.047*** -0.155  -0.000 0.009*  -0.020 
 (0.042) (0.000) (0.359)  (0.484) (0.074)  (0.829) 
Size 0.489** -0.029** -0.073  0.000 -0.014**  0.155 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.670)  (0.468) (0.011)  (0.110) 
Age -0.011 -0.002 -0.060  -0.000 0.001  0.019 
 (0.822) (0.597) (0.102)  (0.284) (0.527)  (0.366) 
Lev -0.081 0.011 -0.102  0.000 -0.011**  -0.063 
 (0.695) (0.396) (0.541)  (0.347) (0.048)  (0.519) 
PastPerform -0.438 0.588*** 1.115  0.000 0.669***  3.666*** 
 (0.885) (0.002) (0.646)  (0.895) (0.000)  (0.010) 
Restricted -0.606 0.021 -0.310  0.000 -0.000  -0.365 
 (0.380) (0.636) (0.582)  (0.591) (0.990)  (0.257) 
Selection 
Correction 
-2.041** -0.067 0.452  0.001** -0.036  -0.442 
 (0.027) (0.251) (0.491)  (0.024) (0.115)  (0.282) 
Industry Y Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Constant 0.812 0.339 5.228*  -0.001 0.263***  10.820*** 
 (0.838) (0.168) (0.086)  (0.764) (0.009)  (0.000) 
Rho -0.860 -0.437 0.235  0.801 -0.563  -0.386 









Endorsement Dummy variable. If the firm is endorsed by government, 
equals 1, otherwise zero. 
SLPD SLPD is a dummy variable which indicates whether the firm 
is located in the same location as Publicity Department 
Types of endorsement  
CSR Political endorsement about firms’ good performance in 
social responsibility like environment protection. 
R&D Political endorsement about firms’ good performance in 
R&D 
New Product Political endorsement about firms’ creation of new 
products. 
Profit This type of endorsement is identified by using a series of 
key words such as lower costs, higher profits, and huge 
sales. 
Achievement Government endorses firms if they have glorious history, 
achieve prizes for management, overcome financial crisis, 
win an international bid and win large market share. 
Operation This type of endorsement is identified by using a series of 
key words about daily operation, such as merge, financing, 
establishing new branches, starting or completing a new 
project, new service and management. 
Co-operation Co-operate with domestic or oversea companies, with 
governments, or with research departments. 
Ideology This type of endorsement is identified by using a series of 
key words such as culture, ideological education, party, and 
model worker.  
Other This type includes all remaining types of endorsement 
which cannot fit previous categories and the observations 




Sequence The sequence of the specific piece of news which includes 
endorsement in the news program of that day.  
Times How many times the same company name is mentioned.  




Brief Dummy variable. If the firm is endorsed in the brief 
summary of the news program, equals 1. If the firm is 
endorsed in normal sections, equals 0. 
Institutional index  
LessGovInt The index of less government intervention measures the 
degree of convenience of administrative process based on a 
survey conducted by Fan and Wang (2011). LessGovInt is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the government 
intervention within the province is lower than national 
average. 
NonStateSales The sales of non-state-owned industrial firms relative to the 
sales of state-owned firms. NonStateSales is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the index of the province is 
higher than national average. Resources: Fan and Wang 
(2011).  
NonStateEmp The number of employees in non-state-owned firms relative 
to that in state-owned firms. NonStateEmp is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the index of the province is 
higher than national average. Resources: Fan and Wang 
(2011).  
NonStateDepo The ratio of the deposits obtained by non-state-owned 
financial institutions to the total deposits obtained by all 
financial institutions, thus reflecting the market competition 
in financial industry. NonStateDepo is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the index of the province is higher than 
national average. Resources: Fan and Wang (2011) 
CreditDiscrepancy The percentage of credits allocated to non-state-owned 
firms from financial institutions. Traditionally, state-owned 
firms can obtain more credits while production is lower. 
Therefore, this index can measure the development level of 
the market. CreditDiscrepancy is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the index of the province is higher than 
national average. Resources: Fan and Wang (2011).  
IntellProtect This index measures the protection of intellectual properties 
according to the ratio of the number of patent applications 
to the number of technical personnel. IntellProtect is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the protection of 
intellectual property within the province is better than 
national average. Resources: Fan and Wang (2011).  
Other variables  
CG If actual controller is central government, equals one.  
SOE_Other If actual controller is other levels of government except 
central government, equals one. 
Private If actual controller is private company or individuals, equals 
one. 
PartyIntensity No. of party members/ Total number of directors 
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PBIntensity Political background intensity. The ratio of directors who 
has working experience as a government official to the total 
number of board directors. 
PB A dummy variable which equals one if at least one director 
of the firm has working experience as a government official. 
StateShare Percentage of shares owned by the state. 
Prov_Entertain Province-level data. A measurement for regional political 
connection and corruption. Refers to the ratio of 
entertainment cost to sales.  
Prov_CorOfficial Province-level data. A measurement for regional political 
connection and corruption. Means the number of regional 
corrupt officials caught in anti-corruption campaign. 
Firm_Entertain Firm-level data. A measurement for firm political 
connection and corruption. Firm_Entertain is a dummy 
variable which equals one if firm’s ratio of the entertainment 
costs of managers or the hospitality fees to sales is higher 
than average. 
Dependence According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), firm’s dependence 
on external financing equals the capital expenditures minus 
cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. 
Dependence is a dummy variable which equals to one if the 
firms depend more heavily on external financing than 
average. 
Size Logarithm of market value, where the value of non-tradable 
shares are calculated by using net asset value. 
Age The age of the firm since listed. 
Lev Total equity/total liability 
Employees The logarithm of employee number 
Restricted Restricted shares. The number of shares that cannot be 
traded publicly during a time period according to regulation. 
ROA_F Return on asset, forwarded one year. ROA is the ratio of net 
income to the average of ending total assets this year and 
the ending total assets last year.  
ΔROA ROA𝑡+1 − (ROA𝑡 + ROA𝑡−1)/2 
Pastperform Past performance, (ROA𝑡−1 + ROA𝑡−2)/2 
ROS_F Return on sales, forwarded one year. Return on sales equals 
to the ratio of net income to sales 
ΔROS ROS𝑡+1 − (ROS𝑡 + ROS𝑡−1)/2 
OM_F Operating margin, forwarded one year. Operating Margin 
(OM)= EBIT/Sales 
Δ OM OM𝑡+1 − (OM𝑡 + OM𝑡−1)/2 
ROIC_F Return on invested capital (ROIC)= (net income+financial 
expenses)/(total assets-current liabilityies+notes 
payable+short-term borrowings +long-term liabilities due 
within one year), forwarded one year. 
CostofDebt_F Cost of debt is the ratio of net interest expense to sales 
according to Cao, Hou, and Pan (2015).  
Subsidy_F Logarithm of government subsidy, forwarded one year. 
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ETR_F Effective tax rate, forwarded one year. Following Feng, 
Johansson, and Zhang (2015)’s method, ETR is defined as 
(tax expense-deferred tax expense)/EBIT. 
ΔETR Following Feng et al. (2015)’s method, ΔETR represents the 
change in tax burden, equaling to the difference between the 
three year average annual effective tax rate before and after 
the political endorsements.  
Salary_F Logarithm of salaries of top 3 managers. 











Political visit is an under-researched way in which governments influence the capital 
markets. Chinese state leaders (i.e. Politburo Standing Committee Members) often 
visit firms during their domestic inspection tours. This study shows that 
representativeness, political connections and alignment with government goals are the 
three basic criteria for choosing firms to visit. This paper documents positive market 
reactions contingent on the political power of different administrations and 
government officials. Moreover, the results show that visits are associated with higher 
operating performance, which are robust after applying PSM to control selection on 
observables and applying treatment effects model with instrumental variable technique 
to control for selection on unobservables. These positive impacts are also contingent 
on certain firm characteristics and the levels of institutional development. Finally, this 
paper finds that political visit can be substituted as a source of legitimacy for CSR 
activities and increases the social attention for the firms, which reduces firms’ 




4.1  Introduction 
Governments participate in financial markets through various methods, such as 
establishing regulations and policies (e.g.Johnson, 1960; Krueger, 1974), providing 
subsidies or directly owning firms (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002). 
Some recent literature, such as that of Li, Tsang, Luo, and Ying (2016) and Schuler, 
Shi, Hoskisson, and Chen (2017), point out that site visits by political leaders are a 
way in which the government affects the market. For example, He and Tian (2008) 
regard politicians’ site visits as a way to enhance government-business relationships 
and thus get more resources. However, research on political visits is still very limited. 
For example, the criteria the government uses to choose firms to visit is still unclear. 
And previous literature cannot differentiate the effects of political visits done by 
officials with different political power, nor between two administrations. Moreover, 
firms’ actions after the visits are largely ignored by previous literature. 
To fill these gaps, this paper focuses on political visits and explores the criteria 
for choosing firms and the impact of political visits on market and firm behaviour. 
Political visit, in this paper, is defined as a political device in which a high-level 
political leader carries out all the functions and symbolic representations of governing 
by periodically visiting firms. For example, in the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron 
visited the London Taxi Company in May 2015, which resulted in a so-called hugely 
exciting day for Coventry. President Obama, for another example, visited Apple Pay 
on 13th February 2015, described as a “big win for Apple Pay” by the CEO of Crone 
Consulting LLC since political visits bring about huge promotional value. Political 
visits are an important opportunity for the government to make key instructions to the 
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market. For instance, Obama visited the Detroit Auto Show in January 2016 and gave 
a speech expressing his government’s idea on the auto industry. 
To test the impact of political visit on capital market, I manually collected data 
on political visits of members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (PSC) in China from the Leader’s Activity Database from 1st January 
2009 to 31st July 2016, covering two administrations, one led by President Hu (1st 
January 2009 to 15th November 2012) and the other by President Xi (15th November 
2012 to 31st July 2016), enabling me to examine the different effects between the two 
administrations. Since the reports in the database reveal the identities of the visiting 
leaders, I code the political power of those leaders according to their political positions, 
enabling this paper to differentiate the effects of political visits by officers with 
different political power.  
Based on analysis of the data and interviews conducted by previous researchers 
like Schuler et al. (2017), this study first proposes that the government is more inclined 
to visit firms that have political connections, adhere to government goals and purposes, 
or are representative enough like the leading performers in their respective fields. The 
results show that firm-level political connection can increase the possibility of being 
visited, while individual-level connections have no impact. Leaders also prefer to visit 
firms located in less developed places, which is consistent with one of the 
government’s goals to weaken the wealth gap and stimulate the economy in poor 
places, and also are more likely to visit firms with more employees which meets 
government’s goal to maximize the social impacts of the visits and win people’s 
support. Moreover, the results show that the government is more inclined to visit firms 
that have better past performance and larger size because such kinds of firms usually 
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play a vital part in the local economy and thus are representative.  
Moreover, this paper hypothesizes that political visits are beneficial for firm, 
both in the form of market performance and operating performance, especially during 
the Xi administration due to this administration’s more united structure of PSC and 
stronger political power. Political visits demonstrate government’s promotion for the 
firms, and literature on political connections highlights that government support in 
countries with discretionary government can bring about material resources, 
suggesting that being visited by state leaders implies future favourable resources. For 
example, close relationships with government can help firms achieve bank loans 
(Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and generate higher long-term returns (Luo & Liu, 2009). 
Furthermore, the theory of private benefits of control provides a theoretical 
background for the positive emotional effects of political visits. Based on Yermack 
(2011), private benefits of control means people can utilise their position and power to 
obtain not only economic benefits but also intangible benefits, such as prestige and 
visibility. For instance, it is the public visibility and prestige Michelle Obama received 
from her political position as First Lady that made her influential in the fashion 
industry (Yermack, 2011). Similarly, in terms of political visits, visiting leaders can 
confer their prestige and visibility as political leaders upon visited firms, thus leading 
to market reactions.  
The results indicate that political visits are positively correlated with market 
reactions over different time windows, especially when visited by Xi administration. 
In addition, this study finds that the higher the levels of leaders’ political power, the 
higher market reactions. After applying PSM to alleviate endogeneity problems caused 
by observable factors and applying treatment effects model with instrumental variable 
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technique to control hidden bias, results reveal that political visits, in particular by Xi 
administration, are significantly and positively correlated with firms’ future 
performance, no matter which performance measurements are used. As a further step, 
I take firm and institution heterogeneity into account to explore whether visits 
differentially affect firm performance across different types of firms and different 
levels of institutional development. The results show that political visits are more 
valuable for firms that are less-connected, weakly performed, or heavily dependent on 
external financing, since political leaders can confer legitimacy and prestige upon 
these firms. And political visit is also more valuable for firms located in places with 
good institutions because the higher quality of local institution can ensure the resources 
from central government eventually reach the target firms without being grabbed.  
Finally, to fill the literature gap about the post-event resources firms obtain and 
firms’ reactions to visits, I examine resources like loans and subsidies, and also test 
firms’ reactions on corporate social responsibilities (CSR) and reactions on unethical 
behaviour like earnings management. The results find that political visit has positive 
impact on bank loans and government subsidies, but imposes negative impact on 
donation because the legitimacy provided by political visit reduce firms’ need to 
conduct CSR. In addition, due to the increased social attention after visits, the 
disclosures about aspects like how firms protect investors increase. However, the 
decreased accountability of managers because of the increased job security and 
privileges brought by political connections after visits can lead to higher earnings 
management.  
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, this study 
complements the literature on the role of government. Existing literature points out 
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that governments can participate in markets through different approaches, such as 
issuing policies (Krueger, 1974), establishing political connections (e.g. Faccio, 
Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; You & Du, 2012)and directly owing firms (La Porta et 
al., 2002). This paper explores an under-researched approach through which the 
government can participate in the market – political visits. Different from political 
connection, both connected and non-connected firms can be targets of political visits. 
Additionally, political leaders that visit firms usually hold much higher positions than 
the government officials that firms generally connect with. For example, firms are 
usually visited by the president, though they rarely have connections with such high-
level political leaders. Moreover, this paper also provides supporting evidence for the 
development view (Arthur Lewis, 1945; Gerschenkron, 1962; Hawtrey, 1926) of the 
government’s positive role in the market. 
Second, this paper is the first to differentiate between the effects of political 
visits from leaders with different political powers, compare the effects of two 
administrations, and identify the post-event resources and firm reactions. Existing 
literature about political visits or presidential travel is restricted to the impact of 
political visits on leaders themselves, or the impact on firm performance and market 
reaction, and cannot tell the difference between two administrations or the impact on 
firms’ post-event behaviour. For example, extant literature points out that political 
visits can increase presidents’ popularity (Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Ostrom & Simon, 
1985), make power more tangible (Herbst, 2014; Mitchell, 1991) and secure the 
allegiance of local elites (Schatzberg, 2001). Li et al. (2016) and Schuler et al. (2017) 
demonstrate the impact of government leaders’ site visits on market and firm 
performance. This paper considers political visits from a different angle, by focusing 
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on the impact on markets and post-event firm behaviour, and comparing the effects of 
different leaders and different administrations.  
Third, this study largely contributes to literature on political visits by examining 
how the government chooses which firms to visit. No literature or material to date has 
clarified the criteria of how visited firms are selected. Schuler et al. (2017) conducted 
interviews with several experts in business-government relations and speculated that 
long-term interactions between firms and government may result in political visits. 
This paper is the first to identify the key criteria used when choosing firms. The results 
of this paper show that political connection is one key criterion, which is consistent 
with the interview results. The results complement the study of Schuler et al. (2017) 
by pointing out that only firm-level political connection can significantly improve the 
probability of political visits while individual connection is not a significant 
determinant.  
Fourth, this paper is related to the literature on CSR. Existing literature 
highlights that political connection is positively correlated with corporate philanthropy 
activities (Li, Song, & Wu, 2015) and environmental information disclosure (Cheng, 
Wang, Keung, & Bai, 2017), and negatively related to management earnings forecast 
(Xing, Duan, & Hou, 2017). This paper complements previous literature by 
investigating the effects of political visits on corporate CSR and pointing out that 
political visits can be substituted as a source of legitimacy and demotivate firms from 
contributing to CSR. 
This paper provides insights for government, firms and investors. First, since the 
results of this study demonstrate that political visits have impacts on resource 
allocation and can direct the ideas of the market, government can refine their selection 
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strategies and visit more socially meaningful firms like environmental-friendly firms 
to enhance social welfare. Second, considering the high value of political visit, 
managers can try to strengthen the aspects that are pointed out as the key determinants 
of political visit in this paper, thus increasing the probability of hosting PSC leaders. 
Third, for the investors, the results of this paper identified which kinds of visits are 
more valuable, thus providing investment insights. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two reviews 
literature, and hypotheses are developed in Section Three. Section Four introduces 
institutional background and Section Five describes the sample and data. The criteria 
for choosing firms to visit are explored in Section Six. Results about the impact of 
political visits on market reactions and firm performance are detailed in Sections Seven 
and Eight respectively. Section Nine analyses the post-event resources and firms’ 
reactions. Finally, conclusions are articulated in Section Ten. 
4.2  Literature Review 
Site visit is a common strategy used by mutual funds and analysts to obtain 
information advantages and boost investment profits. Based on Liu, Dai, and Kong 
(2017), useful information gained from site visits can motivate mutual funds to amplify 
their trading volume and improve their predictive ability significantly to earn higher 
standardised unexpected earnings. This paper also demonstrates a significant positive 
relationship between predictive accuracy and the number of topics mentioned during 
conversations between mutual funds and firm managers. These effects are also 
certified by Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang (2016), who claim that corporate site visits 
can improve forecast accuracy of visiting analysts, and that visits to manufacturing 
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firms and firms with more tangible assets and more concentrated business lines are 
more informative, since these kinds of firms have more observable activities and assets.  
However, little research in finance recognises that site visits are also used by the 
government as a device to influence the market. The government influences the market 
using various methods. Previous literature mainly focuses on political connection (e.g. 
Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio et al., 2006), government policies (e.g. 
Krueger, 1974) and state ownership (e.g. Shleifer, 1998). Specifically, establishing 
regulations and policies is one of the most straightforward ways for the government to 
influence the financial market. For example, the pioneering work of Krueger (1974) in 
political economy demonstrates that government policies like import restrictions can 
harm economic development, showing that establishing policies is an approach that is 
regularly used by the government to affect the market. Many researchers, such as 
Ramey and Ramey (1994), Bhagwati (1969) and Johnson (1960), also certify that 
government policies such as those on government spending, tariffs and quotas can 
influence economic growth. Directly owing firms is another approach for the 
government to participate in the market (La Porta et al., 2002). Compared with other 
approaches, direct government ownership allows governments to have overwhelming 
power over firms. Moreover, political connection is also a common way through which 
both governments in developed countries (Kim, Pantzalis, & Park, 2012) and 
developing economies (Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) influence the 
market. 
Recently, a stream of literature has begun focusing on a new kind of method 
used by the government to affect the market – political visits by government officials. 
Political visits are pervasive in both developing and developed countries. For example, 
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in the USA, President Obama visited corporate executives in the White House, which 
led to positive abnormal stock returns and helped firms win more government contracts 
(Brown & Huang, 2017). In the Chinese market, Schuler et al. (2017) pinpoint similar 
effects on firm performance after being visited by the president or premier.  
However, research on political visits is still quite limited, and existing literature 
cannot differentiate between the effects of officials with different levels of political 
power, and ignore post-event firm reactions as well as the criteria used to choose which 
firms to visit. This study focuses on political visits to fill these gaps. Political visit, in 
this paper, is defined as a political device in which a high-level political leader carries 
out all the functions and symbolic representations of governing by periodically visiting 
firms. 
Political visits have multiple political objectives, such as giving key instructions 
to the market and making governments’ will manifest in person, and also lead to a 
series of market consequences. Based on in-depth case studies of six firms, He and 
Tian (2008) show that site visits by politicians can enhance firm-government 
relationships. Later research empirically investigates the impact on market views. For 
example, focusing on the political visits of the top two government officials – the 
president and premier – during the Hu administration, an event study conducted by 
Schuler et al. (2017) on 84 political visits in China demonstrates a significant positive 
market reaction. This paper complements this study by differentiating the effects of 
visits by different high-ranking government leaders, comparing the effects of the two 
different administrations, and investigating the impact on firm performance and post-
event reactions. I propose that different government leaders and administrations 
provide distinct signalling and certification effects due to their respective governance 
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style and methods.  
In addition to market reactions, Li et al. (2016) tested the effects of political 
visits on firm performance. By investigating visits to manufacturing firms from 2004 
to 2007, Li et al. (2016) point out a positive relationship between political visits and 
firms’ ROA and market-to-book ratio, and highlight that the effects are contingent on 
the severity of information asymmetry and the availability of alternative ways of 
reducing transaction costs. This paper can complement this paper from two 
perspectives. First, by focusing on visits to firms from all industries, this paper can 
eliminate the bias due to the sole focus on manufacturing industry. According to Cheng 
et al. (2016), analyst visits to manufacturing firms can provide more useful information 
because this kind of firms has more observable assets. Therefore, it’s possible that the 
positive effects on firm performance are biased by the nature of the manufacturing 
industry, and this paper can rule out this bias by focusing on all industries. Second, 
firms’ post-visit actions are largely ignored by previous literature. This paper 
complements existing literature by investigating the impacts of political visits on 
corporate social responsibilities and firms’ unethical behaviour.  
4.3  Hypothesis Development 
Almost no literature or material clarifies the mechanism of how firms are chosen 
for political visits, but some indications can be observed from interviews of companies 
and experts. According to the interviews done by Schuler et al. (2017), business-
government relation experts speculated that long-term and complex firm-government 
interactions play a role in the choice of firms. Based on interviews at three firms in 
Guangdong province done by Li et al. (2016), firms need to find a ‘matchmaker’ 
120 
 
between firms and officials in order to secure political visits. However, the visits 
investigated by Li et al. (2016) are from general government officials, not top leaders. 
This paper focuses on top leaders in China, and it's very difficult to influence the visit 
choices of leaders as high as presidents just by using a matchmaker. 
Based on the collected data and the above-mentioned interviews, this paper 
proposes that representativeness, political connections, and alignment with 
government policies are the basic criteria for choosing firms to visit. First, firms must 
be representative enough among other firms in that city in some aspects. For example, 
a firm can be representative if it has larger size or if it is the leading performers in its 
field, because such kind of firms usually plays a vital part in the local economy or 
witnessed the development of that place, and thus has larger social impacts. For a 
specific example, CRRC Changchun Railway Vehicles Co., Ltd was visited by Premier 
Li in April 2015, and was visited again by President Xi in 21st July 2015. This firm 
became a frequent target of visit because it is representative enough in its advanced 
industrial upgrading and outstanding performance of the railway equipment 
manufacturing. 
Second, as shown in the interviews conducted by Schuler et al. (2017), political 
connections are a factor in the choice of firms. But this is just speculation of 
interviewed experts, we still cannot rule out the possibility that firms can achieve 
political visits without connection as long as they are representative or aligned with 
government policies. Therefore, this paper tests whether political connection is a 
possible vital influencing factor in firm visiting decisions, but not a prerequisite. 
Third, this study assumes that visited firms are ones that adhere to the goals, 
policies and ideologies promoted by the government. Since political visits are an 
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opportunity for the government to instruct the market, the types of visited firms will 
change according to the government’s various purposes. For instance, during the 
National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 
Premier Keqiang Li proposed the concept of “Internet+”, demonstrating that 
integrating internet with traditional businesses to create more competitive new 
business models is now put on the top agenda to reach the national strategic level. 
Correspondingly, more and more internet entrepreneurs were chosen as part of the 
delegation to accompany the president during international political visits. For another 
example, encouraging innovation is an important goal of visit recently. From 5th March 
to 20th July 2016, president Xi visited the provinces Anhui, Heilongjiang, and Ningxia, 
and he emphasized the importance of innovation in all of these places. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that firms that are in line with the government's goals, policies and 
ideology are more likely to be chosen as the target of political visits.  
Some government goals and purposes are temporary, like promoting “Internet 
+” as mentioned above, while some are long-term – these are easier to measure and 
test. For example, one of the government’s most important long-term goals is to 
weaken the wealth gap; therefore, it can be supposed that the government tends to 
more frequently visit firms located in less developed places in order to stimulate the 
local economy. Another long-term goal of the government is to win people’s support; 
therefore, this paper will test whether the government tends to visit firms with more 
employees in order to win people’s support.  
Hypothesis 1: Representativeness, political connections and alignment with 
government goals are the basic criteria for choosing firms to visit. 
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This paper hypothesizes that political visits are positively correlated with market 
reactions and future firm performance. Firstly, the political visit indicates 
government’s promotion of the firms since the selected firms are representative, with 
connections, or align with government goals, and the literature on political connection 
demonstrates that government support can increase firms’ access to resources, 
particularly in countries with a high-discretionary government like China (Chen, Ding, 
& Kim, 2010; Yan & Li, 2018), showing that political visits not only imply the high 
quality of visited firms, but also more potential resources. With an overwhelming 
advantage over most unconnected peers in terms of their intimate relationship with the 
government, connected firms can obtain more favourable treats. As Faccio et al. (2006) 
suggest, once firms belong to the cronies or families of current ruling political parties 
or leaders, these connected firms can get preferential resources, such as bailouts. Other 
preferential treats such as tax reductions (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2007; 
Faccio, 2010; Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008), tariffs on counterparts (Goldman, 
Rocholl, & So, 2008) and easier access to loans (Khwaja & Mian, 2005) are common 
among connected firms. As a result, connected firms demonstrate higher value and 
generate higher long-term returns for investors (Calomiris, Fisman, & Wang, 2010; 
Hillman, 2005; Luo & Liu, 2009; Siegel, 2007). 
Secondly, the theory about private benefits of control provides a theoretical 
background for the positive emotional effects of political visits. Private benefits of 
control means people can obtain economic gains for themselves by taking advantage 
of their position and power. For example, by analysing NYSE or Amex firms, Barclay 
and Holderness (1989) claim that block holders can trade at a premium and get private 
benefits by taking advantage of their voting power. According to Yermack (2011), not 
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only economic benefits but also intangible benefits, such as reputation, prestige and 
public visibility, can be obtained through people’s public positions. For instance, the 
clothing choices of former First Lady Michelle Obama can create significant value for 
designers and retailers. It is the public visibility and prestige she obtained from her 
political position as First Lady that gives her the power to influence the market. In 
terms of political visits, visiting political leaders such as presidents can confer the 
publicity and prestige obtained from their position upon visited firms, thus leading to 
market reactions, which complies with the theory about private benefits of control.  
Furthermore, this study proposes that political visits under different government 
administrations have distinct impacts on market views and firm performance due to 
the different governance styles and structures. The time period covered in this study 
(2009-2016) witnessed a major turnover in PSC personnel and position changes upon 
completion of a term of office in the fall of 2012, providing an excellent setting to 
deeply investigate the impact of visits done by PSC members by comparing the two 
administrations. First, the change in personnel was huge, as seven out of nine PSC 
members had to step down due to retirement age rules (Li, 2012), meaning that most 
of the PSC seats were filled by newcomers during the administration transition. These 
newcomers, with distinct fame and ruling styles, influence the value of political visits. 
Second, the number of PSC positions was reduced from nine to seven. The size 
reduction is vital, since the number games can determine which faction occupies the 
pinnacle of power and thus controls top decisions. As a result of the size reduction, 
PSC internal conflicts can be reduced and consensus can be reached more easily. 
Therefore, being visited by the more united PSC of the Xi administration implies more 
solid support from the central government. Third, compared with the Hu 
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administration, the Xi administration is more powerful and are more significantly and 
positively correlated with market reactions. For instance, after a key four-day meeting 
of top-level party officials in Beijing, the Communist Party elevated Xi Jinping to the 
"core" of its leadership. "The core of the Chinese Communist Party” is not just a new 
title but very symbolic in China and implies the power of President Xi. Moreover, after 
Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign, his reputation and prestige became more 
impressive. As a result, this paper hypothesizes that markets make more dramatic 
reactions to visits by President Xi’s government because of its power, reputation, and 
more united structure of PSC. 
Moreover, this paper hypothesizes that there are firm and institutional 
heterogeneities regarding the effects of political visits. First, the positive relationship 
between political visit and firm performance is more significant for firms with lower 
legitimacy like those privately owned, and firms with lower reputation like those with 
weak performance, as political visit can help these kinds of firms obtain legitimacy 
and regain reputation. Second, the value of political visit is expected to be greater for 
firms with heavy dependence on external financing since political visit can act as a 
guarantee from central government to attract more external funds. Third, the quality 
of the local government plays a vital role in determining whether the support from 
central government can eventually reach the visited firms rather than being grabbed 
by the local officials. Local government’s role as a grabbing-hand is proved by a lot 
of researchers like Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009), so this paper hypothesizes that 
better regional institutional development can ensure firms obtain resources after the 
visits, thus leading to better operating performance. 
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Hypothesis 2: Political visits, especially visits by the Xi administration, are 
positively associated with market reactions and future firm performance, and 
the impacts are contingent on firm and institutional characteristics.  
In addition to market reactions and firm performance, this paper hypothesizes that 
achieving political visit can influence firms’ views on corporate social responsibilities 
(CSR) activities and affect firms’ behaviour on disclosure and earnings management 
in order to meet the social expectation. Corporate social responsibility is a strategic 
means by which firms can establish social reputations, combat negative public views 
and ultimately achieve legitimacy. Legitimacy, according to Suchman (1995), is 
defined as the correctness, properness and desirableness of corporate actions which are 
aligned with social values, norms and beliefs. Researchers like Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) highlight the importance of legitimacy as a source of social support and 
resources. As a result, companies use CSR to improve their legitimacy, alleviate 
stakeholders’ defiance towards controversial firms and ultimately enhance firm 
performance (De Roeck & Delobbe, 2012; Frynas, 2005; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & 
Schwarz, 2006). For example, after being criticized by the pressure groups in the 1995 
Brent Spar and Nigeria crisis, Royal Dutch Shell engaged in CSR to mitigate criticism 
(Frynas, 2003). Relying on effective and sincere CSR, firms can positively affect 
consumer beliefs and attitudes (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, & Hill, 2006), strengthen 
stakeholder-company relationships (Bhattacharya, Korschun, & Sen, 2009) and 
motivate employees to regard their firms as a place to share their social values rather 
than just a place to work (Rodrigo & Arenas, 2008).  
Since political visits can confer reputation and legitimacy to visited firms, they 
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can be regarded as a substitute for CSR activities, which can demotivate firms to 
conduct CSR activities. Donation is a common CSR activity firms engage to improve 
legitimacy, especially for firms in controversial industries like oil companies. For 
example, Du and Vieira (2012) highlight that oil firms are more inclined to partner 
with and provide donations to non-profit organisations. In this paper, I suppose the 
need to donate is reduced because political visits are an alternative source of legitimacy.  
On the other hand, some CSR activities are under heavy government pressure, and 
this paper supposes political visit is positively correlated with this kind of government-
related CSR activities as an exchange for the political visits. The government’s role in 
business ethics is controversial. Researchers like Davis (1973) emphasise that 
corporate social responsibility activities are voluntary, and this view is supported by 
business executives in the US and Europe who claim that the government’s power to 
force firms to conduct CSR is limited (Aaronson & Reeves, 2002). By contrast, 
according to EuropeanCommission (2004), governments have a strong initiative to 
influence firms’ CSR. This view is supported by researchers like Moon (2004) who 
highlights that the government is another driver of CSR. For example, in the face of 
fiscal obligations, the UK Thatcher government successfully shifted their 
responsibility for unemployment to firms, and expected firms to address training and 
work opportunity problems for the unemployed, and incorporate this as a form of CSR. 
This paper will further tests whether firms tend to increase their government-related 
CSR such as employing more staffs in exchange for visits. 
Moreover, due to the increased social attention after political visits, this study 
assumes that firms after visits tend to engage more in disclosure. According to Cheng 
et al. (2017), political connection can motivate firms to disclose environmental 
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information more actively. Considering the fact that political visits implied a 
connection and the social attention increased dramatically after visits, firms’ disclosure 
like shareholder protection, supplier protection and environment protection is expected 
to increase, though their real money-related donation decreased. Furthermore, this 
paper assumes that the decreased accountability of managers because of the increased 
job security and privileges brought by political connection after visits, combined with 
the higher expectation of the market will motivate firms to conduct more unethical 
behaviour like fraud and earnings management. 
Hypothesis 3: Political visits demotivate firms’ non-government-related CSR 
activities while motivate government-related CSR, disclosure, and firms’ 
unethical behaviour.  
4.4  Institutional Background 
Historically, the inspection tour is a vital form of political supervision since 
ancient China, generally carried out by supervisory organs of the central government 
or even by emperors themselves. The earliest recorded patrol is from the era of Yao 
and Shun (about 2281 B.C.). Officials were sent by emperors Yao and Shun to carry 
out inspection touring every five years to observe the people's condition, and acted as 
a bridge between emperors and people. Besides sending officials, most emperors 
patrolled the country by themselves. For example, the emperor of the Qin Dynasty 
(221 B.C.-207 B.C.) spent more time performing inspection tours than in his palace. 
Many emperors of other dynasties, such as the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.) and 
the Tang Dynasty (619 A.D.-907 A.D.) also went out to inspect frequently, among 
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which the inspection touring of the Qing Dynasty (1644 A.D.-1911 A.D.) is the most 
famous as the emperors strongly favoured inspection tours, left their footprints all over 
the country and claimed that visiting was more efficient than listening to officials.  
The sole ruling party of China, the CPC, inherited these institutionalised 
practices, viewing visiting as a "weapon" to rule the Party and the country. The 
president of China, Jinping Xi, stressed repeatedly in a 2017 meeting of the CPC that 
the authority of political visiting must be ensured, and also emphasized the vital role 
of political visits during the symposium held in Wuhan on 23rd July, 2013, showing 
that the government highly values such visits. Political visits are the carrier of the 
government’s will. The most famous example of political visiting is the southern tour 
conducted by Xiaoping Deng in 1992, from the capital to southern areas like 
Guangzhou, which aimed to show the world China's determination to achieve 
economic reform. In 2012, President Jinping Xi repeated Deng's southern tour as his 
first political visit after he took office in order to encourage further economic reform. 
In 2017, during President Xi's visit to Switzerland, the Swiss president asked Xi about 
his reflections on country governance, he highlighted the importance of political visit 
and said that he spent five years to travel around provinces in China, showing that 
visiting is still a vital approach to governing in modern China.  
This study focuses on the visits by the members of the Politburo Standing 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (PSC). PSC functions as the most 
powerful part of Chinese central government, usually composed of five to nine 
political heavyweights. The PSC, first established in 1928 to support the daily work of 
the Communist Party, now aims to practice "collective leadership" and prohibit 
arbitrary decision-making by individual leaders. The power of PSC members mainly 
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lies in their simultaneous control over state and Party positions. For example, Jintao 
Hu took the simultaneous positions of the President of China and the general secretary 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Furthermore, PSC members’ strong 
appointment power of high-level political personnel, and the influential regional power 
they accumulated in previous positions, give them enormous political power. PSC 
members are responsible for different functional departments, such as foreign relations 
and military affairs. The positions of visiting leaders can influence people’s 
interpretations of visited firms. For example, visits by Keqiang Li, who is responsible 
for finance and economy, usually transmit policy information, while visits by 
Guoqiang He, who is responsible for party discipline, imply firms’ position on party-
building. 
The purposes of the PSC member visit mainly consist in three types: for politics, 
for economic development and for society. First, as to politics, one typical example is 
the large-scale visits by PSC members after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
Central Committee of the CPC (TPS). The focuses of all political visiting during that 
time period are consistent with the Decision of TPS, showing that political visit is used 
as a way in which government spreads and promotes their new disciplines. Another 
example to show that the PSC members visit firms for political reasons is that firms 
sometimes are inspected about their performance in organising Party-related activities.  
Second, another most important objective of political visits is to deliver key 
instructions to the market (i.e. for economic development). Economy-oriented visits 
usually release some important signals for policies. For example, Keqiang Li, who is 
mainly responsible for economic development, chose to visit two relatively more 
developed provinces, Shanghai and Jiangsu, as his first destinations after assuming 
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office, and then the Shanghai Free Trade Zone was established after his visit.  
Third, improving social welfare is also an important target of political visits by 
PSC members. Social problems like poverty alleviation, medical care, employment, 
housing and food safety are main focuses of inspection during visits. For instance, 
during the visit of Premier Keqiang Li in Sichuan on 26th April 2016, he asked detailed 
questions about the employment, entrepreneurship and job training of university 
students. So it can be expected that firms that contribute to social welfare, such as by 
expanding recruitment for graduates, can increase their probability of being visited. 
4.5  Sample and Data 
Data on political visits is hand-collected from the Leader’s Activity Database. 
The data is from 1st January 2009 to 31st July 2016, covering two administrations: that 
of President Hu (1st January 2009 to 15th November 2012) and that of President Xi 
(15th November 2012 to 31st July 2016).  
The reports in the Leader’s Activity Database reveal information about who the 
visiting leaders were, where they visited and what they did. I record the visit locations 
and the firm names. I also record leaders’ names and rank them according to their 
political power. Other financial data, such as return on assets and firm size, can be 
obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research Database 
(CSMAR), which is developed according to international standards and focuses on the 
Chinese market. The definitions of variables are shown in Appendix 1. 
[Insert Appendix 1] 
I collected data from 713 political visits by PSC members to firms from 1st 
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January 2009 to 31st July 2016. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of provinces that PSC 
members visited. It demonstrates that almost all provinces were visited. Firms located 
in the eastern area have a higher probability of visit. It is worth noting that the number 
of visit in Tibet is zero does not mean PSC members did not visit Tibet. It means PSC 
members did not visit listed firms in Tibet which I can identify the stock number. 
Similarly, the number of visit for Taiwan is zero is because my sample only include 
the visits for firms listed in mainland.  
 Table 4.1 shows the distribution of visits by different leaders. Compared with 
the Xi administration, the Hu administration visited firms more frequently, with 133 
and 580 visits respectively. In the Xi administration, 29 out of 133 visits (21.80%) are 
done by President Xi, while only 38 out of 580 visits (6.55%) are done by President 
Hu during his administration. The higher visit frequency of president Xi is consistent 
with what he highlighted repeatedly in the meeting of CPC to ensure the priority of 
political visit. Moreover, comparing the visits of the two presidents and the 
corresponding PSC members who is mainly responsible for economic development, 
namely president Xi versus Keqiang Li (29 versus 36), and president Hu versus Jiabao 
Wen (38 versus 120), the data shows that the tendency that president Xi strengthens 
the direct leadership in the economy is obvious.  
 [Insert Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1] 
Panel A of Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of visited firms. After 
dropping all observations lack data on ownership, industry codes and other dependent 
and control variables, the number of firms is 188, which is lower than the observations 
of visit because firms can be visited for multiple times. Panel A compares the 
distribution of the number of visited firms that are state-owned and non-state owned. 
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Columns (3) to (6) are based on the subsample of Xi administration and Columns (7) 
to (10) are based on the subsample of Hu administration. Columns (3) and (7) 
demonstrate the number of visited firm during Xi and Hu administrations respectively 
after dropping all observations lack data on ownership, industry codes and other 
dependent and control variables. And Columns (5) and (9) show the number of all 
listed firms during Xi and Hu administrations respectively after dropping all 
observations lack data on ownership, industry codes and other dependent and control 
variables. Columns (4) and (6) show that in Xi administration, 49.02% of visited firms 
are SOEs, while only 41.39% of all listed firms are, meaning that the government is 
more likely to visit SOEs. Columns (8) and (10) show similar results in Hu 
administration. However, compared with the Hu administration, the Xi administration 
visits private firms more frequently, since the percentage of visits to SOEs versus 
private firms is 65.69% versus 34.31% for the Hu administration and 49.02% versus 
50.98% for the Xi administration. Panel B reveals the industry distribution of visited 
firms. Firms in industries such as energy and information technology are more likely 
to be visited. Moreover, the summary statistics of main variables used in this chapter 
are shown in Table 4.3.  
[Insert Table 4.2 and Table 4.3] 
4.6  How Does the Government Choose Which Firms to Visit? 
Recent researches (e.g. Schuler et al., 2017) on leaders’ site visits highlights the 
difficulty of identifying the criteria leaders use to determine which firms to visit. This 
paper fills this gap by investigating several possible determinants of political visits. 
First, this paper hypothesizes that the government is inclined to visit connected firms. 
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Three proxies are used to measure political connection: (1) Whether the controlling 
shareholders of the visited firms are the central government (CG) or other levels of 
government except central government (SOE_other); (2) The number of state shares 
(State shares); (3) Whether at least one director of the firm has working experience as 
a government official (PB). The dependent variable of Table 4.4 is P(visit), meaning 
the probability of being visited, which equals one if the firm is visited by political 
leaders and zero otherwise. The results shown in Columns (1) to (2) of Table 4.4 
demonstrate that political connection is a significant determinant of political visits. 
However, the results in Column (3) indicate that individual-level connection, like the 
political background of directors, cannot increase the probability of visit. These results 
can complement the paper of Schuler et al. (2017), which interviewed several business-
government relations experts and speculated that interaction between government 
officials and firms plays a significant role in securing political visits. The results show 
that firm-level political connection (Columns (1) and (2)) can significantly increase 
the probability of political visits, while individual connection, shown in Column (3), 
is not a significant determinant. Compared with the results of the Chapter 3 Table 4.3 
where the political connection cannot influence government’s idea to endorse, this 
chapter shows that firm-level connection can increase the probability of visit. One 
plausible reason for this difference is that political visits are more costly compared 
with endorsement in terms of the time and financial costs in travelling, planning, and 
organizing security, making it to be a rarer political support. Considering the high costs 
of political visit, some state-owned firms who play a vital role in the economy and 
have higher social impacts are more likely to be visited after cost-benefit analysis.  
Second, this paper hypothesizes that visited firms are firms that adhere to the 
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goals and ideologies promoted by the government. Since one of the long-term 
economic goals of the government is to weaken wealth gaps and stimulate the 
economy in remote areas, it can be assumed that firms located in poorer provinces are 
more likely to be the target of political visits. The first two geographic characteristics 
I test are municipality and autonomous areas. Municipality refers to four relatively 
developed cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. Autonomous areas are 
places with a lot of minorities and relatively less development. These two geographic 
characteristics can help us investigate whether provincial development level is taken 
into account when leaders choose firms to visit. Municipality is negatively significant 
(β=﹣0.277，P<1%), while Autonomous is positively significant (β=0.578，P<1%), 
as shown in Columns (4) and (5) respectively, meaning that the government is more 
inclined to visit less developed areas in order to confer credibility and attention upon 
those firms and regions. Moreover, the more employees one firm has, the larger the 
social impacts if PSC members visit the firm. Therefore, visiting firms with more 
employees can help government to disseminate ideas more quickly and also win more 
people’s support, which is also consistent with the government’s goal. Column (6) 
tested whether the logarithm of employee number (Employee) can significantly predict 
the probability of political visit, and the results support this hypothesis.  
Third, another hypothesis about the determinants of political visit is the 
representativeness of firms. For example, firms can be representative if it has larger 
size because such kind of firms usually plays a vital part in the local economy or 
witnessed the development of that place, and thus has larger social impacts. For 
another example, firms can be representative if they are leading performers in their 
respective fields. And the effects of age are mixed. On the one hand, firms with longer 
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history that witnessed the development of the located city are more representative. On 
the other hand, one of the top goals of the government during these years is promoting 
innovation like the Internet+ mentioned in the previous section. As a result, firms from 
emerging industries that are younger are more adherent to government’s goals, 
therefore more likely to win political visits. I tested whether firm size, age and past 
performance are determining factors of political visits in Models (1) to (6). The results 
of firm size and past performance are positively significant, which are consistent with 
the hypothesis that this kind of firms are more representative thus can win the political 
visits. The results of firm age show that younger firms are more likely to be visited. 
One plausible reason is that younger firms adheres to some temporary goals of the 
government like the promotion on innovation. 
 [Insert Table 4.4] 
4.7  Political Visits and Market Reaction 
To examine the value of political visits, I first use event study to examine 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Abnormal return is calculated as the excess return 
over market return. The event day is the visit day rather than the report day of the 
political visit. In most cases, the report date would be several days later than the actual 
visit date. Figure 4.2 shows that the market reactions to the Xi administration’s visits 
are much greater, approaching 2.7% at the event day, while the CAR for visit by Hu 
administration is 0.3% at the event day. This provides supporting evidence for 
Hypothesis 2, which states that the effects of visits by the Xi administration are more 
significant than those of the Hu administration because the Xi administration is more 
politically powerful and has a more unified PSC. Another possible reason for the 
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significant market reactions is that the Xi administration visited firms less frequently 
(133 times) than the Hu administration (580 times). The market starts to react ten days 
before, which is caused by information leakage, since leaders’ visiting plans are 
determined in advance and the local government is informed about the visit in advance 
in order to have enough time to prepare for the visit.  
 [Insert Figure 4.2] 
In Figure 4.3, I decompose the sample according to visiting leaders’ different 
levels of political power into three subsamples. The political power is coded according 
to the party positions and state positions of the PSC leaders. Detailed definitions of the 
ranking are provided in Appendix 2. Top2 means the President and the Premier; Top 3 
to 5 refers to the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, and the Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for 
Building Spiritual Civilization. And the remaining PSC leaders are classified into the 
category Others. Results in Figure 4.3 demonstrates that higher political power is 
associated with higher market reactions. 
 [Insert Figure 4.3] 
Table 4.5 shows the significance of market reactions over different time 
windows. Row (1) demonstrates that political visits are positively correlated with 
market reactions over all windows. In row (2), I categorize political visits according 
to administrations. The results show that the market reactions to visits by the Xi 
administration are more significant than for the Hu administration, which is consistent 
with Figure 4.2 and with Hypothesis 2. Row (3) divides the whole sample according 
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to leaders’ different rankings of political power. Top one refers to the President. The 
results show that market reactions to presidents’ site visits are significantly higher than 
those to other leaders under some windows. In Row (4) and (5) where I categorize 
visits into those by top two and top four, the results are all consistent that the greater 
the leaders’ political power, the more significant the market reactions. But Row (6) 
shows the market reactions for visits by top five leaders are not significantly different 
from those by other leaders.  
 [Insert Table 4.5] 
To further test the Hypothesis 2 that visit by PSC members of the Xi 
administration is more positively associated with market reactions due to its more 
unified PSC structure and stronger political power when compared with those by Hu 
administration, Table 4.6 regress the dummy variable Xi Adm which equals one if firms 
visited by the Xi administration on the CAR of different windows. And the results 
shown in Table 4.6 are consistent with the previous findings and support Hypothesis 
2. For example, Column (1) of Table 4.6 shows that the one-week market reactions of 
visits by Xi administration is 3.4% (P=0.014) higher than those of Hu administration.  
 [Insert Table 4.6] 
4.8  Political Visits and Firm Performance  
4.8.1 Baseline Results 
The Hypothesis 2 about the impacts of political visits on firm operating 
performance is tested according to the following model: 
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where performance refers to four one-year forwarded measurements of firm 
performance: return on asset (ROA_F),return on equity (ROE_F), return on sales 
(ROS_F) and return on invested capital (ROIC_F). Performance is forwarded one year 
in order to give firms enough time to take advantage of the political endorsement. The 
main variable of interest is Visit, a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is 
visited by PSC members. Based on literature, a series of variables that can influence 
firm operating performance are included as control variables, including variables 
represent political connections (CG, PBIntensity), firm characteristics (Employees, 
Size, Age, Distance, Lev, PastPerform), and governance quality (BoardQuality, 
Duality). The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix.  
The results in Table 4.7 demonstrates that political visit has significant positive 
associations with all measurements of operating performance except ROS. Columns 
(1), (2) and (4) demonstrate that compared with non-visited firms, visited firms 
outperform in ROA, ROE and ROIC by 0.9% (P=0.009), 3% (P=0.016), and 1.4% 
(P=0.005) respectively one year after visiting.  
The results are consistent with the paper of Li et al. (2016), which highlights the 
positive effects of visits by officials. However, the paper of Li et al. (2016) focuses on 
manufacturing firms, while visits to this kind of firms are proved to be more 
informative by researchers like Cheng et al. (2016) since manufacturing firms have 
more observable assets, which could help investors make decisions. This paper 
complements the research of Li et al. (2016) to rule out the potential bias caused by 
the special nature of manufacturing firms by expanding the sample to cover firms in 
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all industries. The results show that the positive effects of political visits on firm 
performance are robust, no matter what industries are covered and no matter what 
performance measurements are used.  
[Insert Table 4.7] 
4.8.2 Robustness Test: Propensity Score Matching 
One concern about the baseline results is that some observable firm characteristics 
can influence the probability of political visits and firm performance simultaneously. 
As shown in Table 4.8, some characteristics of visited firms are significantly different 
from those of non-visited firms, including the number of employees, size, age, leverage, 
past performance, distance to the capital and CEO duality. To alleviate the concern that 
visited firms are selected endogenously based on these characteristics, PSM nearest-
neighbour matching is applied to control the selection on observables by balancing out 
the groups being compared in terms of their covariates (Lennox, Francis, & Wang, 
2011). Through PSM, I formed treatment and control groups with a similar predicted 
likelihood of political visits; hence, these two groups are equally likely ex-ante to be 
visited by the government.  
Moreover, through matching firms according to their past performance, PSM can 
help this study alleviate the concern of reverse causality. The baseline results suffer 
from the concern that firms’ good performance after being visited is just because the 
government tends to choose well-performing firms to protect their reputation. PSM 
can reduce this bias through matching visited and non-visited firms with similar past 
performance. Furthermore, as suggested by Ettner (2004), PSM is particularly suitable 
for studies with very different sizes of treatment and control groups. Considering the 
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small amount of observations of political visits relative to the total firm-year 
observations for all listed firms during the sample period, PSM can help this study 
balance the observations.  
Table 4.8 compares the mean differences of key variables before and after PSM. 
Rows marked as “U” show the mean differences between visited and non-visited firms 
before PSM, and rows marked as “M” demonstrate those after matching. The results 
show that the mean differences between treatment and control groups are no longer 
significant for all these firm characteristics, and the standardised percentage bias for 
all variables after PSM is lower than 10%, meaning the matching balanced the groups 
well. And this is also shown explicitly in Figure 4.4 that the standardised percentage 
bias for all variables is narrowed to a large degree.  
[Insert Table 4.8 and Figure 4.4] 
In Table 4.9, I use the 319 matched pairs of visited and non-visited firms to test the 
effects of political visits on future firm performance. The results show that visited 
firms can significantly outperform firms in the control group after the political visit, 
no matter which performance measurements are used. Specifically, visited firms 
outperform in ROA, ROE, ROS and ROIC by 0.9% (P=0.011), 3% (P=0.002), 1.3% 
(P=0.063) and 1.3% (P=0.004) respectively. These results after PSM are consistent 
with the baseline results and support Hypothesis 2. 
[Insert Table 4.9] 
4.8.3 Robustness Test: Instrumental Variables 
Although PSM can control the selection on observables and alleviate the reverse 
causality between political endorsement and firm performance by matching treatment 
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and control groups according to firms’ past performance and other key characteristics 
to form samples with a similar predicted likelihood of political visits, the limitation of 
PSM is that it cannot deal with hidden bias or unobservable omitted variables issues. 
For example, there is still a concern that some omitted factors, like the growth potential, 
can simultaneously influence the possibility of visits and firm performance, thus 
biasing the results of previous tests. 
Following the method of Schuler et al. (2017) and Lennox et al. (2011), this 
paper applies the treatment effects model to control the selection on unobservables. 
Compared with 2SLS models, treatment effects model can add more structure to 
explicitly account for the binary nature of the endogenous regressor (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). The first stage is a probit model, where the dependent variable is the 
visit dummy. To ensure the identification of the model, an instrumental variable that 
affects the probability of visits but does not influence firms’ operating performance 
need to be included in the first-stage model. Then in the second stage, a treatment 
correction calculated based on the estimation of the first-stage model is included as a 
control variable to address bias caused by selection on unobservables (Guo & Fraser, 
2014; Heckman, 1977; Lennox et al., 2011; Schuler et al., 2017).  
The first instrument used in this paper is the percentage of PSC leaders who have 
life experience in the visited province (LifeRatio). LifeRatio is a valid instrumental 
variable because it meets the relevance condition that the leaders’ experience can 
influence the probability of visitation, and it also meets the exclusion condition, 
because no evidence or theory suggests that the percentage of PSC members who have 
life experience in the relevant provinces can influence firm performance. Moreover, 
considering the fact that most people spend a long time in their birth place which is 
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randomly assigned, LifeRatio can be a good instrument because birth place is 
exogenous. Similarly, the second instrument variable used is the percentage of PSC 
leaders who have work experience in the visited province (WorkRatio). Different from 
LifeRatio, which takes into account PSC members’ experience before working, 
WorkRatio focuses on leaders’ experience after they start their political careers. The 
data about LifeRatio and WorkRatio are manually collected from the resumes of PSC 
leaders.  
According to an expert related to General Office of the State Council, visiting 
destinations are generally determined by the General Office of the State Council or by 
the general office of the Central Committee of the CPC, and these two organizations 
allocate PSC members to different places scientifically. For example, visit destinations 
should be diverse rather than concentrated in order to magnify the impact across the 
whole country. Therefore, it can be assumed that in order to let leaders have a deep 
understanding of the whole country rather than just of several provinces, PSC members 
are more likely to be arranged to visit places where they have no life or work 
experience. Although there are some examples that the places PSC members visit have 
some relationship with the leader, these are individual cases. Because PSC members 
rotated across different provinces when they were relatively junior and young, it is 
inevitable that some visit places are the provinces that they once worked in. So it is 
unreasonable to assume that PSC members prefer to visit provinces they once lived or 
worked in just according to these individual cases. From a holistic view, the visit 
destinations are allocated scientifically and thus leaders are more likely to visit 
provinces without previous experience in order to have a better grasp of the overall 
situation in the whole country. The significant negative relationships between the 
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possibility of political visit and the life experience ratio (β=﹣0.835, Marginal Effects=
﹣0.32, P<1%) or work experience ratio (β=﹣0.780, Marginal Effects=﹣0.30, P<1%) 
are proved in Columns (1) and (6) respectively in Table 4.10, which is consistent with 
the assumption.  
Columns (2) to (5) and (7) to (10) demonstrate the results for the second stage. 
The dependent variables are ROA_F, ROE_F, ROS_F and ROIC_F. The results in 
Columns (2) to (5) show that political visits are positively associated with firm 
performance when LifeRatio is used as the instrumental variable, regardless of which 
performance measurements are used. Specifically, visited firms can outperform 
counterparts in ROA_F, ROE_F, ROS_F and ROIC_F by 4.4% (P=0.088), 17.4% 
(P=0.041), 11.3% (P=0.053) and 7.6% (P=0.036) respectively. In Columns (7) to (10), 
when WorkRatio is used as the instrumental variable, visited firms can also outperform 
the control group in ROE_F by 16.4% (P=0.061), ROS_F by 12.0% (P=0.098) and 
ROIC_F by 7.3% (P=0.05). These results support Hypothesis 2 that political visits can 
improve firm performance, and are consistent with previous results. The Rho in 
Models (2) to (5) and (7) to (9) means the correlation between the error terms between 
the first-stage model and second-stage model. A negative Rho means the results using 
OLS in Tables 7 and 9 are biased downward, and the actual positive impact of political 
visits on firm performance should be larger. 
[Insert Table 4.10] 
4.8.4 Robustness Test: Bias Due to Variable Persistence 
Although this paper has already controlled for selection on observables by 
applying PSM methodology and controlling for selection on unobservables through 
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using treatment effects model with the instrumental variable technique, another 
potential concern of these results is that the statistical significance of the tests is 
overstated due to persistence in variables and correlation over time.  
Table 4.11 tests the impact of political visits on the performance change as a 
robustness test. Performance change equals one-year forwarded performance minus 
the average of this year’s and last year’s performance. Four measurements of 
performance change are tested: ΔROA, ΔROE, ΔROS and ΔROIC. Columns (1) to (4) 
show the results of OLS tests, and Columns (5) to (8) demonstrate the results of tests 
using the instrumental variable: the percentage of PSC leaders who have life 
experience in the visited province (LifeRatio). The results are consistent with previous 
results, regardless of whether OLS or treatment effects models are used. 
[Insert Table 4.11] 
4.8.5 Visit Heterogeneity and Firm Heterogeneity 
This paper further investigates visit heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity. I test 
whether the market reacts differently across different visits (e.g. visits by the Xi or Hu 
administrations) and different types of firms (e.g. firms with different past performance, 
with political connections or dependent on external financing).  
Column (1) of Table 4.12 tests Hypothesis 2 that visits by the Xi administration 
are more value-adding because of its higher political power. The positive coefficient 
of the interaction term Visit × Xi Adm (β=0.019, P=0.013) supports the hypothesis, 
meaning that being visited by Xi administration is a positive moderating factor.  
As for firm traits that can influence the impact of political visits, this paper 
supposes that firms with lower reputation or legitimacy, or that depend more heavily 
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on external financing, can benefit from political visits to a greater extent because such 
visits can help these kinds of firms regain their reputation, obtain legitimacy and access 
key resources, as well as acting as a guarantee from the central government to help 
firms easily access external funds. Therefore, the impact of political visits on firms 
with weak pre-event performance, fewer political connections and a greater 
dependence on external financing is expected to be larger. 
The interaction term Visit × PastPerform (β=﹣0.226, P<1%) in Column (2) and 
the interaction term Visit × StatesShare (β=﹣0.021, P=0.021) in Column (3) support 
the hypothesis that firms that perform weakly or have fewer political connections can 
benefit more from political visits. The results in Column (4) show that the positive 
association between political visit and firm performance is higher (7.6%, P=0.011) 
when firms depend heavily on external funds. 
 [Insert Table 4.12] 
4.8.6 Institution Heterogeneity 
Besides the visit administrations and firm characteristics tested above, regional 
institutional development can also influence the impact of political visits on firm 
performance. Political visits by PSC members represent support from the central 
government, and the quality of the local government plays a vital role in ensuring that 
the support and resources eventually reach the visited firms rather than being grabbed 
by local officials. Researchers like Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) and Cheung et al. (2009) 
highlight the different roles of central and local governments, indicating the potential 
conflicts of interest among different levels of government, and thus implying the 
possibility that support from the central government cannot reach the target firms. 
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Moreover, compared with central government, it is the local government that interact 
more frequently with local firms and influence their operations. Therefore, visits for 
firms located in provinces with better institutions are expected to be more valuable, 
since resources from the central government can eventually reach the intended targets. 
Based on the surveys of Fan and Wang (2011), two indices about the levels of 
institutional development are used in this study. For easier and more consistent 
interpretations, I transformed these indices into dummy variables equal one if the 
institutional development of the province is better than the national average and zero 
otherwise: (1) extra charge besides taxes (LessExTax) means the ratio of extra charge 
besides taxes to sales, reflecting the inefficiency of market resource allocation; and (2) 
the protection of intellectual properties index (IntellProtect), which means the ratio of 
the number of patent applications to the number of technical personnel. 
The positive coefficients of the interaction terms Visit × LessExTax (β=0.017, 
P=0.02), and Visit × IntellProtect (β=0.013, P=0.091) mean the positive impact of 
political visits for firms located in provinces with better institutional development is 
higher, which support the hypothesis.  
 [Insert Table 4.13] 
4.9  Post-event Resources and Reactions of Visited Firms 
4.9.1 Resources Obtained 
One big gap in the previous literature on government officials’ site visits is the 
amount of post-event resources firms can obtain. Table 4.14 tests three potential 
resources: government subsidy, bank loans and whether the effective tax rate declined. 
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Columns (1) and (3) demonstrate that firms with political visits obtain more loans 
(β=0.346, P=0.038) and subsidies (β=0.127, P=0.047) compared with non-visited 
firms, but Column (5) shows that political visits have no impact on the effective tax 
rate.  
In Columns (2), (4) and (6), interaction terms between visits and the Xi 
administration dummy are included to test whether firms visited by the Xi 
administration obtain more resources compared with those visited by the Hu 
administration. Results in Column (2) show that firms visited by Xi administration 
obtain more bank loans (β=0.58,P=0.085). However, there is no evidence supporting 
that visits by the Xi administration have more significant impacts on subsidies and tax 
rates, as shown in Columns (4) and (6). 
[Insert Table 4.14] 
4.9.2 Firm Reactions 
Another gap in the previous literature is that it ignores firms’ reactions to visits, 
such as their reactions in terms of CSR and their reactions to the increased public 
attention and social expectation. This paper assumes that political visits can be 
substituted as a source of legitimacy for CSR activities, leading to firms’ decreased 
incentive to donate. Column (1) of Table 4.15 demonstrates negative relationship 
between political visit and firm donations (β=﹣0.591, P=0.081). On the other hand, 
some CSR activities are under heavy government pressure (Moon, 2004). According 
to See (2009), firms in China are encouraged by the government to increase CSR to 
meet government requirements. For example, Tian and Estrin (2008) point out that the 
government prevented a firm called Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company from 
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dismissing 17,000 employees in order to satisfy the government’s political interests. 
Thus, this paper hypothesizes that firms are expected to shoulder more social 
responsibilities by helping the government solve unemployment problems in exchange 
for political visits. However, the results in Column (2) do not support the positive 
relationship between political visit and employee numbers. 
Moreover, facing increased social attention after political visits, in order to 
maintain a good image, firms tend to engage more actively in disclosure on aspects 
like shareholder protection and creditor protection. Column (3) of Table 4.15 
demonstrates a significant positive relationship between political visit and the 
disclosure index (β=0.268, P=0.046). Furthermore, in face of the increased social 
expectation after visit, firms are assumed to conduct more window-dressing activities 
to meet investors’ expectations. Columns (4) and (5) test the impact of political visits 
on earnings management and fraud. While the association between political visit and 
fraud is not significant, a positively significant relationship with earnings management 
is shown in Column (5) (β=0.134, P=0.021). In addition to meeting public expectations, 
another plausible reason for the increased earnings management is because the 
increased job security and privileges brought by political connection after visits 
decrease the accountability of managers.  
[Insert Table 4.15] 
4.10 Conclusion 
Existing literature investigates how the government participates in the market 
through various approaches, but ignores a common strategy it uses to influence the 
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market – political visits. Political visit, in this paper, is defined as a political device in 
which a high-level political leader carries out all the functions and symbolic 
representations of governing by periodically visiting firms. Extant literature on 
political visits is quite limited, and does not explore how the government chooses 
which firms to visit, cannot differentiate between the effects of political visits from 
government officials with different political powers and between two different 
administrations, and also ignores the post-visit effects on firm behaviour.  
To fill these gaps, political visits are investigated in detail in this study. Results 
show that representativeness, political connections and alignment with government 
goals are the three basic criteria for choosing firms to visit. Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that political visits are positively associated with market reactions over 
different time windows, especially when firms are visited by the Xi administration. 
And the market reactions are also positively associated with leaders’ rankings of 
political power. Besides market reactions, visits are positively correlated with firm 
operating performance, and the results are robust after applying PSM to control 
selection on observables and applying treatment effects model with instrumental 
variable technique to control for selection on unobservables. And the potential bias 
caused by variable persistence is also ruled out. The results also demonstrate that visits 
from Xi administration and to firms that are less-connected, weakly performed, located 
in places with good institutions, and heavily dependent on external financing are more 
valuable. Furthermore, this paper finds that loans and subsidies are the resources firms 
can obtain after visits, but firms tend to donate less and engage in earnings 
management.  
This paper complements literature on the role of government by focusing on 
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political visits, which are an under-researched strategy the government uses to 
influence the market. We also provide supporting evidence to the literature which 
upholds the positive role of government (Arthur Lewis, 1945; Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Hawtrey, 1926). Moreover, this study largely supplements the literature on government 
officials’ site visit (Li et al., 2016; Schuler et al., 2017) by differentiating the effects of 
visits by leaders with different political power and from different administrations, 
exploring how the government chooses which firms to visit, and also pointing out the 
post-event effects on firms’ behaviour. Different from political connection, both 
connected and non-connected firms can be the target of political visits, and political 
leaders that visit firms usually hold higher-level positions than the officials firms are 
normally connected with. Therefore, political visit is different from political 
connection and serves as a new way through which the government can influence the 
market. Furthermore, this paper is also related to the literature on CSR by introducing 
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Figure 4.1 : Visit Frequency of Provinces 
 
This figure demonstrates the visit frequency in each province from 1st January 2009 to 







Figure 4.2 : Market Reactions of Different Administrations 
This figure demonstrates the difference in market reactions of political visits by Xi and 
Hu administrations over one year window. The grey line refers to the cumulative 
abnormal returns of visits by Xi administration, and the blue line shows the cumulative 
abnormal returns of political visits by Hu administration. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 : Market Reactions of Leaders with Different Political Power 
This figure demonstrates the difference in market reactions of political visits by 
different political leaders over one year window. The blue, grey and green lines refer 
to the cumulative abnormal returns of visits done by top2, top3 to 5, and top 6 to 8 
political leaders respectively. I code political power according to the party positions 
and state positions of the PSC leaders. Detailed definitions of the rankings are shown 










































CAR of Visits by Different Administrations 


























Figure 4.4 : Standardized % Bias Before and After PSM 
 
This figure demonstrates the distribution of standardized % bias of the variables 
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Table 4.1 : Descriptive Statistics of Visiting Leaders 
 
This table demonstrates the distribution of leaders who visited firms during 1st January 
2009 to 31st July 2016, covering two administrations: covering two administrations: 
that of President Hu (1st January 2009 to 15th November 2012) and that of President 
Xi (15th November 2012 to 31st July 2016). 
 
 
Xi administration  Hu administration 
Leader names Freq. Percent  Leader names Freq. Percent 
Jinping Xi 29 21.80  Jintao Hu 38 6.55 
Keqiang Li 36 27.07  Jiabao Wen 120 20.69 
Dejiang Zhang 9 6.77  Bangguo Wu 42 7.24 
Zhengsheng Yu  17 12.78  Qinglin Jia 95 16.38 
Yunshan Liu 17 12.78  Changchun Li 114 19.66 
Qishan Wang 0 0  Jinping Xi 46 7.93 
Gaoli Zhang 25 18.80  Keqiang Li 61 10.52 
    Guoqiang He 64 11.03 














Table 4.2 : Descriptive Statistics of Visited Firms 
 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of visited firms. Panel A Columns (1) to (2) demonstrate the ownership distribution of the 
visited firms: state-owned firms (SOE) or non-state-owned firms (Non-SOE). In Columns (3) to (10), the whole sample is decomposed 
into two subsets: Xi administration and Hu administration. Columns (3) and (7) demonstrate the number of visited firm during Xi and Hu 
administrations respectively after dropping all observations lack data on ownership, industry codes and other dependent and control 
variables. And Columns (5) and (9) show the number of all listed firms during Xi and Hu administrations respectively after dropping all 
observations lack data on ownership, industry codes and other dependent and control variables. Panel B reveals the industry distribution 








 Xi Administration  Hu Administration 
 ALL Visited Firms  Visited Firms  All listed firms  Visited Firms  All listed firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 # %  # %  # %  # %  # % 
SOE 115 61.17  25 49.02  892 41.39  90 65.69  867 59.30 
Non-SOE 73 38.83  26 50.98  1,263 58.61  47 34.31  595 40.70 





Panel B: Industry distribution 
   
 Xi Administration  Hu Administration 
GICs Industry ALL Visited Firms  Visited Firms  All listed firms  Visited Firms  All listed firms 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
  # %  # %  # %  # %  # % 
10 Energy 10 5.320  4 7.840  59 2.740  6 4.380  42 2.870 
15 Materials 35 18.62  5 9.800  396 18.38  30 21.90  290 19.84 
20 Industrials 46 24.47  10 19.61  501 23.25  36 26.28  336 22.98 
25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
29 15.43  10 19.61  363 16.84  19 13.87  265 18.13 
30 Consumer Staples 9 4.790  2 3.920  142 6.590  7 5.110  104 7.110 
35 Health Care 12 6.380  2 3.920  153 7.100  10 7.300  101 6.910 
40 Financials 6 3.190  4 7.840  153 7.100  2 1.460  115 7.870 
45 Information 
Technology 
32 17.02  13 25.49  309 14.34  19 13.87  137 9.370 
50 Telecommunicati
on Services 
1 0.530  1 1.960  8 0.370  0 0  4 0.270 
55 Utilities 8 4.260  0 0  71 3.290  8 5.840  68 4.650 




Table 4.3 : Summary Statistics  
 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of main variables used in this chapter. The 
definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. 
 
 
 Full firm-year sample  Matched sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.  Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Visit 12116 0.026  0.160    638  0.500  0.500  
ROA_F 12116 0.033  0.064   638  0.046  0.055  
ROE_F 12116 0.052  0.223   638  0.085  0.151  
ROS_F 12116 0.063  0.189   638  0.080  0.119  
ROIC_F 12116 0.051  0.089   638  0.068  0.068  
ΔROA 12116 -0.005  0.061   638  -0.009  0.047  
ΔROE 12116 -0.007  0.261   638  -0.015  0.153  
ΔROS 12116 -0.004  0.175   638  -0.006  0.090  
ΔROIC 12116 -0.006  0.095   638  -0.009  0.065  
StatesShare 12116 4.262 7.740  638  5.985 8.963 
LifeRatio 12116 0.217  0.263   638  0.266  0.334  
WorkRatio 12116 0.208  0.265   638  0.253  0.338  
Dependence 12116 0.970  0.169   638  0.984  0.124  
LessLessGovInt 12116 0.858  0.349   638  0.823  0.382  
LessExTax 12116 0.617  0.486   638  0.605  0.489  
IntellProtect 12116 0.548  0.498   638  0.503  0.500  
CG 12116 0.021  0.142   638  0.028  0.166  
PBIntensity 12116 0.164  0.126   638  0.155  0.116  
Employees 12116 7.683  1.400   638  8.957  1.604  
Size 12116 22.90 1.163   638  24.00  1.669  
Age 12116 15.33 4.938   638  13.89 4.524  
Distance 12116 6.608  2.040   638  6.005  2.643  
BoardQuality 12116 0.370  0.055   638  0.372  0.061  
Duality 12116 0.197  0.398   638  0.118  0.322  
Lev 12116 1.976  3.949   638  1.324  1.803  
PastPerform 12116 0.041  0.059    638  0.057  0.060  
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Table 4.4 : Determinants of Political Visit 
 
This table presents the results for the research question: what kinds of firms are more likely to achieve political visits? The dependent 
variable P(Visit) equals 1 if the firm achieved political visit and zero otherwise. From Columns (1) to (3), I test a series of connection-
related determinants of visit: (1) CG is a dummy variable which equals one if the actual controller of the firm is central government. 
SOE_Other is a dummy variable which equals one if the actual controller of the firm is other levels of government except CG (2) 
StateShare means the logarithm of number of shares owned by the state. (3) PB means the political background, a dummy variable which 
equals one if at least one director of the firm has working experience as a government official. From Columns (4) to (5), two geographic-
related determinants are tested: (4) Municipality equals one if the firms are located in municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing), otherwise zero. (5) Autonomous equals one if the firms are located in areas classified as autonomous area by government 
since there are a lot of minorities. In column (6), the logarithm of employee numbers (Employees) is tested as a determinant of political 
visit. In all models, I check some other determinants of political visits, including past performance (ROA_P), firm size (Size), firm age 
(Age), leverage (Lev), the quality of the board (BoardQuality) and CEO duality (Duality). Detailed definitions of all variables are provided 
in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: P(visit) 
 Political Connection  Geographic  Employee Number 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
CG -0.022        
 (0.902)        
SOE_other 0.139**        
 (0.018)        
StateShare  0.007**       
  (0.029)       
PB   0.035      
   (0.715)      
Municipality     -0.277***    
     (0.000)    
Autonomous      0.578***   
      (0.000)   
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Employees        0.148*** 
        (0.000) 
Size 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.293***  0.320*** 0.301***  0.173*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.025***  -0.027*** -0.026***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lev -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.049***  -0.046*** -0.046***  -0.034** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.034) 
PastPerform 1.369*** 1.360*** 1.274***  1.119** 1.352***  1.386*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)  (0.023) (0.006)  (0.005) 
BoardQuality -0.994** -1.002** -1.015**  -0.995** -0.963**  -1.016** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.030)  (0.034) (0.041)  (0.031) 
Duality -0.152** -0.179** -0.188**  -0.198*** -0.190**  -0.178** 
 (0.047) (0.016) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.018) 
Constant -7.923*** -7.855*** -8.028***  -8.573*** -8.268***  -6.551*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
N 12116 12116 12116  12116 12116  12116 







Table 4.5 : Market Reactions  
 
This table shows the significance of market reactions over different time windows, starting from 7 days before the event until one week, 
half month, one month, one quarter, half year or one year after political visit . In Row (1), I treat all political visits as a whole. In Row (2), 
I divide political visits into the visits by Hu administration and the visits by Xi administration. Row (3) divides the whole sample according 
to leaders’ different rankings of political power. Political power is coded according to the party positions and state positions of the PSC 
leaders. Top1 refers to President. Row (4) compares the effects of visits by top2 leaders and other leaders. Top2 means President and 
Premier. Top4 in Row (5) refers to President, Premier, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and 
Chairman of the National. Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Top5 in Row (6) means the top four plus 
Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization. The detailed definitions of these categories are shown 
in Appendix Table A4.2. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
 
  CAR 
  (-7,1 Week) (-7,Half Month) (-7,1 Month) (-7,1 Quarter) (-7,Half Year) (-7,1 Year) 
(1)  Visit  0.009* 0.012** 0.018*** 0.024** 0.050*** 0.078***   
(0.053) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)         
(2) Xi administration  0.052*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.071** 0.122*** 0.149*** 
  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)  
Hu administration  0.001 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.037*** 0.067*** 
  
(0.955) (0.407) (0.131) (0.136) (0.007) (0.001)  
Diff 0.051*** 0.049** 0.047** 0.057* 0.085* 0.0820         
(3) Top1 0.058** 0.041* 0.079** 0.074** 0.137*** 0.208*** 
  (0.026) (0.096) (0.049) (0.036) (0.006) (0.003) 
 other 0.004 0.009* 0.012* 0.018* 0.040*** 0.066*** 
  (0.383) (0.069) (0.055) (0.061) (0.004) (0.001) 
 Diff 0.054** 0.0320 0.067* 0.0560 0.097* 0.142** 
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(4) Top2 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.116*** 0.150*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
 other -0.002 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.025* 0.053** 
  (0.726) (0.486) (0.205) (0.401) (0.083) (0.014) 
 Diff 0.037*** 0.031** 0.034* 0.054** 0.092*** 0.097** 
        
(5) Top4 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.036** 0.081*** 0.109*** 
  (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
 other -0.005 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.017 0.047* 
  (0.371) (0.576) (0.311) (0.404) (0.305) (0.062) 
 Diff 0.027*** 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.063** 0.062 
        
(6)  Top5 0.012** 0.013** 0.022*** 0.027** 0.063*** 0.093*** 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.009) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Other 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.046 
  (0.692) (0.187) (0.367) (0.310) (0.320) (0.145) 
 Diff 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.042 0.046 
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Table 4.6 : Compare Market Reactions between Xi and Hu Administrations 
This table compares the significance of market reactions between Xi and Hu 
Administrations over different time windows: from one week to one year. The main 
variable of interest in this table is Xi Ad. which equals one if the firm is visited by Xi 
administration. Xi administration refers to the government led by president Xi. The 
sample of this paper covers from 15th November 2012 to 31st July 2016. In contrast, 
Hu administration refers to the government led by president Hu. The sample of this 
paper covers from 1st January 2009 to 15th November 2012. The detailed definitions of 
variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 CAR 











Xi Adm 0.034** 0.029* 0.040* 0.060** 0.073* 0.067 
 (0.014) (0.066) (0.056) (0.044) (0.085) (0.274) 
CG 0.042 0.032 0.053 -0.068 -0.101 -0.007 
 (0.104) (0.276) (0.178) (0.225) (0.203) (0.947) 
PBIntensity 0.032 -0.020 0.001 0.033 0.002 0.038 
 (0.511) (0.705) (0.987) (0.754) (0.986) (0.852) 
Employees -0.007 -0.008 -0.028*** -0.031** -0.011 0.014 
 (0.325) (0.289) (0.008) (0.034) (0.594) (0.642) 
Size 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.014 0.005 -0.047 
 (0.795) (0.664) (0.229) (0.367) (0.810) (0.115) 
Age -0.002* -0.003** -0.002 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.010* 
 (0.078) (0.026) (0.444) (0.129) (0.001) (0.097) 
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.515) (0.402) (0.485) (0.638) (0.296) (0.958) 
BoardQuality 0.060 0.028 -0.084 0.142 -0.214 -0.568 
 (0.489) (0.772) (0.522) (0.449) (0.418) (0.124) 
Duality 0.003 0.026 0.009 -0.005 0.009 0.026 
 (0.848) (0.161) (0.710) (0.899) (0.855) (0.714) 
Lev -0.007* -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.014 -0.001 
 (0.067) (0.472) (0.872) (0.311) (0.201) (0.930) 
PastPerform 0.032 0.007 -0.102 -0.556*** -1.044*** -0.858** 
 (0.738) (0.945) (0.476) (0.007) (0.000) (0.035) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.021 0.042 0.031 0.023 0.248 1.398** 
 (0.873) (0.777) (0.874) (0.935) (0.533) (0.012) 
N 405 405 405 405 405 405 
R2 0.052 0.049 0.064 0.074 0.091 0.084 
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Table 4.7 : Impact of Political Visits on Firm Performances 
 
This table explores the impact of political visits on firm performance. The dependent 
variables from Columns (1) to (4) are four one-year forwarded performance 
measurements: ROA, ROE, ROS and ROIC. Performance is forwarded one year in 
order to give firms enough time to take advantage of the political visits. The main 
variable of interest is the visit dummy. The definitions of all variables are shown in 
Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA_F ROE_F ROS_F ROIC_F 
Visit 0.009*** 0.030** 0.007 0.014*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.486) (0.005) 
CG -0.008* -0.027** -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.065) (0.049) (0.306) (0.255) 
PBIntensity 0.008* 0.007 0.079*** 0.008 
 (0.087) (0.644) (0.000) (0.202) 
Employees -0.005*** -0.005** -0.016*** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.026) 
Size 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.001*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.993) (0.857) (0.119) (0.993) 
BoardQuality -0.032*** -0.046 -0.090*** -0.044*** 
 (0.003) (0.204) (0.009) (0.003) 
Duality -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005** 
 (0.147) (0.346) (0.845) (0.026) 
Lev 0.000*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.004) (0.197) (0.000) (0.000) 
PastPerform 0.289*** 0.671*** 0.510*** 0.388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.102*** -0.275*** -0.683*** -0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 12116 12116 12116 12116 







Table 4.8 : Robustness of PSM 
 
This table demonstrates how well the treatment and control groups are matched. The detailed definitions of variables are shown in 
Appendix. U refers to the unmatched sample and M means the matched sample.  
 
 Unmatched or Mean  t-test 
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias t p>|t| 
CG U 0.0282 0.0205 5 0.950 0.341 
 M 0.0282 0.0282 0 0 1 
PBIntensity U 0.159 0.165 -4.300 -0.730 0.465 
 M 0.159 0.150 7.800 1.030 0.304 
Employees U 8.946 7.648 86.90 16.51 0 
 M 8.946 8.969 -1.600 -0.180 0.855 
Size U 23.96 22.87 76.10 16.66 0 
 M 23.96 24.04 -5.600 -0.600 0.546 
Age U 13.83 15.37 -34.10 -5.520 0 
 M 13.83 13.95 -2.600 -0.330 0.740 
Distance U 1255 1431 -19.50 -3.670 0 
 M 1255 1259 -0.500 -0.0600 0.953 
BoardQuality U 0.368 0.370 -3.600 -0.660 0.509 
 M 0.368 0.375 -10.90 -1.310 0.192 
Duality U 0.122 0.199 -21.10 -3.420 0.001 
 M 0.122 0.113 2.600 0.370 0.713 
Lev U 1.344 1.993 -20.70 -2.900 0.004 
 M 1.344 1.304 1.300 0.280 0.776 
PastPerform U 0.0583 0.0407 28.60 5.250 0 
 M 0.0583 0.0551 5.200 0.670 0.502 
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Table 4.9 : Impact of Political Visits on Firm Performances -- PSM 
 
This table explores the impact of political visits on firm performance based on the 
matched sample. The dependent variables from column (1) to (4) are four one-year 
forwarded performance measurements: ROA, ROE, ROS and ROIC. Performance is 
forwarded one year in order to give firms enough time to take advantage of the political 
visits. The main variable of interest is the visit dummy. The definitions of all variables 
are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA_F ROE_F ROS_F ROIC_F 
Visit 0.009** 0.030*** 0.013* 0.013*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.063) (0.004) 
CG -0.012 0.005 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.328) (0.889) (0.559) (0.479) 
PBIntensity 0.019 0.099* 0.053 0.020 
 (0.343) (0.084) (0.187) (0.447) 
Employees -0.007*** -0.016** -0.017*** -0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.026) (0.001) (0.013) 
Size 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
Age -0.002*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.418) (0.003) 
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.108) (0.854) (0.185) (0.094) 
BoardQuality -0.009 0.052 0.027 -0.010 
 (0.807) (0.620) (0.713) (0.839) 
Duality 0.012* 0.021 0.033** 0.015* 
 (0.060) (0.251) (0.011) (0.071) 
Lev 0.003** -0.002 0.013*** -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.615) (0.000) (0.703) 
PastPerform 0.236*** 0.137 0.299*** 0.202*** 
 (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.094* -0.304* -0.454*** -0.121* 
 (0.068) (0.059) (0.000) (0.075) 
N 638 638 638 638 






Table 4.10 : Impact of Political Visits on Firm Performances – Instrument Variable 
 
This table demonstrates the robust tests about the impact of political visits on firm performances by using instrumental variables. From 
Columns (1) to (5), the percentage of PSC leaders who have life experience in the visited province (LifeRatio) is used as the instrumental 
variable of political visit. From Columns (6) to (10), the percentage of PSC leaders who have work experience in the visited province 
(WorkRatio) is used as the second instrumental variable to make the results more robust. Columns (1) and (6) show the results of the first 
step and the dependent variables are the probability of political visits. Columns (2) to (5) and (7) to (10) reveal the results of the second-stage 
tests. The dependent variables are four one-year forwarded performance measurements: return on asset (ROA_F), return on equity (ROE_F), 
return on sales (ROS_F), and return on invested capital (ROIC_F). Performance is forwarded one year in order to give firms enough time to 
take advantage of the political visits. The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** 
denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  
 IV: Leader ratio with life experience  IV: Leader ratio with work experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Visit ROA_F ROE_F ROS_F ROIC_F  Visit ROA_F ROE_F ROS1_F ROIC_F 
LifeRatio -0.835***           
 (0.000)           
WorkRatio       -0.780***     
       (0.000)     
Visit  0.044* 0.174** 0.113* 0.076**   0.041 0.163* 0.120* 0.073* 
  (0.088) (0.041) (0.053) (0.036)   (0.127) (0.061) (0.098) (0.050) 
CG 0.222 -0.017 -0.019 0.013 -0.025  0.221 -0.016 -0.018 0.012 -0.025 
 (0.497) (0.183) (0.636) (0.635) (0.147)  (0.499) (0.183) (0.643) (0.725) (0.146) 
PBIntensity 1.172** -0.017 -0.025 0.038 -0.032  1.162** -0.015 -0.022 0.063 -0.031 
 (0.021) (0.432) (0.712) (0.424) (0.269)  (0.022) (0.465) (0.751) (0.266) (0.284) 
Employees 0.034 -0.003 -0.006 -0.025*** -0.002  0.031 -0.003 -0.006 -0.034*** -0.002 
 (0.596) (0.231) (0.424) (0.000) (0.484)  (0.625) (0.232) (0.428) (0.000) (0.487) 
Size -0.001 0.005** 0.017** 0.029*** 0.006*  -0.001 0.005** 0.016** 0.037*** 0.006* 
 (0.992) (0.041) (0.046) (0.000) (0.070)  (0.989) (0.042) (0.046) (0.000) (0.071) 
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Age -0.012 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000  -0.012 -0.001 0.001 0.003** -0.000 
 (0.307) (0.279) (0.696) (0.131) (0.586)  (0.316) (0.265) (0.705) (0.030) (0.574) 
Distance -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.091) (0.327) (0.553) (0.391) (0.312)  (0.126) (0.315) (0.556) (0.398) (0.303) 
BoardQuality -1.168 -0.002 0.030 0.040 0.001  -1.172 -0.003 0.026 0.057 -0.001 
 (0.179) (0.962) (0.789) (0.612) (0.991)  (0.178) (0.928) (0.818) (0.541) (0.987) 
Duality 0.106 0.015** 0.047** 0.031** 0.018**  0.109 0.015** 0.047** 0.038** 0.018** 
 (0.511) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.040)  (0.497) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.037) 
Lev 0.004 0.003** 0.001 0.016*** -0.000  0.003 0.003** 0.001 0.024*** -0.000 
 (0.910) (0.013) (0.861) (0.000) (0.896)  (0.935) (0.012) (0.865) (0.000) (0.891) 
PastPerform 0.117 0.348*** 0.307** 0.358*** 0.344***  0.134 0.349*** 0.308*** 0.161 0.344*** 
 (0.903) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.888) (0.000) (0.009) (0.101) (0.000) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant  -0.099* -0.406** -0.556*** -0.129*   -0.095* -0.394** -0.694*** -0.125* 
  (0.067) (0.021) (0.000) (0.088)   (0.078) (0.025) (0.000) (0.097) 
Selection 
Correction 
 -0.023 -0.090* -0.068* -0.041*   -0.021 -0.083 -0.071 -0.039* 
  (0.162) (0.090) (0.066) (0.073)   (0.220) (0.127) (0.119) (0.098) 
N 638 638 638 638 638  638 638 638 638 638 
Rho  -0.472 -0.571 -0.620 -0.604   -0.430 -0.536 -0.547 -0.580 
Pseudo R2 0.029      0.028     
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Table 4.11 : Impact of Political Visits on Firm Performances – Performance Change 
 
To solve the potential concern that the statistical significance of the previous tests is overstated due to persistence in variables and correlation 
over time, this table demonstrates the impact of political visits on performance changes. Performance change equals to one-year forwarded 
performance minus the average performances of this year and last year. Four measurements of performance change are tested: ΔROA, ΔROE, 
ΔROS, and ΔROIC. Columns (1) to (4) show the results of OLS tests, and Columns (5) to (8) demonstrate the results of tests using the 
instrumental variable: the percentage of PSC leaders who have life experience in the visited province (LifeRatio). The definitions of all 
variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 OLS  IV: Leader ratio with life experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ΔROA ΔROE ΔROS ΔROIC  ΔROA ΔROE ΔROS ΔROIC 
Visit 0.008** 0.039*** 0.017*** 0.009*  0.048** 0.139* 0.046 0.075** 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.009) (0.054)  (0.048) (0.091) (0.309) (0.034) 
CG -0.006 0.008 -0.016 0.001  -0.012 -0.009 -0.027 -0.015 
 (0.582) (0.843) (0.466) (0.939)  (0.293) (0.809) (0.206) (0.379) 
PBIntensity 0.007 0.068 -0.017 0.002  -0.018 -0.000 -0.024 -0.037 
 (0.717) (0.286) (0.643) (0.947)  (0.367) (0.998) (0.501) (0.194) 
Employees -0.002 -0.007 0.004 -0.006*  -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.292) (0.361) (0.410) (0.079)  (0.753) (0.647) (0.298) (0.291) 
Size 0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.003  0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.499) (0.495) (0.704) (0.310)  (0.494) (0.596) (0.655) (0.292) 
Age -0.001*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002***  -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.451) (0.826) (0.000)  (0.144) (0.651) (0.891) (0.116) 
Distance 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.425) (0.711) (0.412) (0.519)  (0.628) (0.420) (0.290) (0.973) 
BoardQuality -0.008 0.079 0.009 0.005  -0.003 0.071 0.000 0.005 
 (0.795) (0.487) (0.895) (0.908)  (0.934) (0.515) (0.996) (0.910) 
Duality 0.005 0.025 0.014 0.009  0.006 0.030 0.016 0.010 
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 (0.427) (0.225) (0.239) (0.281)  (0.310) (0.128) (0.143) (0.235) 
Lev 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.000  0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.776) (0.451) (0.917) (0.963)  (0.590) (0.269) (0.620) (0.650) 
PastPerform -0.466*** -0.868*** -0.610*** -0.598***  -0.424*** -0.787*** -0.567*** -0.533*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.014 -0.074 0.024 0.017  -0.034 -0.149 0.003 -0.059 
 (0.769) (0.646) (0.796) (0.803)  (0.497) (0.379) (0.973) (0.426) 
Selection 
Correction 
     -0.026* -0.065 -0.021 -0.042* 
      (0.089) (0.204) (0.460) (0.058) 
N 638 638 638 638  638 638 638 638 
R2 0.258 0.108 0.158 0.210      







Table 4.12 : Visit Heterogeneity and Firm Heterogeneity 
 
This table tests whether the visits by Xi Administration are more beneficial for firms, and 
whether political visits differentially affect firm performance across different types of 
firms. Dependent variables are one-year forwarded ROA (ROA_F). Column (1) tests 
whether political visits by Xi Administration have a more positive impact on firm 
performance than those by Hu Administration. Xi Adm refers to the government led by 
president Xi. The sample of this paper covers from 15th November 2012 to 31st July 2016. 
In contrast, Hu administration refers to the government led by president Hu. The sample 
of this paper covers from 1st January 2009 to 15th November 2012. From Columns (2) to 
(4), different interaction terms between political visits and firm characteristics are 
included in the models. (2) PastPerfrom means the past performance of firms, which is 
measured as the average ROA of past two years. (3) SatesShare refers to the logarithm of 
number of shares owned by the state. (4) Following the method of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), firm’s dependence on external financing equals to the capital expenditures minus 
cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. Dependence is a dummy 
variable which equals to one if the firms depend more heavily on external financing than 
average. The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA_F 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Visit × Xi Adm 0.019**       
 (0.013)       
Visit × PastPerform   -0.226***     
   (0.000)     
Visit × StatesShare     -0.021**   
     (0.021)   
Visit × Dependence       0.076** 
       (0.011) 
Visit 0.030  0.047*  0.045*  0.041 
 (0.228)  (0.070)  (0.085)  (0.114) 
CG -0.017  -0.018  -0.016  -0.014 
 (0.142)  (0.131)  (0.204)  (0.258) 
PBIntensity -0.016  -0.016  -0.014  -0.013 
 (0.419)  (0.431)  (0.515)  (0.533) 
Employees -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
 (0.262)  (0.230)  (0.203)  (0.225) 
Size 0.006**  0.005**  0.005*  0.006** 
 (0.020)  (0.033)  (0.058)  (0.027) 
Age -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.750)  (0.267)  (0.286)  (0.333) 
Distance 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.277)  (0.339)  (0.323)  (0.413) 
BoardQuality 0.008  0.000  -0.008  -0.006 
 (0.814)  (1.000)  (0.823)  (0.872) 
Duality 0.017***  0.012*  0.015**  0.016*** 
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 (0.005)  (0.050)  (0.014)  (0.008) 
Lev 0.004***  0.003***  0.003**  0.003*** 
 (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.010) 
PastPerform 0.353***  0.474***  0.356***  0.344*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Xi Adm -0.025***       
 (0.000)       
StatesShare     0.016**   
     (0.024)   
Dependence       -0.091*** 
       (0.000) 
Selection 
Correction 
-0.016  -0.022  -0.022  -0.021 
 (0.307)  (0.181)  (0.184)  (0.183) 
Industry Y  Y  Y  Y 
Constant -0.120**  -0.115**  -0.095  -0.109* 
 (0.030)  (0.045)  (0.100)  (0.056) 
N 638  638  638  638 











Table 4.13 : Institution Heterogeneity 
 
This table tests whether political visits differentially affect firm performance across 
different institutional development levels. Dependent variables are one-year forwarded 
ROA (ROA_F). Columns (1) and (2) incorporate different interaction terms between 
visits and provincial institutional development indexes. All of these institutional 
indices are based on the book and surveys of Fan and Wang (2011). For easier and 
more consistent interpretations, the institutional indices used in this paper are 
transformed to dummy variables, which equals to one if the institutional development 
is better than national average and zero otherwise. (1) Extra charge besides taxes 
means the ratio of extra charge to sales, reflecting the inefficiency of market resources 
allocation. LessExTax is a dummy variable which equals to one if the extra charge in 
the province is lower than national average. (2) The protection of intellectual 
properties index means the ratio of the number of patent applications to the number of 
technical personnel. IntellProtect is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
protection of intellectual property within the province is better than country average. 
The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA_F 
 (1) (2) 
Visit × LessExTax 0.017**  
 (0.020)  
Visit × IntellProtect  0.013* 
  (0.091) 
Visit 0.054* 0.046* 
 (0.072) (0.100) 
CG -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.242) (0.177) 
PBIntensity -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.401) (0.400) 
Employees -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.220) (0.236) 
Size 0.005* 0.005** 
 (0.056) (0.044) 
Age -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.324) (0.282) 
Distance 0.000 0.000 
 (0.441) (0.336) 
BoardQuality 0.001 0.000 
 (0.971) (0.998) 
Duality 0.016** 0.016** 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
Lev 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.020) (0.010) 
PastPerform 0.344*** 0.349*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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LessExTax -0.007  
 (0.259)  
IntellProtect  -0.006 
  (0.295) 
Selection Correction -0.029 -0.023 
 (0.126) (0.180) 
Industry Y Y 
Constant -0.105* -0.104* 
 (0.084) (0.074) 
N 638 638 
Rho -0.573 -0.477 
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Table 4.14 : Impact on Government Support 
 
This table presents the impact of political visits on the access of government supports. 
Columns (1) and (2) test the impact of political visits on one-year forwarded logarithm of bank 
loans (Lnloan_F). Column (3) and (4) reveal the impact on the change in the government 
subsidy (ΔSubsidy). Columns (5) and (6) demonstrate the impact on one-year forwarded 
effective tax rate (ETR_F). Following Feng, Johansson, and Zhang (2015)’s method, ETR is 
defined as (tax expense-deferred tax expense)/EBIT. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), interaction 
terms between political visits and Xi administration are added to differentiate the government 
supports of Xi and Hu administrations. The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
 Government Support 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 




 ETR_F ETR_F 
Visit 0.346** 0.290*  0.127** 0.081  -0.275 -0.223 
 (0.038) (0.099)  (0.047) (0.253)  (0.308) (0.437) 
Xi Adm  -0.569**   -0.049   0.571 
  (0.027)   (0.618)   (0.173) 
Visit × Xi Adm  0.580*   -0.112   -0.417 
  (0.085)   (0.401)   (0.460) 
CG -0.719 -0.761  -0.133 -0.138  -0.116 -0.096 
 (0.186) (0.161)  (0.536) (0.520)  (0.885) (0.905) 
PBIntensity 0.953 0.850  -0.381 -0.376  0.048 0.066 
 (0.278) (0.333)  (0.233) (0.239)  (0.971) (0.961) 
Employees -0.026 -0.028  0.030 0.038  -0.259 -0.269 
 (0.814) (0.801)  (0.429) (0.325)  (0.117) (0.105) 
Size -0.278** -0.256**  -0.066* -0.073*  0.319* 0.313* 
 (0.016) (0.027)  (0.096) (0.067)  (0.062) (0.068) 
Age -0.005 0.005  -0.017** -0.013  -0.042 -0.052 
 (0.819) (0.821)  (0.043) (0.130)  (0.203) (0.125) 
Distance 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.884) (0.886)  (0.394) (0.397)  (0.280) (0.270) 
BoardQuality 2.332 2.664*  -0.272 -0.161  -1.609 -1.985 
 (0.138) (0.091)  (0.629) (0.775)  (0.491) (0.398) 
Duality -0.212 -0.184  -0.050 -0.043  -0.101 -0.143 
 (0.449) (0.512)  (0.623) (0.672)  (0.820) (0.746) 
Lev -0.152*** -0.140**  -0.030 -0.026  -0.076 -0.087 
 (0.009) (0.015)  (0.163) (0.212)  (0.402) (0.336) 
PastPerform 1.460 1.492  -0.110 -0.096  0.227 0.101 
 (0.384) (0.373)  (0.861) (0.879)  (0.927) (0.968) 
Industry Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Constant 6.978*** 6.627***  2.727*** 2.776***  -3.969 -3.856 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.218) (0.231) 
N 638 638  454 454  542 542 
R2 0.085 0.094  0.041 0.048  0.024 0.028 
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Table 4.15 : Impact on Post-event Firm Behavior 
 
This table tests the impact of political visit on post-event firm behaviour. Donation_F 
is one-year forwarded logarithm of donation amount. Employees_F refers to one-year 
forwarded logarithm of employee number. Disclosure_F is a one-year forwarded 
disclosure index which measures firms’ disclosure on ten aspects. Fraud_F is the 
number of times the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement against fraud, forwarded 
one year. ΔEM means the change in earnings management. Following Chen, Cumming, 
Hou, and Lee (2013), earnings management is the ratio of non-operating income 
relative to revenue. The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. P-values 
are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 Post-event Firm Behaviour 
 Reaction on CSR  Reaction to 
increased social 
attention 
 Reaction to 
increased 
expectation 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
 Donation_F Employees_F  Disclosure _F  Fraud_F ΔEM 
Visit -0.591* 0.011  0.268**  0.010 0.134** 
 (0.081) (0.721)  (0.046)  (0.608) (0.021) 
CG 0.766 -0.095  -0.679*  0.050 -0.163 
 (0.415) (0.301)  (0.079)  (0.489) (0.360) 
PBIntensity 1.174 -0.163  -0.926  -0.139 0.065 
 (0.494) (0.271)  (0.190)  (0.238) (0.830) 
Employees 0.251 0.807***  0.100  -0.000 0.016 
 (0.331) (0.000)  (0.347)  (0.994) (0.667) 
Size 0.661** 0.150***  -0.095  -0.009 -0.051 
 (0.012) (0.000)  (0.398)  (0.591) (0.195) 
Age -0.067 0.002  -0.029  0.005 -0.001 
 (0.129) (0.528)  (0.132)  (0.104) (0.942) 
Distance 0.000** -0.000  0.000**  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.048) (0.480)  (0.024)  (0.304) (0.532) 
BoardQuality -1.903 0.215  0.637  -0.167 -0.157 
 (0.539) (0.419)  (0.632)  (0.441) (0.774) 
Duality -0.492 -0.011  -0.031  -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.392) (0.816)  (0.898)  (0.699) (0.746) 
Lev 0.102 -0.008  0.052  -0.017* -0.033 
 (0.425) (0.427)  (0.332)  (0.051) (0.107) 
PastPerform 4.258 0.457  -0.779  -0.232 -0.677 
 (0.268) (0.105)  (0.635)  (0.325) (0.235) 
Industry Y Y  Y  Y Y 
Constant -12.808*** -1.864***  8.733***  0.669* 2.193*** 
 (0.009) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.055) (0.004) 
N 303 557  303  638 558 




Table A4.1: Variable Definition 
Variables Definitions 
Visit Dummy variable, equals one if the firm is visited by the political 
leaders of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party 
of China (PSC), and zero otherwise. 
LifeRatio The percentage of PSC leaders who have life experience in the visited 
province.  
WorkRatio The percentage of PSC leaders who have work experience in the 
visited province. 
Xi Adm Xi administration refers to the government led by president Xi. The 
sample of this paper covers 15th November 2012-- 31st July 2016. Xi 
Adm equals one if the firm is visited by Xi administration.  
Hu Adm Hu administration refers to the government led by president Hu. The 
sample of this paper covers 1st January 2009 -- 15th November 2012. 
Hu Adm equals one if the firm is visited by Hu administration. 
CG A dummy variable which equals one if the actual controller of the firm 
is central government.  
SOE_other A dummy variable which equals one if the actual controller of the firm 
is other levels of government except CG. 
Private If the actual controller of the firms are private companies or 
individuals, equals one. 
PBIntensity Political background intensity. The ratio of directors who has working 
experience as a government official to the total number of board 
directors. 
PB A dummy variable which equals one if at least one director of the firm 
has working experience as a government official. 
StateShare The logarithm of number of shares owned by the state. 
Municipality Dummy variable which equals one if the firms are located in 
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), otherwise 
zero.  
Autonomous Dummy variable which equals one if the firms are located in areas 
classified as autonomous area by government since there are a lot of 
minorities, and zero otherwise. 
Size Logarithm of market value, where the value of non-tradable shares are 
calculated by using net asset value. 
Age The age of the firm since establishment. 
Lev Leverage, equals to the ratio of total equity to total liability  
Employees The logarithm of employee number 
Employee_F The logarithm of employee number, forwarded one year. 
ROA_F Return on asset, forwarded one year. ROA is the ratio of net income to 
the average of ending total assets this year and the ending total assets 




ΔROA ROA𝑡+1 − (ROA𝑡 + ROA𝑡−1)/2 
ROA_P 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, (ROA𝑡−1 + ROA𝑡−2)/2  
ROS_F Return on sales, forwarded one year. Return on sales equals to the ratio 
of net income to sales 
ΔROS ROS𝑡+1 − (ROS𝑡 + ROS𝑡−1)/2 
ROE_F Return on equity, forwarded one year. ROE is the ratio of net income 
to the total equity. 
ΔROE 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 − (𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1)/2 
ROIC_F Return on invested capital (ROIC)= (net income+financial 
expenses)/(total assets-current liabilityies+notes payable+short-term 
borrowings +long-term liabilities due within one year), forwarded one 
year. 
ΔROIC 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑡+1 − (𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑡−1)/2 
BoardQuality The ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of 
directors. 
Duality A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO is also the chair of 
the board. 
Dependence According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), firm’s dependence on 
external financing equals to the capital expenditures minus cash flow 
from operations divided by capital expenditures. Dependence is a 
dummy variable which equals to one if the firms depend more heavily 
on external financing than average. 
Distance The logarithm of distances of firms’ headquarters to the capital —
Beijing. 
LessExTax Extra charge besides taxes means the ratio of extra charge to sales, 
reflecting the inefficiency of market resources allocation; LessExTax 
is a dummy variable which equals one if the extra charge in the 
province is lower than national average. Resources: Fan and Wang 
(2011)  
IntellProtect This index measures the protection of intellectual properties according 
to the ratio of the number of patent application to the number of 
technical personnel. IntellProtect is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the protection of intellectual property within the province is 
better than national average. Resources: Fan and Wang (2011).  
Lnloan_F Logarithm of bank loans, forwarded one year. 
ΔSubsidy Change in the logarithm of government subsidy between Subsidyt+1 
and Subsidyt 
ETR_F Effective tax rate, forwarded one year. ETR is defined as (tax expense-
deferred tax expense)/EBIT. 
Disclosure_F Disclosure index. Refers to the sum of 10 disclosure items: disclosure 
about (1) shareholder protection (2) creditor protection (3) staff 
protection (4) supplier protection (5) customer protection (6) 
environment protection (7) public relation (8) the construction and 
improvement of social responsibility system (9) safe production (10) 





Donation_F Logarithm of donation amount, forward one year. 
Fraud_F The number of times the firm is subject to regulatory enforcement 
against fraud. Forwarded one year. 
ΔEM Following Chen, Cumming, Hou, and Lee (2013), earnings 
management is the ratio of non-operating income relative to revenue. 







Table A4.2: PSC Members and Ranks  
This table presents detailed lists of the names, ranks of political power and positions of PSC leaders. Political power is coded according 
to the party positions and state positions of the PSC leaders. Panel A shows the 17th PSC (2007-2012), and Panel B demonstrates 18th 
PSC (2012-2017). 
 
Panel A 17th PSC (2007-2012) 
RANK NAME PARTY POSITION STATE POSITION 
1 Jintao Hu  General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee 
 Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission 
 President of the People's Republic of China 
 Chairman of the PRC Central Military 
Commission 
2 Jiabao Wen  Party secretary of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China 
 Premier of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China 
3 Bangguo Wu  Party secretary of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress 
 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress 
4 Qinglin Jia  Party secretary of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference 
 Chairman of the National Committee of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference 
5 Changchun Li  Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building 
Spiritual Civilization 
 
6 Jinping Xi  Top-ranked Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the CPC 
 Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission 
 President of the Central Party School of the CPC 
 Vice President of the People's Republic of 
China 
 Vice Chairman of the PRC Central Military 
Commission 
7 Keqiang Li  Deputy Party secretary of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China 
 First-ranked Vice Premier of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China 











Panel B 18th PSC (2012-2017) 
RANK NAME PARTY POSITION STATE POSITION 
1 Jinping Xi  General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee 
 Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission 
 Leader of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening 
Reforms 
 Chairman of the National Security Commission 
 President of the People's 
Republic of China 
 Chairman of the PRC 
Central Military 
Commission 
2 Keqiang Li  Party secretary of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
 Deputy Leader of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms 
 Vice Chairman of the National Security Commission 
 Premier of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of 
China 
3 Dejiang Zhang  Party secretary of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
 Vice Chairman of the National Security Commission 
 Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National 
People's Congress 
4 Zhengsheng Yu  Party secretary of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference 
 Chairman of the National 
Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political 
Consultative Conference 
5 Yunshan Liu  Top-ranked Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the CPC 
 Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual 
Civilization 
 President of the CPC Central Party School 
 Deputy Leader of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms 
 
6 Qishan Wang  Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection  
7 Gaoli Zhang  Deputy Party secretary of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
 Deputy Leader of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms 
 First Vice Premier of the 
State Council of the People's 









Signalling theory is widely used in the literature, especially in researches on IPO 
market. However, existing signalling literature largely ignores signals that are not 
intentionally sent out by firms themselves. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept 
of passive signalling, where firms lose control of the signalling decision and signalling 
contents. This paper argues that passive signals can have strong influences on people’s 
evaluations on companies because of the higher signal honesty, signal fit, and signal 
observability. The IPO market provides a perfect setting to test the impact of passive 
signals regarding its high information asymmetry. The results show that passive signals 
are strong enough to influence every part of IPO process, including the IPO application 





5.1  Introduction 
Information asymmetry and lacking track records can be major problems for 
financing and valuation, which is especially salient for small and new firms (Canovas 
& Solano, 2007). To address this problem, ventures intentionally send out signals to 
convey positive information, and researchers approach this problem from the 
perspective of signalling theory, focusing either on the different kinds of signallers 
(e.g. Coff, 2002; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004) and receivers, such as shareholders (Cohen 
& Dean, 2005) and VCs (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005), or on various kinds of 
signals like board composition or prestige (D'Aveni, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993) and 
brand name (Rao & Monroe, 1989). However, existing literature on signalling theory 
mainly focuses on signals sent intentionally by firms themselves, where firms have the 
power to decide whether to issue the signals and determine the signal content, and 
extant researches also focus on commercial-led signals, where the signalling 
relationships are established by signing commercial contracts to form mutually 
beneficial relationships such as those with VCs or reputable underwriters with the main 
purpose of boosting firms’ performance. The literature largely ignores a totally 
different kind of signal – passive signals, where firms lose control of either the signal 
issuing decision or the signal content, and the authority issues signals for firms 
voluntarily without commercial contracts with the main purpose of stimulating the 
whole industry and economy rather than helping individual firms.  
To fill the gap, this paper proposes the concept of ‘passive signalling’ to extend 
the boundaries of existing signalling theory. Political endorsement and visits, which 
refer to public statements or visits showing that governments support firms, are 
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examples of passive signalling. For example, Roshow Group Co., Ltd, a high-tech 
company, was praised for its advanced technology in processing copper raw material 
by the Chinese government in a government-controlled news program on 25th July 
2010. With the market sentiment triggered by political endorsement, Roshow Group 
outperformed the market and counterparts after its IPO both in the short and long term. 
The 7-day and 1-year cumulative abnormal returns are as high as 11.6% and 85.5% 
respectively. In this paper, political endorsement and visits are deemed as examples of 
passive signals because it is the government rather than firms themselves send out 
these signals while firms are only left to accept the decisions of the government 
passively. Moreover, the purpose of government does not target on boosting firms’ 
individual performance but rather on improving the whole economy.  
Passive signals have several unique characteristics which distinguish them from 
other signals in the existing literature. A passive signal is authority-led, which is 
different from the commercial-led signals explored in existing literature in terms of 
both purpose and form. In terms of the purpose, under commercial-led signals, the 
relationship between the firm and other entities (e.g. celebrity endorsers, VCs or 
reputable underwriters) is based on signing commercial contracts to form a mutually 
beneficial situation, with the purpose of enhancing firms’ commercial performance. 
By contrast, under authority-led passive signals, no contract is needed to form the 
relationship thus is more objective as the authoritative party, for example the 
government, will issue signals voluntarily with the broader purpose of stimulating the 
market and economy after considering the effects of the endorsement on the local 
economy or on specific industries rather than just on firms themselves. In terms of 
forms, passive signals are characterized by losing control of the signal issuing decision 
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and signal content. Existing literature on signalling theory mainly focuses on the 
actions entities intentionally take to send positive information to the public (Connelly, 
Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010), while largely ignoring situations where firms 
themselves no longer have abilities to decide whether or not to issue the signal. Under 
passive signalling, firms lose control of the issuing decision and the content of the 
signal due to the power of the authoritative party. For example, in political 
endorsement, it is the government that determines which firms to endorse and then 
issues signals by broadcasting political endorsements nationwide, while firms 
themselves are only left to accept the decisions passively. 
These unique perspectives of passive signalling make it overwhelmingly 
powerful in influencing the evaluation of people on firms through several channels: 
serving as a particularly reliable cue to combat information asymmetry, certifying and 
transferring legitimacy, and indicating resources. Consequently, passive signals can 
effectively influence the views and valuations of shareholders, investors, regulators 
and partners. First, a passive signal serves as a particularly reliable cue to combat 
information asymmetry, as it is less likely to be manipulated by firms themselves due 
to its “passive” nature. Moreover, signallers issuing passive signals are as authoritative 
as government who have a higher reputation for honesty and fewer incentives to send 
false signals, and usually have professional knowledge and testing facilities to perform 
due diligence and dig into the deep of the firm, thus increasing signal reliability. 
Second, the authority of the signallers in passive signalling can transfer and certify the 
cultural, resource and moral legitimacy of firms, as only the firms behave culturally 
and politically correctly, deal with resources efficiently and perform morally well can 
attract authoritative entities to send passive signals for them. Third, passive signals 
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sent out by authoritative entities usually indicate signaller’s support because of the 
broader purposes of the signaller. Instead of focusing on one particular firm, the 
signaller holds a broader purpose to stimulate the whole economy, thus indicating that 
the authoritative entities like government tend to provide more resources after the 
signalling for the firms.  
This paper examines the effects of passive signals in an IPO setting, where 
information asymmetry is salient and signals are especially important. Information 
asymmetry is obvious at IPO due to firm owners’ incentives to distort information and 
the complexity of the information as a result of the mixture of corporate culture, 
leadership, strategy and technology. Under high information asymmetry, investors do 
not believe in every signal. Instead, they screen signals and only rely on credible ones 
(Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Riley, 1979; Spence, 1976). Therefore, the IPO market 
provides a perfect setting to examine whether passive signals like political 
endorsement are valued by investors, and whether they are strong enough to trigger 
reactions in a market with high information asymmetry when investors carefully 
screen signals.  
Although both political endorsement and visits are examples of passive 
signalling, this paper empirically tests the effects of political endorsement due to the 
small number of observations of political visits before firms’ public listing. This study 
hypothesises that political endorsement can influence every part of IPO process, 
including IPO application process, valuation during issuing, and post-IPO 
performance. The strong effects of passive signalling in IPO market is due to its 
passive nature: the signal is not sent out intentionally by firms themselves, and the 
content of the signal is also out of firms’ control, thus leading to higher signal honesty 
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and signal fit. And the strength of the passive signalling is also rooted from the 
authority of the signaller who can certify firms’ cultural, moral and resource legitimacy. 
Moreover, the broader purposes of passive signalling indicates potential increase in 
accessible resources. As to IPO application, the first hypothesis is that passive signals 
like political endorsement can efficaciously influence the views of IPO regulators 
because passive signals can foster trust and legitimacy, certify firms’ compliance with 
government IPO regulations, and indicate political relations which can increase firms’ 
access to officials in the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), thus 
leading to higher IPO application success. Second, as to IPO valuation during issuing, 
this paper supposes that investment bankers will narrower IPO offer price spread 
because of the reduced risk following political endorsement as passive signals indicate 
more accessible potential favourable resources. Moreover, political endorsement can 
stimulate the demand of institutional investors, thus leading to higher price and lower 
under-pricing. Third, in terms of post-IPO performance, this paper hypothesizes that 
firms with endorsement can outperform in the long run because the signaller (i.e. the 
government) has both a better ability to test the firm’s quality and less incentive to 
send false signals.  
To test the effects of passive signals like political endorsement, I hand-collected 
data on political endorsement in China from the government-controlled daily news 
programme Xinwenlianbo, from 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011. 
Xinwenlianbo is under the firm control of the Publicity Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and serves as a mouthpiece for the government. Therefore, the 
positive coverage of particular firms shown in Xinwenlianbo can be regarded as 
government endorsements. In order to test the effects on IPO, this paper only focuses 
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on observations where endorsement happens within one years before firms’ public 
listing. From 2009 to 2012, 802 firms went public, 41 of which were endorsed by the 
government before public listing. 
One possible concern of the study is selection bias. For example, it’s possible 
that the government is more inclined to endorse firms with good internal corporate 
governance as these firms are safer, allowing the government to protect its own 
reputation. Good corporate governance, in turn, results in better IPO performance and 
higher valuation at IPO. Therefore, it was vital to find a group of non-endorsed firms 
that are similar to endorsed firms in all pre-treatment characteristics. To address 
observable selection bias, propensity score matching (PSM) is applied to match the 
treatment group with its five nearest neighbours according to a series of significant 
factors of IPO valuation and performance, thus forming treatment and control groups 
with similar likelihood to achieve endorsement. 
The results show that political endorsement, as an example of passive signals, 
can influence regulators, partners, and institutional and individual investors, hence 
impacting IPO application success, IPO valuation at issuing and post-IPO performance. 
This paper first finds that political endorsement can influence CSRC members, as 
endorsed firms are 7.8% more likely to pass the IPO screening with their first attempt 
with every additional endorsement. Second, I test the impact on valuation at IPO and 
find that investment bankers set a narrower spread for endorsed firms due to the 
reduced risk and increased certainty about the offer price, and the first-day returns for 
endorsed IPOs are significantly lower, meaning less under-pricing. Third, by 
investigating the impact on post-IPO performance, I find that endorsed IPO firms have 
higher cumulative abnormal returns and industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over 
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one to five years after IPO. Furthermore, results also demonstrate that the changes in 
post-IPO operating performance, like return on asset, return on sales, and operating 
margin are more positive and significant for endorsed firms after IPO, meaning that 
firms with political endorsement are less likely for face-changing and can outperform 
in the market in both the short and long term. 
This paper contributes to the literature on signalling theory in a number of ways. 
First, this study extends the boundaries of signalling theory in the literature by 
introducing the concept of passive signalling through investigating political 
endorsement. The investigated setting challenges traditional signalling theory, where 
signals are sent intentionally by insiders and firms can control the signal contents (e.g. 
BliegeBird et al., 2005; Connelly et al., 2010). Different from signals sent intentionally 
by firms, like board composition or prestige (D'Aveni, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993) or 
CEO-retained equity (Brealey, Leland, & Pyle, 1977; Carter & Van Auken, 1991), 
political endorsement is a signal determined and sent by the government. Due to the 
government’s overwhelming power over firms, companies lose control of the 
signalling decision and contents, and such passively issued signals are largely ignored 
by literature. Second, this study also compliments the literature on signalling theory 
by introducing “authority-led signals”. Commercial-led signals are the main focus of 
existing signalling literature, where the signalling relationship is based on commercial 
contracts, such as those with reputable underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 1990) and 
VCs (Megginson & Weiss, 1991), and the purpose is to improve firm performance. 
However, in authority-led signals, contracts are not the prerequisites thus are more 
objective, and the main purpose of authority-led signals is not just enhancing firm 
performance but stimulating the whole market. Third, this paper supplements 
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signalling literature which mentions the reliability of signals (e.g. Busenitz et al., 2005; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). Due to the unique features of passive signals discussed 
in this paper, passive signals are particularly reliable and credible since they are less 
likely to be manipulated by firms and have higher signal honesty, signal fit and signal 
observability. Although some literature mentions signal reliability, few empirical 
studies exist. The results of this paper can indicate the strength of the impact of reliable 
signals and introduce the passiveness as a new criteria to judge the signal reliability. 
This paper is also related to the literature on entrepreneurship. This stream of 
literature points out that ventures usually overcome the liability of smallness or 
newness through strategic alliance or associating with prestigious entities (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003). For instance, affiliation with prestigious underwriters (Pollock, Chen, 
Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010), venture capitals (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013), auditors 
(Beatty, 1989) and reputable third parties like universities (Bonardo, Paleari, & 
Vismara, 2011) can enhance affiliated firms’ reputation and bring about resources and 
expertise, hence increasing the survival probability of business ventures. The results 
provide supporting evidence that political endorsement is a new way for new ventures 
to increase their chance of survival. Different from the strategic alliance and 
association investigated in existing entrepreneurship literature, where firms have some 
degree of freedom to choose which underwriter or venture capital to cooperate with, 
political endorsement is a unilateral choice where only the government chooses which 
firms to endorse. Therefore, compared with strategic alliance and association, 
achieving government endorsement is rarer and more valuable. New ventures can try 
to establish long-term political connections to strive for political endorsement.  
Moreover, this study contributes to IPO literature as the first to investigate the 
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impact of political endorsement on IPO application, valuation and performance. The 
government’s role in the IPO market is usually restricted to their regulatory power 
through their political connections with firms (e.g. Yang, 2013). By contrast, political 
endorsement in this study is a strategy the government uses to influence the market by 
using its market power exercised through sending out signals, rather than regulatory 
power. Just through providing endorsements to guide people’s views, the government 
succeeds in guiding efficient resource allocation in the IPO market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section Two first reviews 
literature and then extends signalling theory. Section Three describes the market 
consequences of passive signals, and develops hypothesis. Research design is detailed 
in Sections Four. Results and discussions are articulated in Section Five, followed by 
conclusion in Section Six.  
5.2  Literature Review, Theoretical Background, and Signalling 
Theory Extension 
Literature on signalling theory covers different signals, various kinds of signallers 
and some factors that influence the efficacy of signals. The passive nature and other 
unique perspectives of political endorsement and political visits discussed below 
distinguish it from the signals covered in previous literature, and enable political 
endorsement and political visit to be influential in the market, especially in markets 
with high uncertainty like the IPO market.  
Signalling theory demonstrates the information-identifying process of decision 
makers when information is asymmetrical (Spence, 1973). In a market characterised 
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by high information asymmetry, companies own more information than investors, 
hence giving firms the power to deceive investors. As a result, investors turn to signals 
for help (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). Existing literature on signalling theory covers 
many signals, such as price (Wolinsky, 1983), warranties and guarantees (Grossman, 
1981; Lutz, 1989; Spence, 1977), advertising (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Nelson, 
1974), and brand name (Rao & Monroe, 1989).  
Moreover, researchers have identified different kinds of signallers. Firms are the 
main signallers in finance, strategy and management studies (e.g. Coff, 2002; 
Karamanos, 2003; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). For example, Park and Mezias (2005) 
consider 74 e-commerce firms as signallers and alliance announcements as signals, 
and find that multiple meanings are attached to one signal during interpretation. In 
some literature, especially strategy studies, individuals are tested as signallers. For 
instance, the studies of Miller and del Carmen Triana (2009) and Kang (2008) regard 
boards of directors as signallers, and directors use board diversity and interlocks to 
send signals to organisational stakeholders and shareholders respectively. Moreover, 
studies like Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, and Dharwadkar (2007) also deem 
managers as signallers.  
Besides signallers, researchers also investigate different types of receivers. In 
entrepreneurship studies, investors are the main signal receivers (Daily, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Jain, Jayaraman, & Kini, 2008). For example, 
in Cohen and Dean (2005), IPO firms that send signals to certify the legitimacy of top 
management to potential investors can reduce under-pricing. Another stream of 
literature focuses on shareholders as signal receivers. For instance, managers usually 
try to send signals to shareholders to ensure that managers’ own wealth is aligned with 
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shareholders’ wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). Moreover, other 
stakeholders, such as VCs (Busenitz et al., 2005), customers (e.g. Basuroy, Desai, & 
Talukdar, 2006), competitors (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006) and 
acquirers (Coff, 2002) are also investigated as signal receivers in previous literature.  
Furthermore, recent literature discusses in depth the factors that influence the 
efficacy of signals. First and foremost, observability is a prerequisite of signal efficacy, 
which means inside actions must be observable to outsiders. Second, the costs of the 
signal must be high enough to prevent other unqualified firms from imitating and 
sending false signals (Connelly et al., 2010). Third, researchers like Connelly et al. 
(2010) point out that the reliability of a signal depends on signal honesty and signal fit. 
Signal honesty (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009), also known as signal 
veracity (Busenitz et al., 2005), refers to consistency between signals and the real 
quality of the firm. In other words, the extent to which firms send false signals. Firms 
will develop a reputation for dishonesty over time if their real actions and signals are 
inconsistent, and signals sent by such firms will be no longer effective. Signal fit refers 
to the correlation between the signal and underlying quality (Busenitz et al., 2005). 
Signal fit is different from signal honesty because the former is a feature of the signal 
itself, while the latter is a characteristic of the signallers. Fourth, the literature also 
highlights that the efficacy of signals depends on the frequency of signal issuance 
(Baum & Korn, 1999) and the consistency of different signals (Chung & Kalnins, 
2001).  
Signalling theory is the dominant theoretical explanation the literature applies 
to examine the IPO market (e.g. Daily & Dalton, 2001; McBain & Krause, 1989). In 
an IPO context, it is the information asymmetry between issuing firms and other 
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market participants regarding firms’ future prospects that leads to the need for firms to 
issue signals to increase IPO success. Existing literature covers a series of signals 
which could reduce uncertainty and increase the probability of successful IPO, 
including board quality (Certo, 2003), certification (Rao, 1994) and the presence of 
founders (Nelson, 2003). Researchers like Carter and Manaster (1990), Bonardo et al. 
(2011), Bruton, Chahine, and Filatotchev (2009) and Gompers (1996) point out that 
affiliation with prestigious third-parties like underwriters, prestigious universities, 
business angels and venture capitalists can serve as strong signals that lower 
uncertainty over performance. In addition, prospectuses are a major channel through 
which IPO firms can issue signals to influence investors’ evaluation of a firm (Daily 
et al., 2005).  
However, existing signalling theory literature largely ignores passive signals, 
and political endorsement and political visits, as examples of passive signals, provide 
an invaluable setting to extend the boundaries of existing signalling theory. Passive 
signals have several unique features which can complement current literature on 
signalling theory. The first feature of a passive signal is its broader purposes. Passive 
signals are authority-led. Different from commercial-led signals, where the main 
purpose is to boost firms’ commercial performance, authority-led passive signals have 
a wider purpose – to motivate the whole economy. Specifically, examples of 
commercial-led signals are the mutually beneficial relationships built by signing 
commercial contracts, such as those with reputable underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 
1990), VCs (Megginson & Weiss, 1991) and accounting firms (Yang, 2013), and the 
main purpose of commercial-led signals is to enhance firms’ commercial performance, 
such as their performance in sales or in financing. By contrast, there is no commercial 
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contract thus no vested interests between the firm and the authoritative entity in an 
authority-led signal, and the authoritative entities (e.g. the government) voluntarily 
issues signals based on a holistic view about the whole economy. The authoritative 
entity in passive signalling usually aims to improve the whole market, stimulate the 
local economy or strengthen political correctness, rather than just helping an individual 
firm. For example, specifically to political endorsement, the government endorses 
firms located in rural areas in order to stimulate the local economy. Therefore, 
compared with commercial-led signals, the purpose of authority-led passive signals is 
broader.  
The second unique aspect of passive signals is the lost control of the signalling 
decision and signal content. Previous literature investigates signals sent intentionally 
by firms to deliberately convey positive information (Connelly et al., 2010). For 
example, during IPO, firms intentionally issue signals like board quality (Certo, 2003), 
certification (Rao, 1994), and affiliation with underwriters or venture capitals (Carter 
& Manaster, 1990; Gompers, 1996) to convince investors of the quality of new firms. 
In these cases, firms take the initiative to issue signals and convey positive information. 
By contrast, in passive signals, like political endorsement and political visits, it is up 
to authoritative entities (e.g. government) to determine whether to issue this signal, 
which means firms play a passive role. Such cases are ignored by previous signalling 
literature as existing literature relies heavily on intentional and active signals.  
The unique perspectives of political endorsement discussed above distinguish 
political endorsement from the signals investigated in existing literature, and make it 
overwhelmingly powerful in influencing people’s judgement. Compared with normal 
signals sent out intentionally by firms, political endorsement is more reliable because 
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it is less likely to be manipulated as firms have no control of the content of 
endorsement, and also cannot control whether or not they are endorsed or visited. 
Furthermore, under circumstances with severe information asymmetry, like the IPO 
market, such passively issued signals are extremely valuable because investors will 
only respond to reliable signals, while ignoring certain information released by owners 
when information transparency is poor (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Riley, 1979; Spence, 
1976). 
5.3  Market Consequences and Hypothesis Development 
Passive signals like political endorsement or visit are efficacious in influencing 
people’s valuation of firms through three channels: serving as a particularly reliable 
cue to combat information asymmetry (mainly due to the passive nature of the signal), 
certifying and transferring legitimacy (because of the powerful signaller), and 
indicating resources (because of the broader purpose of passive signal). As a result, 
passive signals can influence the views of shareholders, potential institutional and 
private investors, related regulators and cooperated partners. This paper uses the IPO 
setting to test the impact of passive signals on the views of IPO regulators, 
underwriters, institutional investors and potential individual investors. 
5.3.1 Channel One: Reliable Cue in Markets with High Information 
Asymmetry 
When information asymmetry is high, only reliable information will catch the 
attention of investors (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Riley, 1979; Spence, 1976). Passive 
signals are especially reliable and efficient in influencing people under high 
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information asymmetry and when track records are limited, because passive signals 
are less likely to be manipulated by firms and have higher signal honesty, signal fit and 
signal observability. First, since passive signals are sent out by an authoritative third 
party (e.g. the government) rather than firms themselves, they are less likely to be 
manipulated than other signals intentionally issued by firms themselves to convey 
positive ideas.  
Second, the signaller in passive signals has higher “signal honesty” since they 
are more objective as an authoritative third party. For example, in political 
endorsement and visit, the high integrity of the signaller (i.e. the government) can 
enhance the reliability of signals. According to Connelly, Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel 
(2011), information reliability can be improved by the integrity of the information 
sender, which means whether the sender has a reputation for honesty or has the 
incentive to intentionally mislead investors with false information. Compared with 
other signallers, the authoritative entities like government has higher integrity and 
fewer incentives to endorse or visit bad firms for the following reasons: (1) like venture 
capitals or reputable managers in existing signalling literature, governments risk their 
own reputation if endorsed or visited firms perform badly; (2) without receiving direct 
compensation from firms, the government is more objective; (3) like other investors, 
the government would perform due diligence to ensure the quality of firms before 
endorsement or visit, because the government usually allocates financial resources or 
issues favourable policies to endorsed or visited industries or firms. 
Third, passive signals are more likely to meet the “signal fit” criterion of 
signalling theory, which means signals are consistent with the real quality of the firms. 
Since the signallers in passive signals are authoritative entities, they usually have a 
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better ability to identify good firms through their professional knowledge and 
advanced testing facilities, thus ensuring consistency between endorsements and 
actual quality. Furthermore, in order to avoid risking its reputation and to ensure 
efficient resource allocation, the signaller will perform due diligence to investigate the 
private information thoroughly, hence increasing signal fit and reliability. 
Fourth, high “signal observability” enhances the influence of passive signals. 
Due to the overwhelming power and authority of signallers of passive signals, the 
signals they send out usually attract more attention. For example, political 
endorsement is broadcast nationwide on the government-controlled news program 
Xinwenlianbo. Virtually all channels in China are regulated to broadcast Xinwenlianbo 
live at 7 p.m. everyday, which reaches more than 95% of the population and thus has 
extensive coverage (Jin, 2009). As a result, signals sent out by powerful authoritative 
entities can be easily noticed by the public.  
The IPO market this paper focuses on is one with high information asymmetry 
and quite limited track records, where passive signals can show their effectiveness and 
efficiency in influencing peoples’ ideas. One key characteristic of the IPO market is 
information asymmetry, because these firms usually lack track records. While internal 
owners of the firms can obtain extensive knowledge about operations or the quality of 
management and employees (Brealey et al., 1977), limited information is available to 
outsiders (e.g. Carter & Manaster, 1990; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Information 
asymmetry is especially obvious in the IPO market for a number of reasons. First, IPO 
candidates usually lack track records. Second, firm owners have high incentives to 
distort information before it becomes publicly available (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). 
Third, the mixture of corporate culture, leadership, strategy and technology of each 
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new organisation highlights the complexity of IPO information. Fourth, material 
information is usually not fully disclosed, notwithstanding the legal requirement of 
information disclosure (Cohen & Dean, 2005). Under high information asymmetry, 
investors do not believe in every signal. Instead, they screen signals and only rely on 
credible ones (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Riley, 1979; Spence, 1976). Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to testing whether passive signals are so reliable as to effectively influence 
people’s evaluation on firms in markets with high information asymmetry like the IPO 
market.  
5.3.2 Channel Two: Legitimacy Transfer and Certificate 
Based on Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973) and Scott (1987), institutionalisation 
emphasises a taken-for-granted feeling, norms and conformity. Legitimacy, as the 
symbol of appropriateness, taken-for-grantedness (Carroll & Hannan, 1989), social 
acceptance (Brown, 1997), congruence and reasonableness (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977), is the essential prerequisite for firms to obtain a good 
reputation, access resources and survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Therefore, one core implication from 
institutional theory is that legitimacy is paramount in determining firm performance 
(Barringer & Milkovich, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1988). 
Passive signals can transfer legitimacy since the signaller in passive signals is 
usually overwhelmingly powerful and authoritative. Political endorsement or visits is 
one of the most efficient passive signals for legitimacy transfer because the signaller 
is the government. The legitimacy can be transferred because the passive signals can 
motivate investors to classify firms and another authoritative party into the same 
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category. According to Brewer and Feinstein (1999), Bodenhausen, Macrae, and 
Sherman (2016), and Fiske, Lin, and Neuberg (1999), investors tend to employ 
categorical thinking to simplify the evaluation process, especially when individuals 
cannot think deeply and accurately due to a lack of time, resources and cognitive 
capacity. Since new firms are characterised by few track records and high uncertainty, 
the most observable and reliable cues to judge newcomers are their partners, founders 
or endorsers. As a result, newcomers either fall into the same category as their partners 
or are categorised according to their founders’ social capital (Milanov & Shepherd, 
2013). Therefore, passive signals like political endorsement can help investors shape 
categorisation, and facilitate the transfer of legitimacy from authoritative entities to 
firms.  
Besides transferring legitimacy, passive signals can also certify firms’ cultural 
legitimacy, resource legitimacy and moral legitimacy, because signallers use certain 
criteria to choose firms. First, cultural legitimacy means the authoritative entity in the 
passive signals confirm that the firms they endorse or visit behave culturally and 
politically appropriate, because only the firms with political correctness and good 
culture can be endorsed or visited. For example, Hengrui Medicine were visited by 
PSC leaders on 25th April 2009, during which it were commended and encouraged for 
further development in Party building. Through the passive signal, government 
explicitly indicates the market that this firm perform politically appropriate, thus 
certifying its cultural legitimacy. Second, passive signals can let investors recognize 
firms’ resource legitimacy because the authoritative entity is more inclined to endorse 
or visit firms that can utilize resources effectively after careful cost-benefit analysis in 
order to protect its own reputation. Third, through passive signals, the authoritative 
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entity also certified the moral legitimacy of some firms that donate to help disaster 
areas or expand recruitments to solve social problems.  
5.3.3 Channel Three: Resources Indication 
As discussed previously, the purpose of passive signal is wider when compared 
with other signals as the authoritative entity has a broader consideration rather on 
focusing on helping an individual firm. For example, the government can visit or 
endorse firms for politic reasons, for improving social welfare or for stimulating the 
economy. Congqing Chuanyi Automation, China South Locomotive, and Yuanda 
Holdings, for example, were visited by government in 2014 because they are in 
industries that need huge innovations to remain competitive and government was 
promoting innovation at that time. By visiting these firms, government sets these firms 
as models in their respective industries and motivate other firms to follow. Since the 
purposes of passive signal consists in a big picture which target at improving the whole 
economy and social welfare, it can be expected that government will promote these 
firms by providing more resources. And this is already proved in the previous two 
chapters as subsidies and loans increased. Therefore, the broader purpose of the 
passive signal distinguish it from other signals, and it is the wider considerations of 
the signaller in passive signal that indicate potential increase in resources accessibility 
for firms.  
5.3.4 Hypothesis Development  
Considering passive signal’s reliability and its ability to transfer legitimacy and 
indicate resources, this paper supposes passive signals could influence the views of 
IPO regulators, leading to higher success rates. Moreover, passive signals can also 
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influence underwriters and institutional investors, resulting in lower under-pricing and 
offer price spread. Most importantly, individual investors in the market will also be 
influenced by passive signals thus raising the cumulative abnormal return. Detailed 
development of these hypotheses are provided below. 
5.3.4.1 Application Success 
IPO firms have to be approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) before listing. The CSRC, as an institution of the State Council and with a 
ministry-level rank, was granted the authority to impose unified and centralised 
supervision and regulation of the Chinese securities market. Accounting and financial 
issues are closely monitored by the CSRC, and up to 20% of IPO applications were 
rejected. Seven CSRC members, called “the key seven people” attend each committee 
meeting to screen IPO candidates, and candidates have to achieve more than five votes 
to pass and go public.  
The IPO selection process is somewhat subjective rather than strictly objective, 
which enables political endorsement to influence CSRC members’ decisions. 
According to Yang (2013), some criteria used by the CSRC to screen IPO candidates 
are not known publicly. Although there are some regulations to guide and standardise 
IPO selection, a number of criteria are soft, vague and qualitative. For instance, the 
rule “the amount of funds raised should be commensurate with the issuer's current 
business scale, financial status, technical level, and management capabilities” is 
qualitative and ambiguous. As a result, these vague regulations give CSRC officials 
great discretion and flexibility. Researchers like Yang (2013) highlight that political 
connections with CSRC members can increase survival probability during the IPO 
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screening process, showing that CSRC members have a great deal of discretion in 
making decisions, and that the IPO selection process is not that objective. 
The first hypothesis is that firms with political endorsement or visits are more 
likely to pass the IPO screening process. First, from a theoretical perspective, political 
endorsement or visit is an effective passive signal in influencing people’s valuations 
of firms because it has higher signal honesty, signal fit and signal observability, and 
passive signals are also less likely to be manipulated by firms themselves. Since 
passive signals are more reliable and can transfer legitimacy and indicate resources, I 
suppose CSRC members would be influenced by political endorsement or visits, 
leading to higher IPO success. Second, political endorsement or visit certifies firms’ 
legitimacy since it indicates governments’ positive ideas about firms’ compliance with 
regulations and rules, as the government has the ability to look deep into firms’ 
regulatory issues. Therefore, governments’ endorsements or visits to firms can reduce 
IPO firms’ regulatory and operational risks and increase their chances of success. Third, 
one possible resources indicated by political endorsement or visit is the connection 
between firm and government, though not as obvious as the connections researched in 
other literature, endorsed or visited firms are more likely to have access to CSRC 
officials, leading to stronger lobbying power. Considering that the political and 
lobbying influence on the IPO regulatory process in the Chinese market has been 
proven by previous literature (e.g. Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000; Hung, Wong, & 
Zhang, 2012), this paper supposes that achieving political endorsement or visit can 
increase the chance of IPO success.  
Hypothesis 1: Passive signal can efficaciously influence the views of IPO 
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regulator, leading to higher IPO application success. 
5.3.4.2 Valuation at IPO 
The Chinese government has experimented with different IPO pricing 
mechanisms since the establishment of the stock market. The fixed-price system was 
first adopted by regulators from 1990 to 1995, which means the price was set according 
to the firm book value. Then, a controlled P/E range system was used from 1996 to 
1999, with the P/E confined to about 15. From mid-1999 to 2002, to reduce 
government intervention and let the market determine the price, regulators adopted an 
auction system to let investors decide the offer price through online bidding. However, 
this trial ultimately led to extremely high initial returns and large later losses due to 
high speculation. As a result, the controlled P/E system was reused from mid-2002 to 
2004, with P/E confined to 20.  
With the growth of institutional investors, the commonly used book-building 
system was finally adopted by regulators at the beginning of 2005 (Gao, 2010) to allow 
the market to determine prices and reduce government intervention further. Under the 
book-building system, the lead underwriter first determines the price range of new 
shares according to the information obtained from some particular institutions and 
individual investors, and then repeatedly corrects the issue price according to the 
demand of institutional investors. The adoption of the book-building system reduced 
the arbitrariness of stock pricing by involving institutional and particular individual 
investors in the pricing process. 
The book-building system enables passive signals to influence the valuation at 
IPO since it involves the judgement of both underwriters and institutional investors. 
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As to underwriters, Tinic (1988) suggests that investment bankers are very sensitive to 
the uncertainty of IPO firms, and they set prices according to firms’ available resources 
and risk levels. In the face of high risk, underwriters tend to set a wider spread of offer 
prices in order to retain the flexibility to set a more accurate offer price later. A 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) is applied by researchers like 
Daily et al. (2005) to investigate the influence of resources on IPO pricing. For 
example, Daily et al. (2005) find that resources like the skills of the top management 
team can encourage investment bankers to set a narrower spread and higher offer price 
due to the lower risks. As discussed in section 3.3, the broader purposes of passive 
signals indicate that the authoritative entity will provide more resources after endorse 
or visit, so passive signal can reduce underwriters’ concern regarding firm risk and 
motivate underwriters to set a narrower spread. By the same token, the potential 
resources implied by passive signal also increase the demand of institutional investors, 
resulting in lower under-pricing. Therefore, this paper hypothesises that political 
endorsement or visit, as a passive signal which is deemed to be credible, is regarded 
by underwriters and institutional investors as an indication of more accessible 
favourable resources from the authoritative signaller, which reduces risks and 
motivates investment bankers to set a narrower offer price spread, and also gives 
institutional investors incentives to increase demand, thus leading to reduced degree 
of IPO under-pricing.  
Hypothesis 2: Passive signals influence the evaluation of underwriters and 




5.3.4.3 Post-IPO Performance 
Face-changing, which happens when the operating performance of IPO firms 
declines significantly and immediately after IPO, is a common phenomenon in the 
Chinese market (Yang, 2013). In order to pass the CSRC’s IPO screening process, 
firms tend to use “financial packaging”, within which earnings management is a 
significant part (Aharony et al., 2000). As a result, these firms usually turn out to 
perform badly and change face quickly. For example, Guangzhou Shangpin Home 
Collection Co., Ltd, a firm listed publicly in March 2017, was issued at a price as high 
as 54.35 RMB because of its high earnings 3.15 RMB per share in financial report 
before listing. However, it changed face quickly and its performance turn out to be bad 
according to its first quarterly financial report in 2017, resulting in a loss of 0.57 RMB 
per share. Face-changing attracts the close attention of investors, regulators and the 
media since it happens frequently. To solve this problem, regulators even impose 
penalties on firms whose earnings decline by more than 50%.  
Despite repeated efforts by regulators, face-changing is still a serious problem, 
making it meaningful to test whether passive signals can really indicate the quality and 
resources of the firms thus reducing firms’ probability of face changing. I conjecture 
that firms with passive signals are less likely to change face for several reasons. First, 
passive signals has higher signal fit, which means the actual quality of the firms are 
more likely to be consistent with what is indicated in signals because of authority’s 
higher ability to identify good firms. Another reason for the high signal fit is that 
passive signal is not intentionally sent out by firms themselves but by an more 
objective authoritative party. Second, the signallers in passive signal has higher 
honesty because the authoritative entity does not receive compensations and value its 
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own reputation. Third, the bonding hypothesis of signalling theory implies that the 
reputation of government will suffer if the endorsed firms turn to perform bad, and the 
bonding system is especially obvious in passive signalling since the authoritative 
entities are more vulnerable to reputation loss. As a result, government has incentives 
to help the endorsed firms to get good performance in the long-term such as providing 
more resources like subsidies or bank loans as tested in previous two chapters. 
Therefore, it can be supposed that passive signals can imply more accessible future 
resources and are more effective in reflecting the real quality of firms, so firms with 
passive signals outperform other IPO firms in the long run in the stock market and are 
less likely to change face. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with passive signals outperform in the stock market and 
are less likely to change face. 
5.4  Research Design  
5.4.1 Data, Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
Both political endorsement and visit are examples of passive signals. However, 
the number of observations of political visits those happen before firms’ public listing 
is as small as nine, therefore the following empirical tests focus on political 
endorsement. The endorsement data covers the period from 1st January 2009 to 31st 
December 2011; this is the time period when the Chinese IPO market was more 
comparable with other global markets for several reasons. First, from 1990 to 2000, a 
strict quota system was imposed by the Chinese government on the IPO market, 
leading to limited IPO supply and high initial returns. After 2001, the quota system 
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was abandoned and a standard registration system was used, and firms now have the 
right to choose whether to go public by themselves. Therefore, the use of a registration 
system means that government intervention in the IPO market reduced after 2001. 
Second, the Chinese government has tried different IPO pricing mechanisms since 
1990, including a fixed-price system, a controlled P/E range system and an auction 
system. With the growth of institutional investors, on January 1, 2005, the Chinese 
IPO market finally adopted the commonly used book-building system, under which 
stock price is determined by market force. The book-building system means that 
institutional investors first determine the IPO price and then individual investors apply 
for shares at this price. The book-building system made the Chinese IPO market more 
comparable to other international markets (Gao, 2010). Third, the floatation reform 
was finished in late 2006, making the Chinese market more market-oriented. The 
difference between tradable and non-tradable shares is one unique feature of the 
Chinese stock market. Non-tradable shares are usually held by the government in order 
to maintain state control, and the holders of non-tradable shares are the major 
shareholders and real decision makers. As a result, non-tradable shareholders are 
inclined to harm the interests of tradable shareholders. In 2004, the Chinese market 
started a reform to unify tradable and non-tradable shares, which was completed in late 
2006. The sample period is from 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011 when the 
market was compatible with other global markets, since the book-building method was 
used for IPO pricing during this time period, and the majority of split share structure 
reform was complete. Therefore, this study on China’s IPO market is meaningful and 
comparable with studies on other markets.  
I manually collect data about political endorsement by watching the 
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government-controlled daily news program Xinwenlianbo, which serves as the 
mouthpiece of the government. Xinwenlianbo is one of the most important outlets to 
spread the government’s views and ideology, and it is broadcast daily and reaches over 
95% of the population (Jin, 2009). Firm names and endorsement dates are recorded, 
and only the endorsements that occur within one year before firms’ listing dates are 
retained. Since it’s possible for a firm to be endorsed repeatedly, I calculate 
endorsement frequency (EnF), which is equal to the number of times a firm is endorsed. 
Endorsement frequency is especially important in this study since researchers like 
Baum and Korn (1999) point out that the frequency of signal can influence its efficacy. 
IPO data is collected from China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) and CHOICE databases. The endorsement data is from 2009 to 2011, and 
we focus on firms that achieve political endorsement within one year before listing, so 
the whole sample includes firms that went public from 2009 to 2012. As shown in 
Table 5.1, after dropping firms that lack data on GICS industry codes, provinces codes 
and year, I identify 802 firms that went public during the sample period, of which 41 
achieved political endorsement before listing. Other financial and accounting data are 
also collected from CSMAR and CHOICE. Panel A of Table 5.1 shows the number 
and percentage of firms going public in different years. Years 2009 and 2010 are the 
years that more previously endorsed firms went public successfully, with 12 and 21 
firms respectively. 
Panels B and C demonstrate the distribution of IPO firms in different industry 
sectors and provinces. In Panel B, GICS code is used to identify industry sectors, and 
it shows that some industries, like industrial and financial firms, are more likely to 
achieve endorsement before listing. Panel C demonstrates the distribution of IPO firms 
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in different provinces, and shows that firms in more developed provinces are more 
likely to go public, especially firms in Guangdong (18.96%), Zhejiang (12.97%), 
Jiangsu (13.09%) and Beijing (10.97%). But more firms going public in more 
developed provinces does not necessarily mean firms in more developed provinces are 
more likely to achieve endorsement before listing. For example, only 3 out of 152 IPO 
firms in Guangdong achieved political endorsement before listing. While only eight 
firms went public in Tianjin during the sample period, three of them achieved 
endorsement.  
[Insert Table 5.1] 
5.4.2 Application Process and Success  
Propensity score matching is used to match treatment and control groups before 
testing the impact of the political endorsement on IPO market to address selection bias 
by controlling for relevant observable factors. By using propensity score matching, I 
form treatment and control groups with similar predicted likelihood of political 
endorsement since PSM can balance out the groups being compared in terms of their 
covariates. Considering the relative small observations of listed firms that achieve 
endorsement before going public (41), the treatment group is matched with their five 
nearest neighbours in order to get substantial samples for testing. However, different 
from one-to-one matching, a firm can be put into the control group multiple times. In 
other words, a firm can be one of the five nearest neighbours for different firms in the 
treatment group simultaneously. Therefore, the final sample used for regression is 
smaller than what it is supposed to be.  
Firms are matched according to a series of significant factors of IPO application, 
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valuation and performance, including leverage, firm size, firm age, connection with 
central government, previous profitability, retained equity, state shares, board quality, 
duality, reputation of underwriters and auditors, proceeds, and exchange effects (e.g. 
Bonardo et al., 2011; Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Daily 
et al., 2005). Researchers like Brealey et al. (1977) and Carter and Van Auken (1991) 
point out that more retained equity (RE) indicates that the founder or CEO perceives 
the IPO firm as having long-term potential. State shares (StateShares) and the 
connection with central government (CG)is included to control the effects of political 
connection. Since board independence (BoardQuality) can indicate the existence of an 
effective monitoring system (Daily et al., 2005) and is negatively associated with IPO 
under-pricing (Certo et al., 2001), it is also included as a matching factor. In addition, 
CEO duality (Duality) is included as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance. 
Based on Carter et al. (1998), IPO stocks supported by a reputable underwriter can 
outperform in both the short and long run, so I also match firms according to 
underwriter reputation (UnderRepu) and auditor reputation (AuditorRepu). Moreover, 
to control for a systematic influence of offering size (Carter et al., 1998), I also match 
firms according to the logarithm of proceeds (LnProceeds). Treatment and control 
groups are also matched according to the exchange firms listed (Exchange) to control 
impact brought by the choice of listing venue. Additionally, I also match samples 
according to some key firm characteristics, including leverage (Lev), firm size (Size), 
firm age (Age), previous performance (ROA), and industries (GICS). Since the factors 
mentioned above would influence IPO application, performance and valuation, and it 
is also possible that these factors will influence the possibility of endorsement 
simultaneously, I first apply PSM to match the endorsed firms with other firms based 
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on these factors to form treatment and control groups with similar ex-ante likelihood 
to be endorsed.  
Based on the matched sample, I first test the impact of political endorsement on 
the success probability of IPO application. IPO applications have to pass screening by 
the CSRC, and some criteria used by the CSRC to screen IPO candidates are too 
qualitative and vague (Yang, 2013),which makes the selection process subjective to 
some extent and gives political endorsement the opportunity to influence CSRC 
members’ decisions. The regulatory and operational risks of IPO candidates can be 
reduced after political endorsement since the government has the ability and incentive 
to carefully investigate firms before providing endorsement to protect its own 
reputation, therefore a positive association between political endorsement and the 
probability of passing the screening can be expected. Second, political endorsement 
implies a connection and more accessibility to officials, resulting in stronger lobbying 
power and a higher probability of passing the screening. This paper use the following 
model to test whether political endorsement has positive impacts on success 
probability of IPO application: 




where the dependent variable is the probability of passing the IPO screening and 
successfully going public only with one application attempt, otherwise equals zero if 
firms apply for multiple times. The main variable of interest is the endorsement 
frequency (EnF) which equals the number of times firms achieve political 
endorsement within one year before listing. To test the efficacy of passive signal, the 
endorsement frequency is more important than whether the firms are endorsed because 
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frequency of signal can influence its efficacy (Baum & Korn, 1999). Moreover, 
considering the fact that pre-IPO firms are relatively small and people are usually 
unfamiliar with and insensitive to the firm names, the more frequently firms are 
endorsed by the government, the more likely people change their valuation of IPO 
firms. Therefore, endorsement frequency is used in the regression as the main variable 
of interest. The control variables are the same set of variables used for PSM matching.  
5.4.3 Valuation at IPO 
To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the impact of political endorsement on the 
valuation at IPO, I regress the endorsement frequency on spread and initial return. 
According to researchers like Tinic (1988), investment bankers tend to set a wider 
spread of offer price in order to have the flexibility and time to find a more accurate 
offer price later if the IPO candidate is risky. If the passive signal is regarded as 
valuable and reliable in the eyes of underwriters, they will set a narrower spread in 
face of the reduced risk implied by political endorsement. Similarly, if institutional 
investors regard passive signals reliable, they tend to bid the stock and thus leading to 
less under-pricing.  
The matched sample is used to test the impact of political endorsement on 
valuation at IPO by using the following model.  




The dependent variable is IPO valuation, including IPO spread and IPO under-
pricing. Spread (Spread) is defined as the range set by investment bankers, within 
which the IPO offer price will likely reside. The spread and the final offer price directly 
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determine the amount of funds firm owners are likely to raise. According to Yang 
(2013), the width of the spread can reflect the uncertainty and risk of IPO firms. If 
passive signals are regarded as reliable by underwriters, investment bankers will 
narrow the spread due to the reduced risk implied by political endorsement. 
Under-pricing means the difference between the pre-market valuation set by 
investment bankers and the aftermarket pricing set by investors on the first day of 
public trading. Under-pricing is described by researchers like Tully (1999) as money 
left on the table by initial shareholders, because the pricing difference is wealth 
creation for first-day investors but is a loss for initial shareholders who sold equities 
to investment bankers at a price lower than the market price. Since greater under-
pricing leads to greater first-day return, these two terms are interchangeable in most of 
the literature. Therefore, I measure under-pricing using first-day return (FDreturn) and 
first-day market-adjusted return (FDadjreturn), which is defined as the percentage 
difference between the first-day closing price and the offer price, adjusted by market 
return. 
5.4.4 Post-IPO Performance 
Researchers like Yang (2013) highlight a special phenomenon in the IPO market 
– face-changing. To test Hypothesis 3 regarding the impact of political endorsement 
on post-IPO performance, the following model is established based on the matched 
sample: 




where the dependent variable is firms’ post-IPO performance. I first use buy-
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and-hold return (BHR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to measure short- and 
long-term market performance. Following the method of Michel (2014), BHR is 
calculated using weekly returns, starting from the first week of IPO and ending 1, 2, 3, 
4 or 5 years after listing, or ending on the delisting date, whichever is earlier. And then 
BHR is adjusted for the industry BHR. I exclude firms for which I didn’t find weekly 
returns after one month of listing. CAR is another proxy for market performance. 
Abnormal return is calculated as the excess return over market return.  
Another aspect of post-IPO performance is firm operating performance. Like 
previous researchers such as Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D'souza and Megginson 
(1999), Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994) and Sun and Tong (2003), I use 
accounting figures to measure operating performance. To make the results robust, 
different measurements are used. First, following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007)’s 
method, this paper uses performance change which refers to the difference in 
performance between the two-year average after IPO and the two -year average before 
public listing, including change in return on asset (ΔROA), change in return on sales 
(ΔROS) and change in operating margin (ΔOM).  
5.5  Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 Results for Application Process and Success 
Before testing Hypothesis 1 that passive signals like political endorsement can 
efficaciously influence the views of IPO regulators, thus having positive impact on 
IPO application success, the descriptive statistics on application success for endorsed 
firms are shown in Table 5.2. Panel A is related to firms that only submitted an 
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application once. It shows that 38 out of 41 endorsed firms passed the screening and 
successfully went public after only one application attempt. It is noteworthy that Row 
(2) of Table 5.2 demonstrates that 8 endorsed firms had already passed screening 
before achieving political endorsement, but their listing date is later than their 
endorsement dates. Therefore, I exclude these eight firms when I test the impact on the 
probability of passing the screening.  
Panel B includes firms that submitted a listing application multiple times. As 
shown in Row (3), two firms failed to pass the screening initially, but successfully 
went public when they applied a second time after achieving political endorsement. 
Moreover, Row (4) shows that only one firm failed to pass the screening after 
endorsement, and this firm failed twice consecutively. After excluding the eight firms 
that passed the screening before endorsement, it shows that 32 out of 33 (97%) firms 
passed the screening successfully after endorsement, thus indicating that political 
endorsement can increase the success probability of IPO.  
[Insert Table 5.2] 
PSM is applied to control for selection on observables. The mean test in Table 5.3 
shows that endorsed and non-endorsed IPO firms are significantly different in some 
firm characteristics. For example, IPO candidates with endorsement have larger firm 
size. One concern is that these observable firm characteristics will influence IPO 
application and the possibility of endorsement at the same time. PSM can reduce this 
concern by forming treatment and control groups with similar likelihood of achieving 
political endorsement. Table 5.4 Column (1) shows the first-step of propensity score 
matching. In PSM for this section, I exclude the eight firms that passed the screening 
before endorsement (shown in Row 2 of Table 5.2), and the two firms that were refused 
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before the endorsement but passed after (shown in Row 3 of Table 5.2) because it is 
possible that these two firms passed at their second application because they learned 
from the previous experience, so their pass cannot totally reflect the effects of political 
endorsement. Therefore, this section excludes 10 firms when I match firms to test the 
impact on IPO application, and the number of firms in the treatment group is 31. After 
one-to-five match, the total sample size is 174. As mentioned previously, in one-to-
multiple matching, a firm can be one of the five nearest neighbours for different firms 
in the treatment group simultaneously, so the sample size is bit smaller than 6 times 
31. However, an advantage of putting selected non-endorsed firms back to the pool is 
to ensure a better balance between the groups being compared in terms of their 
covariates 
 [Insert Table 5.3 and 5.4] 
Based on the matched sample, Table 5.5 shows that firms with political 
endorsement are more likely to pass the IPO screening and successfully go public with 
only one application attempt (β=0.459, Marginal Effect=0.078, P=0.057), meaning 
that every additional political endorsement increases the probability of going public 
with only one application attempt by 7.8%. These results support the first hypothesis 
that political endorsement, as a passive signal, is effective in influencing CSRC 
regulators, thus imposing positive impact on the chance of IPO success.  
 [Insert Table 5.5] 
5.5.2 Results for Valuation at IPO 
This section tests Hypothesis 2 about the impact of political endorsement on 
valuation at IPO. I rematch the sample by adding the ten firms excluded in the previous 
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section back to the pool to expand sample. Table 5.4 Column (2) shows the first-step 
of propensity score matching of this section. Based on the matched sample, Table 5.6 
tests the impact of political endorsement on IPO valuation. Column (1) shows that 
every additional endorsement can motivate investment bankers to narrower the offer 
price spread by 1.96 RMB (P=0.017), which supports Hypothesis 2 that political 
endorsement can convey reliable information to enhance information transparency and 
reduce firm risk, thus motivating underwriters to set a narrower spread. Column (2) 
tests IPO under-pricing. The results show that each additional political endorsement 
can reduce the first-day return by 2.1%. In Column (3), the market-adjusted first-return 
is tested as a robustness check, and the results are consistent with Column (2), which 
supports the hypothesis that political endorsement can convince underwriters and 
institutional investors about the quality of the firm, thus having negative impact on 
under-pricing.  
[Insert Table 5.6] 
5.5.3 Results for Aftermarket Valuation 
This section tests whether endorsed firms outperform other firms in the market 
and are less likely to change face after IPO. The results in Table 5.7 demonstrate that 
political endorsement has a significant positive correlation with almost all CAR and 
BHR over 1 to 5 years after endorsement. For example, Columns (3) and (8) show that 
the 3-year CAR and BHR are 4.4% (P=0.006) and 4.5% (P=0.016) significantly higher 
if firms get one more endorsement before listing.  
 [Insert Table 5.7] 
The results for face-changing are shown in Table 5.8, which provides supporting 
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evidence for Hypothesis 3 that politically endorsed firms are less likely to change face 
because the passive signal has higher signal fit and the government has higher signal 
honesty which ensures the quality of the endorsed firms. Results in Tables 8 
demonstrate that endorsement frequency is positively associated with performance 
change in ROA, ROS and OM, demonstrating that endorsed firms outperform their 
counterparts in the market and are less likely to change face after IPO. 
[Insert Table 5.8] 
5.6 Conclusion 
Signalling theory is well-researched in literature; however, no study has ever paid 
attention to “passive signals”, where firms lose control of the signal issuing decision 
and the signal content, with a main purpose to stimulate the whole economy rather 
than helping individual firms. To fill these gaps, this paper introduces political 
endorsement and visits as a new setting to examine the effects of passive signals.  
This paper proposes that passive signals are more influential in guiding the 
public because they have higher signal honesty, signal fit and signal observability, and 
are less likely to be manipulated by firms. Moreover, the authoritative signaller in 
passive signal can transfer and certificate cultural, resource and moral legitimacy, as 
well as indicate more potential accessible resources. Political visit and endorsement 
are two setting can be used to test the effects of passive signals. Due to the small 
number of observations of political visits before firms’ public listing, this paper 
empirically focuses on political endorsement. The results find that political 
endorsement, as a passive signal, can influence the evaluation of IPO regulators: each 
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additional political endorsement a firm achieves can increase endorsed firms’ success 
probability in the IPO market by 7.8%. Moreover, the results demonstrate that passive 
signals can influence institutional investors and partners like underwriters, resulting in 
reduced offer price spread and lower under-pricing. Furthermore, passive signals are 
also proved be positively associated with CAR and BHR over one to five years 
following IPO. Besides the contributions to signalling theory and literature on 
entrepreneurship, this paper also complements literature on IPO, since previous 
literature mainly focuses on the regulatory power of the government or on political 
connections, while political endorsement is a way in which the government acts as a 
market pusher by sending signals to guide the public without using its regulatory power. 
The findings of this study also have implications for policy makers regarding how to 
more efficiently allocate resources. Although some anecdotal evidence shows that 
political endorsement is a great honour for firms, no study empirically investigates the 
real impact, especially in the IPO market. The results show that firms with political 
endorsement outperform counterparts both in the short and long term, which indicates 
to policy makers that their political endorsements are effective in triggering dramatic 
reactions. As mentioned before, the purpose of political endorsement is to stimulate 
the whole economy; therefore, policy makers can consider more valuable criteria to 
select firms to provide endorsements so as to allocate resources more efficiently to the 
firms that deserve it. 
Although different measurements of dependent variables and PSM have been 
used to make the results more reliable, this study still has some limitations, which 
future studies can try to test. First, the sample is relatively small due to the time-
consuming manual data collection process. I collected 41 firms that achieved political 
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endorsement before listing from 2009 to 2011 by watching the daily government-
controlled news program, and then matched these 41 firms with their five nearest 
neighbours. Future studies can try to expand the time period and sample size to test 
whether the results are robust. Second, I tested the effects of passive signals by using 
political endorsement as an example. Future research can try other forms of passive 
signals like political visits to see whether the effects are as strong as those of political 
endorsement. Additionally, future research can test the generalised effects of political 
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Table 5.1 : Descriptive Statistics for IPO and Endorsed Firms 
 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of IPO and Endorsed firms during 2009 to 
2012. The distributions of listing years, industry sectors, and provinces of IPO firms 
are shown in Panel A, B and C respectively. Firms are regarded as endorsed if the firm 
achieve political endorsement within one year before its public listing. Industry sector 












Total listed firms 
 Firms achieved 
Endorsements within 1 
year before listing 
 N %  N % 
Panel A: By year      
2009 99 12.34%  12 29.27% 
2010 349 43.52%  21 51.22% 
2011 282 35.16%  7 17.07% 
2012 72 8.98%  1 2.44% 
 802   41  
Panel B: By industry Sector 
10 Energy 18 2.24%  0 0.00% 
15 Materials 129 16.08%  1 2.44% 








30 Consumer Staples 43 5.36%  0 0.00% 
35 Health Care 64 7.98%  3 7.32% 















55 Utilities 9 1.12%  0 0.00% 
  802   41  
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Table 5.1 : Descriptive Statistics for IPO and Endorsed firms (Cont.) 
 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of IPO and Endorsed firms during 2009 to 
2012. The distributions of listing years, industry sectors, and provinces of IPO firms 
are shown in Panel A, B and C respectively. Firms are regarded as endorsed if the firm 
achieve political endorsement within one year before its public listing. Industry sector 
is coded according to the GICS code of firms. 
 
 
Panel C By Province Shenzhen/Shanghai 
Exchange 
Total listed firms 
 Firms achieved 
Endorsements within 
1 year before listing 
 N %  N % 
1 Beijing  88 10.97%  11 26.83% 
2 Tianjin 8 1.00%  3 7.32% 
3 Hebei 14 1.75%  2 4.88% 
4 Shanxi 5 0.62%  0 0.00% 
5 Neimenggu 3 0.37%  0 0.00% 
6 Liaoning 14 1.75%  2 4.88% 
7 Jilin 7 0.87%  1 2.44% 
8 Heilongjiang 5 0.62%  1 2.44% 
9 Shanghai 45 5.61%  2 4.88% 
10 Jiangsu 105 13.09%  2 4.88% 
11 Zhejiang 104 12.97%  4 9.76% 
12 Anhui 21 2.62%  1 2.44% 
13 Fujian 30 3.74%  1 2.44% 
14 Jiangxi 6 0.75%  0 0.00% 
15 Shandong 54 6.73%  3 7.32% 
16 Henan 26 3.24%  0 0.00% 
17 Hubei 19 2.37%  0 0.00% 
18 Hunan 25 3.12%  2 4.88% 
19 Guangdong 152 18.95%  3 7.32% 
20 Guangxi 4 0.50%  0 0.00% 
21 Hainan 6 0.75%  0 0.00% 
22 Chongqing 9 1.12%  1 2.44% 
23 Sichuan 25 3.12%  1 2.44% 
24 Guizhou 3 0.37%  0 0.00% 
25 Yunnan 2 0.25%  0 0.00% 
26 Xizang 2 0.25%  0 0.00% 
27 Shannxi 8 1.00%  1 2.44% 
28 Gansu 4 0.50%  0 0.00% 
29 Qinghai 2 0.25%  0 0.00% 
30 Ningxia 1 0.12%  0 0.00% 




Table 5.2 : Descriptive Statistics for IPO Application Success  
 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for IPO application success for endorsed firms. Panel A is related to firms only submitted 
application once. Panel B includes firms who submitted IPO applications for multiple times. 
 
 
  # of Endorsed 
firms 
Application No. 
 Panel A:Single application   
(1) Pass after endorsement 30 1 
(2) Passed before Endorsement, but was listed publicly after endorsement. 8 1 
    
 Panel B: Multiple applications   
(3) Being refused before, but passed after endorsement 2 2 
(4) Applied after endorsement, and was refused consecutively 1 2 






Table 5.3 : Compare Endorsed and Non-endorsed Firms 
 
This table presents the mean differences between endorsed and non-endorsed firms, 




Variables Non-endorsed Endorsed Mean Difference 
Lev 0.443 0.546 -0.103** 
Size 19.53 20.99 -1.463*** 
Age 8.848 6.732 2.117** 
CG 0.008 0.098 -0.089* 
ROA 0.090 0.056 0.034*** 
RE 0.309 0.138 0.172*** 
StateShare 0.021 0.139 -0.118** 
BoardQuality 0.336 0.348 -0.0120 
Duality 0.446 0.250 0.196*** 
LnProceeds 11.10 12.35 -1.250*** 
AuditorRepu 0.027 0.122 -0.095* 
UnderRepu 0.217 0.146 0.0700 
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Table 5.4 : PSM 
This table shows the results for propensity score matching, where the dependent 
variable is Endorse, which equals one if the firms are endorsed by government within 
one year before public listing, and zero otherwise. I match the treatment and control 
groups according to a series of significant factors of IPO application, valuation and 
performance, including pre-IPO leverage (Lev), firm size (Size), state shares 
(StateShare), previous profitability (ROA), firm age (Age), whether the controlling 
shareholder is central government (CG), retained equity (RE), board quality 
(BoardQuality), duality (Duality), reputation of underwriters and auditors (UnderRepu 
& AuditorRepu), logarithm of net proceeds (LnProceeds), exchange effects 
(Exchange), and industry effects (Industry). The definitions of all variables are shown 
in Appendix. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Endorse Endorse 
Lev -1.650** -1.631** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
Size 0.267* 0.226 
 (0.072) (0.117) 
Age 0.005 0.007 
 (0.829) (0.749) 
CG 0.847 1.059 
 (0.306) (0.145) 
ROA -9.243*** -8.688*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
RE -0.642 -0.630 
 (0.193) (0.194) 
StateShare 0.477 0.451 
 (0.441) (0.460) 
BoardQuality 2.681 2.174 
 (0.152) (0.192) 
Duality -0.095 -0.106 
 (0.679) (0.639) 
LnProceeds 0.653*** 0.704*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
AuditorRepu -0.736 -0.746 
 (0.308) (0.228) 
UnderRepu -0.308 -0.327 
 (0.290) (0.251) 
Industry Y Y 
Exchange Y Y 
Constant -14.173*** -13.506*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 621 621 





Table 5.5 : Impact on IPO Application  
 
This table tests the impact of political endorsement on the success probability of IPO. 
The dependent variable is the probability of passing the IPO screening and go public 
successfully only with one application attempt, which equals one if the IPO candidates 
pass the screening only with one application attempt, and zero if with multiple 
application attempts. The main variable of interest is EnF, which refers to endorsement 
frequency and equals the number of times firms achieve political endorsement within 
one year before listing. The definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. 



































Table 5.6 : Impact on Valuation at IPO 
 
This table shows the impact of political endorsement on the valuation at IPO based on 
the matched sample. Offer price spread and underpricing are two aspects of IPO 
valuation. In column (1), the dependent variable is Spread, which equals the range set 
by investment bankers within which the IPO offering price will likely reside. The 
dependent variables in column (2) and (3) are two different measurements of 
underpricing. First-day return (FDreturn) and first-day market-adjusted return 
(FDadjreturn). FDreturn is defined as the percentage difference between the first-day 
closing price and the offer price, and FDadjreturn adjusted the first-day return by 
market return. The main variable of interest in this table is the endorsement frequency 
(EnF), which means the number of times firms achieve political endorsement within 
one year before listing. The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. 
*,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
 Spread  FDreturn FDadjreturn 
EnF -1.960**  -0.021* -0.021* 
 (0.017)  (0.097) (0.081) 
Lev -7.676  -0.732*** -0.567*** 
 (0.439)  (0.001) (0.003) 
Size -3.023  0.130*** 0.093*** 
 (0.133)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Age -0.256  -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.155)  (0.352) (0.365) 
CG 12.980  0.269 0.308 
 (0.229)  (0.140) (0.116) 
ROA 19.042  -1.134* -0.883 
 (0.534)  (0.054) (0.114) 
RE 4.678  -0.108 -0.104 
 (0.269)  (0.287) (0.273) 
StateShare -11.205**  0.407** 0.386** 
 (0.029)  (0.012) (0.012) 
BoardQuality -16.182  -0.309 -0.367 
 (0.246)  (0.298) (0.212) 
Duality 1.289  -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.516)  (0.884) (0.946) 
LnProceeds 11.016***  -0.216*** -0.188*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
AuditorRepu 5.046  -0.100 -0.075 
 (0.612)  (0.439) (0.545) 
UnderRepu 1.312  -0.066 -0.061 
 (0.630)  (0.239) (0.242) 
Industry Y  Y Y 
Exchange Y  Y Y 
Constant -42.449  0.825 1.258* 
 (0.304)  (0.223) (0.062) 
N 228  228 228 
R2 0.550  0.227 0.214 
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Table 5.7 : Impact on Post-IPO Valuation – Market Performance 
 
This table shows the impact of political endorsement on post-IPO market performance based on matched sample. Buy-and-hold return 
(BHR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are used to measure short- and long- term market performance. BHR is calculated using 
weekly returns, starting from the first week of IPO and ending 1,2,3,4 or 5 years after listing, or ending on the delisting date, whichever 
is earlier. And then BHR is adjusted for the industry BHR. I exclude firms which I didn’t find weekly returns after one month of listing. 
CAR is calculated as the excess return over the market return. The main variable of interest in this table is the endorsement frequency 
(EnF), which means the number of times firms achieve political endorsement within one year before listing. The detailed definitions of 
all variables are shown in Appendix 1. *,**,*** denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 CAR  BHR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y  1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 
EnF 0.027** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.066** 0.037  0.030** 0.035*** 0.045** 0.239 0.191** 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.447)  (0.013) (0.002) (0.016) (0.139) (0.043) 
Lev 0.148 0.324 0.513* 0.427 0.699  0.177 0.508 0.726 1.289 0.941 
 (0.358) (0.169) (0.059) (0.178) (0.193)  (0.274) (0.173) (0.132) (0.161) (0.197) 
Size -0.029 -0.073* -0.125** -0.161*** -0.049  -0.033 -0.072** -0.105** -0.222 -0.299* 
 (0.310) (0.057) (0.011) (0.008) (0.768)  (0.245) (0.039) (0.036) (0.183) (0.079) 
Age -0.001 0.004 0.011 0.012 0.007  0.000 0.005 0.013 0.035 0.029 
 (0.701) (0.456) (0.152) (0.199) (0.551)  (0.974) (0.414) (0.182) (0.160) (0.313) 
CG -0.047 -0.004 -0.016 0.127 -0.123  -0.004 -0.036 0.091 0.314 0.072 
 (0.694) (0.980) (0.960) (0.771) (0.781)  (0.976) (0.827) (0.698) (0.728) (0.949) 
ROA -0.034 0.187 -0.787 -0.017 0.663  0.060 0.970 -0.365 1.014 2.379 
 (0.946) (0.807) (0.370) (0.987) (0.714)  (0.903) (0.239) (0.725) (0.669) (0.489) 
RE -0.060 -0.097 -0.040 -0.069 0.749  -0.023 -0.040 -0.156 -0.945 -0.149 
 (0.465) (0.450) (0.785) (0.695) (0.304)  (0.771) (0.752) (0.348) (0.111) (0.754) 
StateShare 0.040 0.332*** 0.298 0.288 0.456  0.135 0.378** 0.327 0.887 0.959 
 (0.716) (0.008) (0.109) (0.265) (0.162)  (0.334) (0.011) (0.176) (0.229) (0.122) 
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BoardQuality 0.699*** 0.593 1.197** 1.389** -0.672  0.836*** 0.542 0.747 1.007 3.212* 
 (0.005) (0.120) (0.017) (0.022) (0.734)  (0.003) (0.212) (0.228) (0.482) (0.052) 
Duality -0.068* -0.073 -0.107 -0.072 0.211  -0.063 -0.064 -0.081 0.142 -0.221 
 (0.086) (0.253) (0.182) (0.428) (0.535)  (0.122) (0.364) (0.423) (0.619) (0.402) 
LnProceeds -0.041 -0.105** -0.150** -0.170** -0.135  -0.009 -0.073 -0.143* -0.388** -0.519** 
 (0.298) (0.048) (0.035) (0.042) (0.403)  (0.832) (0.193) (0.074) (0.040) (0.019) 
AuditorRepu 0.012 0.082 0.195 0.278 0.152  -0.066 0.059 0.146 0.140 0.863* 
 (0.914) (0.580) (0.261) (0.242) (0.773)  (0.584) (0.656) (0.379) (0.824) (0.087) 
UnderRepu 0.077 0.171** 0.232** 0.205* -0.112  0.057 0.080 0.160 0.199 0.365 
 (0.181) (0.041) (0.013) (0.081) (0.726)  (0.379) (0.356) (0.180) (0.439) (0.241) 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Exchange Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.869 2.389*** 3.771*** 4.626*** 2.274  0.514 1.765** 3.174*** 7.392** 10.093*** 
 (0.161) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.609)  (0.448) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.002) 
N 228 228 228 228 228  228 228 228 228 228 








Table 5.8 : Impact on Post-IPO Valuation – Operating Performance 
 
This table shows the impact of political endorsement on post-IPO operating 
performance based on matched sample. From Columns (1) to (3), dependent variables 
are change in return on asset (ΔROA), change in return on sales (ΔROS) and change in 
operating margin (ΔOM). ‘Change’ refers to the difference between the two-year 
average after IPO and the two -year average before public listing. ROA is the ratio of 
net income to the average of ending total assets in this and last years. ROS means the 
ratio of net income to total sales. OM equals the ratio of EBIT to sales. The main 
variable of interest in this table is the endorsement frequency (EnF), which means the 
number of times firms achieve political endorsement within one year before listing. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix. *,**,*** denote the 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔROA ΔROS ΔOM 
EnF 0.010*** 0.033** 0.030* 
 (0.010) (0.046) (0.081) 
Lev -0.097** -0.326** -0.293** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.047) 
Size 0.003 -0.033* -0.039* 
 (0.702) (0.068) (0.060) 
Age 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.530) (0.128) (0.305) 
CG 0.046* 0.173*** 0.176** 
 (0.068) (0.005) (0.031) 
ROA -0.166 -0.008 0.120 
 (0.194) (0.976) (0.700) 
RE -0.004 -0.036 -0.061 
 (0.828) (0.478) (0.281) 
StateShare -0.021 0.089 0.085 
 (0.580) (0.444) (0.516) 
BoardQuality 0.031 -0.120 -0.132 
 (0.745) (0.545) (0.567) 
Duality -0.027*** -0.055** -0.058** 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.039) 
LnProceeds 0.011 0.033 0.043 
 (0.257) (0.235) (0.183) 
AuditorRepu -0.025 0.168* 0.186* 
 (0.470) (0.086) (0.098) 
UnderRepu -0.005 0.033 0.033 
 (0.800) (0.362) (0.413) 
Industry Y Y Y 
Exchange Y Y Y 
Constant -0.142 0.253 0.248 
 (0.377) (0.469) (0.527) 
N 228 228 228 





Table A5.1 : Variable Definition 
 
Main variable of 
interest 
 
Endorse Dummy variable. If the firm is endorsed by government within 
one year before listing, equal 1, and otherwise zero. 
EnF Endorsement frequency. Equals the number of times a firm 




Pro(pass)  The probability of passing the IPO screening and go public 
successfully, which equals to one if the IPO candidates pass the 
screening only with one application attempt, and zero if with 
multiple application attempts. 
Spread Equals the range set by investment bankers within which the 
IPO offering price will likely reside. 
FDreturn First-day return is the percentage difference between the first-
day closing price and the offer price. 
FDadjreturn First-day market-adjusted return is defined as the percentage 
difference between the first-day closing price and the offer price, 
and then adjusted by market return. 
BHR Buy-and-hold return. BHR is calculated using weekly returns, 
starting from the first week of IPO and ending 1,2,3,4 or 5 years 
after the listing, or ending on the delisting date, whichever is 
earlier. And then BHR is adjusted for market BHR to calculate 
BHR. I exclude firms which I didn’t find weekly returns after 
one month of listing. 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return, which is calculated as the excess 
return over the market return. 
ΔROA Change in ROA. The difference between the two-year average 
ROA after IPO and the two-year average before public listing. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to the average of ending total 
assets in this and last years. 
ΔROS Change in ROS. The difference between the two -year average 
ROS after IPO and the two-year average before public listing. 
ROS means the ratio of net income to total sales.  
ΔOM Change in OM. The difference between the two-year average 
OM after IPO and the two-year average before public listing. 
OM equals to the ratio of EBIT to sales. 
Control variables  
Lev Leverage one year before listing, refers to the ratio of total 
liability to total assets. 
Size Logarithm of total sales one year before listing 
ROA Return on asset one year before listing 
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Age  Years since establishment. 
CG Equals one if the controlling shareholder of the firm is central 
government, and zero otherwise. 
RE Retained equity, means the percentage of shares executives 
retain post-IPO. 
StateShare The percentage of shares held by state one year before listing. 
BoardQuality Board quality, is measured as the percentage of independent 
directors in board. 
Duality A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO is also the chair 
of the board. 
LnProceeds Logarithm of net proceeds 
UnderRepu Underwriter reputation, equals one if the leading underwriter of 
the IPO candidate wins the top 5 in market shares, and zero 
otherwise. 
AuditorRepu Auditor reputation, equals one if the IPO firm use a “Big Four” 
accounting firm, including Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PWC, and 
zero otherwise. 
Exchange Exchange effects, to control impact brought by the choice of 
listing venue. 










Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the role of the government in the market and mainly 
contributes to existing literature on the role of government (e.g.Frye & Shleifer, 1996; 
Gerschenkron, 1962; Krueger, 1974; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) by examining two 
under-researched ways in which governments affect financial markets. First, through 
testing a sample of endorsed firms in Chapter 3, results reveal that political 
endorsement is positively correlated with market reactions and firm performance. 
Moreover, the results show that political endorsement for less-connected firms and for 
those perform weakly are more valuable, as these firms lack reputation and legitimacy. 
Because of the easier access to external funds after endorsement, the value of 
endorsement for firms that heavily depend on external financing are more significant. 
Furthermore, political endorsement has greater impact on firms located in provinces 
with strong institutions. The results of Chapter 3 are consistent with the development 
view (Arthur Lewis, 1945; Gerschenkron, 1962; Hawtrey, 1926) which supports the 
government’s positive role in the market, and also provides supporting evidence for 
the helping-hand model of government (Sun & Tong, 2003). Besides complementing 
literature on the role of government, Chapter 3 also fills the gaps in literature on 
endorsement, which mainly tests endorsement in the field of marketing, such as 
celebrity endorsements (Farrell, Karels, Montfort, & McClatchey, 2000; Khatri, 2006), 
typical customer endorsements (Freiden, 1984) and expert endorsements (Fireworker 
& Friedman, 1977). Through testing the effects of political endorsement in the 
securities market, this chapter extends the literature by introducing the concept of 
endorsement into finance and shifting attention to a new type of endorsers – the 
government. Moreover, this chapter supplements literature which points out the 
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certification effects provided by financial organisations like venture capitals (Milanov 
& Shepherd, 2013) or auditors (Beatty, 1989) by investigating political endorsement, 
which is ignored in existing literature.  
Second, this thesis studies political visits in Chapter 4 based on a sample of firms 
who were visited by Chinese state leaders from 2009 to 2016. The results suggest that 
political visit is an efficient tool the government can use to help firms enhance value, 
both in the form of market reactions and operating performance, contingent on various 
firm and institutional features. Moreover, this chapter identifies the key criteria the 
government uses to choose which firms to visit, and differentiates the effects of visits 
by government leaders with different amounts of political power, and also compares 
different administrations, which particularly contributes to the paper of Li, Tsang, Luo, 
and Ying (2016) and Schuler, Shi, Hoskisson, and Chen (2017). Furthermore, the 
results show that firms will change their CSR behaviour after political visits from state 
leaders, and these results contribute to literature on CSR by pointing out that political 
visit can be substituted as a source of legitimacy and demotivate firms to contribute to 
CSR. 
Finally, this thesis employs the concept of political endorsement and political 
visits as examples of passive signals to extend existing signalling theory in Chapter 5. 
By testing the effects of political endorsement under an IPO setting, this chapter finds 
that passive signals are still valued by investors even under circumstances with high 
information asymmetry when investors carefully screen information. Their passive 
nature distinguishes passive signals like political endorsement and visits from other 
signals investigated in existing literature, which enables them to serve as a reliable cue 
to combat information asymmetry. The results demonstrate that passive signals can 
249 
 
affect every aspect of IPO, including having positive impact on the success probability 
of the IPO application through influencing the views of regulators, narrowing IPO 
offer price spread and lowering initial returns through affecting the ideas of investment 
bankers as well as those of institutional and individual investors. Furthermore, I find 
that IPO firms with passive signals witness higher cumulative abnormal return and 
industry-adjusted buy-and-hold return, and also outperform their counterparts in the 
long run. This chapter largely contributes to the literature on signalling theory, as 
existing literature is mainly restricted to intentional signals sent out by firms 
themselves, like board prestige (Certo, 2003) and firm names (Lee, 2001). Furthermore, 
the results show that the passive nature of signals indicates higher reliability, which 
complements literature on determinants of signal efficacy (e.g. BliegeBird et al., 2005; 
Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010). Moreover, this chapter is also closely 
related to literature on entrepreneurship, as the results suggest that political 
endorsement is a new strategy that the government and firms can use to increase the 
success probability of new ventures, besides strategic alliance (Gulati, 1998) and 
prestigious association (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & 
Hambrick, 2010) discussed in existing literature. Finally, this chapter also adds value 
to literature on IPO by re-examining the government’s role in the IPO market from the 
perspective of a market pusher rather than a regulator (e.g. Gao, 2010). 
Besides the contributions to literature discussed above, this thesis also provides 
practical implications for governments and companies. First, the results from Chapters 
3 to 5 provide implications for government on how to affect the market and help 
allocate resources more efficiently. Although some anecdotal evidence shows that 
political endorsement and political visits are a great honour for firms, few study 
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empirically investigates the real impact. The results of this thesis show that political 
visits and political endorsement can efficiently help both listed firms and new ventures 
add value both in the short and long run, which means political visits and endorsement 
can serve as efficient tools for the government to fulfil its helping-hand function in 
China. One practical implication is that the government, in future, can make full use 
of political endorsement and visits to guide resource allocation. For example, the 
government can help private firms gain more resources if they want to develop the 
private sector by endorsing or visiting more private enterprises. Second, considering 
the positive impact of political endorsement and visits on market reactions and firm 
performance, one implication for the companies is to strengthen the aspects that are 
favoured by government in order to increase the probability of endorsing and visiting, 
and also try to publicize the political endorsement and visits once they achieved it to 
maximize the positive impact. Third, the results from Chapter 5, about the impact of 
political endorsement on the IPO market, indicate a new method new ventures can use 
to increase their survival probability besides the common strategies used by new 
ventures to overcome the liability of newness such as strategic alliance (Gulati, 1998) 
and association with prestigious parties like VCs (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013). 
This thesis remains a fruitful area for future research. First, due to limitation in 
data availability, this thesis tests political endorsement and political visit in the Chinese 
market. As discussed in previous chapters, political endorsement and political visits 
exist widely in both developed and developing countries. Therefore, generalised 
effects in different markets can be tested in future research. Second, Chapter 5 regards 
political endorsement and visits as an example of a passive signal, and future research 
can try to find more kinds of passive signals and compare their effects with those of 
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political endorsement. Third, the sample size for Chapter 5, where this thesis tests the 
impact of endorsement on the IPO market, is relatively small, and this thesis did not 
empirically test the impact of political visit on IPO market because the number of 
observations for firms hosting political visits before listing is too limited. Future 
studies can try to expand the time period and sample size to test whether the results 
are robust. Fourth, since Chapter 4 indicates that political visits can increase firms’ 
resources and are positively correlated with firms’ future performance, executives can 
be benefited through political visits. Moreover, one possible reason for the positive 
correlation between political visit and earnings management in section 4.9.2 is because 
the increased job security and privileges brought by political connection after visits 
decrease the accountability of managers. Therefore, examining the career development 
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